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Summary:  
 
Traditional journalism is facing a broad crisis encompassing its 
economic foundation, its social legitimacy, a transformed technological 
environment and changing audience expectations and practices. Given the 
privileged position traditionally afforded to journalism in Western liberal 
democracies, there is great concern about what these changes might mean for 
political participation, as well as for longstanding media businesses.  
 
Against this background this thesis provides an investigation into the 
changing political conditions that shape the operation of journalism as a 
cultural technology. Under the economic politics of advanced liberalism, 
journalism is being reshaped around increasingly financial objectives. Two 
Australian cases, The Age Online – the online version of a daily broadsheet 
newspaper – and Crikey, an online-only daily news email – are used to explore 
the relationship between the dominant contemporary economic politics and the 
current changes affecting news and journalism. The discussion is structured 
into four key areas: the changing political role of journalism; the 
professionalisation of journalism and the opposite but associated move towards 
more ‘authentic’ forms of (often, user generated) content; the changing news 
audience; and the centrality of the news ‘business model’ to discussions about 
the future of journalism.  
 
 viii 
 At a time when changes to the news industry are being viewed with 
equal measures of concern and optimism, this thesis provides a 
conceptualisation of journalism’s changing political role that moves beyond the 
limitations of the ‘fourth estate’ rhetoric. By positioning journalism as a 
historically shaped cultural technology, it is possible to account for these 
changes without an appeal to a bygone era, while also taking of stock of those 
elements of ‘traditional’ journalism we might hope to maintain in the future.  
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Introduction 
 
In August 2009 an article appeared in The Sunday Age newspaper, 
weighing the chances of journalism’s survival (Hyland, 2009). The problem, 
argues journalist Tom Hyland, is that the news industry is “cannibalising itself” 
– a phrase coined by Rupert Murdoch to describe the practice of providing free 
news content online when it is produced at a great cost. As Hyland 
acknowledges, “[Murdoch] should know”. Elaborating on the problem, Hyland 
argues that newspapers are losing money, mostly through the loss of advertising 
as its rivers of gold – the classified advertising that once paid the cost of 
journalism’s production – are drying up. Adding to these woes, print journalism 
is also losing readers, and online readers bring in less profit than their print 
counterparts. The result is not only the contraction of advertising-funded space 
for journalism, but also the jobs of people who make it. Hyland quotes the US 
blog, Paper Cuts, to report that more than 12,480 jobs have been lost in the US 
in 2009 alone. In the UK more than 60 local papers closed between 2008 and 
2009. In France the government is pumping millions of euros into the 
newspaper industry and subsidising subscriptions for 18-year-olds in the hope 
of reviving the struggling business and creating a new, younger market for 
news. In the UK, the US, France, and a range of other Western liberal 
democracies, including Australia, newspaper journalism is in crisis.  
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This matters to Rupert Murdoch because if his newspapers are 
cannibalising themselves, what they are eating is the source of his profits. As 
Hyland reports in 2009, Murdoch announced a $US3.4 billion loss for his 
global news business, News Corporation. For Murdoch, journalism’s future is 
measured, in large part, in dollars. For others this cannibalisation elicits 
another sort of concern: one to do with what journalism does for societies. 
Hyland cites former journalist David Simon, who is now best known for his 
work as writer and producer of the television series The Wire, expressing his 
concern about the death of what he calls “high-end journalism”. What worries 
Simon are the implications for democratic processes and participation. He 
argues that the informed reporting and scrutiny of public institutions that has 
traditionally been provided by high-end journalism is vanishing, and “unless a 
new economic model is achieved, it will not be reborn on the web or anywhere 
else”.  
 
Simon’s call for a “new economic model” is a familiar refrain for those 
engaged in debates about journalism’s uncertain future. It is also suggestive of 
the way in which different players in these debates attempt to locate a singular 
source of journalism’s woes. For Simon, it is the deterioration of the economic 
model that underpins journalism’s production that most threatens its future. So 
too for Michael Gawenda, former editor-in-chief of The Age and director of 
Melbourne University’s Centre for the Advanced Study of Journalism – and 
another expert cited by Hyland – who argues that “the fundamental problem is 
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that what once paid for journalism in newspapers no longer pays for it”. For 
Simon, Gawenda, Murdoch and many like them in the media industry, it is the 
economic model – or more commonly, the business model – that is both the 
source of the problem that journalism is facing but also, if the right model is 
found, the source of its redemption.  
 
Among the experts Hyland sources for his article, Margaret Simons and 
Eric Beecher have become two of the more prominent voices in the discussions 
surrounding the practice of journalism and its future development in Australia. 
For Simons, who is a journalist, blogger, and the chair of Swinburne 
University’s Public Interest Journalism Foundation, the problem with 
journalism can be related to economic problems, but not necessarily the 
business model. Rather, Simons argues that it has been the short-term focus of 
news proprietors on their net profits (or bottom line) and share prices – rather 
than on journalism itself – that has crippled newspaper journalism in Australia. 
She argues, “the credibility of journalism is being mined all the time in an 
attempt to sustain large profits for as long as possible”. Eric Beecher, publisher 
of Crikey and former editor of The Sydney Morning Herald, agrees with Simons that 
part of the problem is credibility: “the credibility of the media generally, 
including the quality media, has never been lower and it keeps ratcheting 
down, therefore there is no public debate about this issue”. Beecher has 
positioned himself as a vocal critic of the mainstream media, and as an expert 
voice on matters to do with journalism’s future in Australia. For him, the 
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problem encompasses the changing news business model, but chiefly as it 
threatens the continued existence of “public trust journalism in Australia” – or, 
the journalism that fulfils the traditional fourth estate role many see as the 
primary function of the news media, and particularly newspapers.  
 
What are the possible solutions to these problems? Hyland sources a 
number of remedies from his interview subjects. For example, Beecher calls for 
the preservation of ‘public trust’ journalism, something he argues cannot be 
delivered entirely by smaller online offerings like Crikey, but needs to be taken 
up by larger media companies in Australia – although exactly how this would 
be accomplished remains unclear. Gawenda calls for government subsidy, 
arguing that there’s a need for a “body similar to the government-funded Arts 
Council that would subsidise independent journalism projects”. Hyland’s article 
itself was prompted in large part by Murdoch’s plans to erect what are known 
as ‘paywalls’ around online content, requiring readers to pay for access to 
material that has previously been available free of charge. Hyland says that 
(then) Fairfax chief executive, Brian McCarthy, is considering something 
similar, perhaps including dual levels of access to different categories of 
materials so that readers only pay for access to “more upmarket, high-quality 
data and information”. But Hyland acknowledges that the expectation that 
people will pay for something they have grown accustomed to getting for free 
poses a great threat to the news business. Former Age journalist and current 
Professor of Journalism at the University of Canberra, Matthew Ricketson, tells 
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Hyland that such a move requires of news publications a “leap of faith”. But he 
also points out that habits around the use of media do change – “people now 
pay more for their phones than in the era before mobiles … many subscribe to 
pay TV … there’s evidence some people will pay and they can change their 
habits”. John Hartigan, chief executive of the Australian branch of Murdoch’s 
News Corporation, News Limited, certainly hopes so. He is confident that 
people will pay for “news that is original, exclusive, has authority and is 
relevant”.    
 
While this article leaves the reader concerned about journalism’s future 
and unclear about the source of its possible conservation, I have outlined its 
arguments in considerable detail precisely because of the way it maps out the 
field of argument that surrounds print and online journalism in Australia. 
Hyland’s article encapsulates the problematisation of journalism in economic 
or political terms with the tendency for these two perspectives to be presented 
as irreconcilable in the struggle for journalism’s future. It also demonstrates the 
multiple accounts of the source of these problems, as well as the likely solution, 
along with the centrality of expert figures in translating, intervening and 
speaking for the various interests and conflicts bound up in this issue and its 
negotiation.  
 
Against this background, this thesis asks the question: in what ways have 
changing political and economic conditions shaped the development of online 
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news in Australia? I explore these changing conditions in relation to two 
Australian instances, The Age Online and Crikey – the former, an online version of 
Melbourne’s daily broadsheet newspaper, The Age, and the latter, an online-
only independent daily email newsletter, with corresponding website. Specific 
focus will be given to four key areas that have been identified as central to the 
development of online news: journalism’s changing political role; journalism’s 
professional status; the changing news audience; and the business of news.  
 
The decision to use two Australian case studies was made in response to 
a gap in the scholarship around the development of digital news in Australia. 
Flew (2009) suggests there is a need for more close, detailed studies of specific 
news industries and the effects of new media:    
 
Given the propensity for speculative accounts and meta-theory around 
the social impact of new media, a case can be made for more empirical 
accounts that aim to develop a snapshot of developments around one 
medium in one location, and to seek to extrapolate from that towards 
understanding of wider trends. (p. 97) 
 
This thesis responds to Flew’s call for a snapshot of a particular medium in a 
particular place by undertaking a study of online news sites in Australia. This 
thesis also aims to produce a snapshot by building up detail from a range of 
sources through the use of comparative case studies and the analysis of a 
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combination of material documents, artefacts, and the synthesis of diverse 
critical materials, as outlined in Chapter One. As well as outlining the 
methodological approach and materials adopted in this study, the first chapter 
outlines the field of research in detail by mapping out the multifaceted nature of 
the crisis afflicting newspaper journalism, as well as the number of rhetorics that 
attempt to account for the source, nature and solution of this crisis.  
 
As suggested by the use of the term rhetorics above, this thesis adopts an 
approach to the development of online news – and communication more 
generally – that understands language as rhetorical in nature. Leith and 
Myerson’s (1989) rhetorical approach to communication positions all language 
as an attempt to persuade in that it is a response to another possible speaking 
position. As outlined particularly in Chapter One, but throughout this thesis, 
multiple rhetorics surround the development of online news in an attempt to 
make sense of its many changes. Indeed, online news operates as a site of 
multiple rhetorics, and part of my strategy in the thesis is to trace these rhetorics, 
and outline the way in which they attempt to provide explanatory frames for 
the transformations affecting news in a changing economic, political, cultural 
and technological environment. Within these explanatory frames, such as the 
rhetoric of an approaching technological golden age, or equally, a lost golden 
age of fourth estate journalism, the rhetoric of the business model, the rhetoric 
of global competitive free markets, and the rhetoric of the durability of 
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journalism, while illuminating and persuasive, are ultimately insufficient in 
their capacity to account for the development of online news.  
 
What these frames do not adequately account for are the broader 
changing political and economic conditions within which the migration of news 
online is occurring. This migration requires the navigation of four factors that 
most influence the changing shape of news online. The arrival at these factors 
in particular – that is, politics, professionalism, audiences and business – was 
informed by the elements that Schudson (2003) posits combine to shape the 
development of news: the news marketplace, news sources, the political culture 
of news, the news audience, and news as literature and narrative. Schudson’s 
factors account for the cultural development of journalism, but not at the 
expense of a range of other social factors, indicating the utility of an 
interdisciplinary approach to fully account for the development of news. My 
four areas of focus echo Schudson’s elements, though not entirely: my focus on 
the changing political role of news aligns with his consideration of the political 
culture of news; my consideration of rhetorics of professionalism resonates with both 
his emphasis on news sources and again, his concern with the political culture 
of news; my consideration of news as a business is aligned with his interest in the 
news marketplace; and finally, we both emphasise the importance of the news 
audience. Chapter Two is concerned with mapping the theoretical development 
of online news, and the broader approach to the field of study.   
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Through the investigation of these four areas, politics remains sharply in 
focus. Politics is used here in the broad sense to encompass any sort of power 
relation; or, as “the ways and means by which people negotiate the relations of 
power in which they find themselves in a host of institutions involved in the 
government of populations” (Greenfield & Williams, 1992). Politics is at play in 
the development of online news in the struggles, tussles, negotiations and 
decisions required to shape its future. The way in which these political struggles 
are played out are considered, first, through interrogating the rhetoric of 
journalism’s traditional fourth estate role, and the way this is being challenged 
in a changing media environment. Drawing on the work of Nolan (2008), I 
position journalism as a cultural technology, its characteristics and objectives 
shifting in relation to changing dominant political rationalities.  
 
In Chapter Three I begin by outlining journalism’s long relationship 
with democracy and the centrality of this relationship to particular professional 
identities, before outlining in some detail the campaign fronted by Crikey 
publisher Eric Beecher for the preservation of what he calls (as Hyland reports) 
at different times ‘quality journalism’ or ‘public trust journalism’ in Australia. 
This is a form of journalism that maintains the fourth estate role of the press in 
Western liberal democracies – one he argues is under threat from a range of 
fronts, but mostly the financial crisis facing traditional news caused by the 
migration of advertising dollars and readers online. I use this example to 
 10 
illustrate the problematic relationship between journalism and democracy and 
demonstrate that this relationship is historically contingent and tied to a 
particular form of liberalism under which this sort of journalism arose and 
flourished. I argue that the discomfort expressed by Beecher demonstrates the 
tension that arises around changing forms of liberalism – and it is the changing 
conditions of liberalism that constitute the political, economic and cultural 
conditions in which journalism operates. I argue that while Beecher, and hence 
Crikey, are experiencing these tensions acutely, The Age Online is demonstrating 
more flexibility and thus less tension around the changing conditions in which 
it operates.  
 
If journalism is a cultural technology, it is involved in the task of 
governing, which, following writers such as Dean (2010), Dean and Hindess 
(1998), Miller and Rose (1990), and Foucault (2008), I define in the broad 
sense, not only as the preserve of parliaments and elected officials but as “any 
attempt to shape our behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for a 
variety of ends” (Dean, 2010, p. 18). Within this conception of government, 
technologies are the tools employed to know and govern populations, the 
“diverse and heterogeneous means, mechanisms and instruments through 
which governing is accomplished” (Dean, 2010, p. 269). Government occurs 
beyond the bounds of the parliamentary system and is dispersed across a range 
of social agencies and institutions, such as the school, the media, the prison, the 
church, the family, the workplace, and so on. Journalism then is bound up in 
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processes and practices of government, but it is also self-governing, as I outline 
in my consideration of the politics of professional status.  
 
Specifically, I consider the extent to which the navigation of professional 
status is shaped by the political, economic and cultural logic of advanced 
liberalism. The way in which this thesis considers the changing political and 
economic conditions shaping online news is to pay attention to the intersections 
of particular elements of news with associated rationalities of liberal 
government. This is joined by use of a genealogical approach that helps to 
describe discontinuities as much as continuities between past and present, 
between newer and older forms of news. What is produced is a history of the 
present (Dean, 1997). I use the term advanced liberalism to signify the dominant 
contemporary political ethos of Western, and increasingly non-Western (Ong, 
2007), liberal democracies. While the term neoliberalism has gained more 
popular mileage, I adopt advanced liberalism in recognition that contemporary 
government does not take a monolithic form. Rather, advanced liberal 
government inhabits a number of guises, of which neoliberalism is the most 
prominent. Forms of advanced liberal government are thus recognisable not by 
their declared ethos, but by their central elements, including the spread of the 
market into areas formerly of public provision, the adoption of indirect means 
of regulation, and the dispersion of government across multiple sites and forms 
of agency (Dean, 2010, p. 266).  
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Similarly, as the definitions of ‘news’ and ‘journalist’ are extended online 
– from independent but mainstream sites like Crikey, to citizen journalism sites 
and social media platforms – the professional status of journalism is being 
challenged and reworked. Extending the governmental approach outlined 
above, in Chapter Four I position professionalism as a means of journalistic 
authority in which journalistic autonomy, from government and economic 
interests, allows journalism to be shaped as a cultural technology for particular 
ends. I outline that the freedom secured by journalistic autonomy is not only 
the means through which journalists exercise their authority, but also the 
means by which their autonomy is acted upon to constitute particular kinds of 
journalistic cultures and practices, including professional norms and standards. 
I argue that Crikey inhabits a paradoxical position professionally, conflicted by 
its attempts to be recognised as professional by mainstream measures and its 
simultaneous rejection of these measures to suggest that it offers something 
more authentic than the mainstream press. It is through these publicly 
rendered discussions that Crikey is governing its own professional standards.  
 
In comparison, The Age Online has demonstrated little engagement with 
discussions of professionalism and changing journalistic practices online. I 
argue that this does not represent an absence of professionalism, but rather a 
changed professionalism online. This is heightened by a newsroom divide 
between the print and online arms of the paper that sees considerably different 
forms of news gaining prominence in the two versions. This is a source of angst 
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for staff at the newspaper, and might seem to suggest a rejection at the online 
version of the traditional journalistic values embodied by the print paper. But 
what this represents is a different sort of professionalism online, more aligned 
with the cultural logic of advanced liberalism and its economic imperatives. 
Thus I argue that The Age newspaper and The Age Online find themselves 
working to different measures of professionalism and within different 
jurisdictions, while Crikey straddles the uncomfortable position between an older 
version of professionalism and new standards that have emerged online.   
     
The interrogation of the political development of online news is further 
developed in Chapter Five through the consideration of the changing 
relationship between news producers and audiences. News has long shaped 
spatial and temporal identities, and in the digital era this history has resonance 
in the notion of interactivity. But interactivity is often held more as an ideal 
than implemented in practice, often because the practices of interactivity 
conflict with traditional liberal news values. This is demonstrated in the two 
cases where, although Crikey currently exhibits more interactive options, The Age 
Online demonstrates more potential for future interaction on its site because of 
Crikey’s attachment to discourses about traditional journalistic practices 
compared to The Age Online’s demonstrated flexibility around changing news 
practices online. Interactivity can also be read as part of sped-up processes of 
capitalism that Thrift (2006) argues are bringing producers and consumers into 
closer proximity with each other, resulting in new practices of innovation.  
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This new producer-consumer relationship can be demonstrated by the 
incident that saw Age columnist Catherine Deveny sacked after a flood of 
negative readers’ comments in response to her remarks on social networking 
site Twitter. I suggest that this incident can also be read as an example of the 
market populism that has increasingly become incorporated into the operation 
of online journalism. Market populism might also be said to underpin the 
operation of social network markets – the feature that separates the creative from 
other industries, according to Creative Industries scholars (Potts, Cunningham, 
Hartley, & Ormerod, 2008). Thus the final part of this lengthy chapter takes a 
detour to map the field of the Creative Industries scholarship and debates in 
order to demonstrate the politics of this rhetoric, which is increasingly shaping 
the practices, training and education of journalism, but also bringing it into 
being. Given the political focus developed throughout the thesis, this chapter 
ends by considering what the politics of the Creative Industries research and 
policy agenda might mean for the future of journalism.  
 
Chapter Six is concerned with the business of news, entering the field by 
first outlining Rupert Murdoch’s introduction of paywalls around online content 
across his news sites, and the subsequent media response. Throughout these 
discussions the business model is upheld as an explanatory frame and 
diagnostic tool, which, it is hoped, contains the formula to guarantee a news 
site’s survival. However, discussion of the business model also involves 
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discomfort, as it requires recognition of the fact that journalism is a business as 
well as a social institution. I argue that the business model is an insufficient 
explanatory frame to come to grips with online news because it seeks to isolate 
the business element of journalism’s operation from its other roles. I draw on a 
number of sources to argue that businesses cannot be understood as singular, 
holistic entities, but rather as part of broader social networks, with a range of 
goals and imperatives. Nonetheless, the economic politics of advanced 
liberalism demands that economic imperatives such as shareholder value, 
become increasingly central to matters of culture, journalism included. I outline 
the way in which The Age Online is navigating this shift in ways that impact upon 
its cultural operation, to the concern of some critics. Similarly, I describe the 
way in which Crikey seeks to diminish the importance of its business model in 
order to assert its professional legitimacy and status within the mainstream 
media.  
 
This thesis aims to present a close study of two prominent Australian 
online news sites, as well as a broader framework for the study of online news, 
amidst a changing technological environment which positions these changes 
alongside a governmental regime, to better account for the social development 
of online news. This detailed and localised account of two instances of 
Australian online news and journalism is made at a time of great change. While 
the study of news and journalism in the digital era is a popular field of inquiry, 
few studies have related these changes to the conditions of advanced liberalism, 
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and the tensions that arise in relation to a changing political and economic 
media environment. This is particularly pertinent given the great angst in some 
quarters, and in others, great optimism about the future of journalism as a 
profession and social institution. With changing political conditions come 
changing notions about the political role of journalism and particularly its 
status as the fourth estate and a vital mechanism in a democracy. As journalism 
is reshaped within a political economic rationality that places greater emphasis 
on market and shareholder value, it is necessary to break through the ‘threat or 
opportunity’ dichotomy that tends to dominate such discussions in order to 
accurately describe the way in which news is changing.  
 
 
By drawing together analysis of the changing political, professional, 
audience and business elements of news in each case, I produce a detailed 
snapshot of two different but related cases of Australian online news. By 
positioning the development of these sites across the four key areas of 
professional concern in relation to the conditions of advanced liberalism, I 
provide an analysis of online news in relation to the broader political, economic 
and cultural conditions in which it emerges. Along with the empirical, historical 
detail provided about each case, I map an approach to online news that can be 
applied to a range of other cases in a range of other locations, both 
international and local. At a time when news and journalism faces enormous 
pressure and change from a range of fronts, this thesis maps an approach that 
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encompasses the social development of these changes. In the following chapter 
I begin by demonstrating the specific nature of the range of challenges 
currently afflicting news and journalism, before outlining the selection and 
rationale for the chosen case studies. This precedes discussion of my approach 
to news, journalism, communication and technology, which is then followed in 
Chapters Three to Six, by the analysis of the four key professional foci. 
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Chapter One:  
The Problem of News  
 
 19 
Journalism’s “golden age”? 
In the first of his six Boyer Lectures for the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) in 2008, News Corporation Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Rupert Murdoch declared that the world is on the cusp of a “golden age”, 
brought about by the transformations of the previous few decades and the 
“unleashing of human talent and ability across our world” (2008a). While the 
spread of democratic freedom, and with it global competitive free markets, is 
central to this vision, Murdoch posits that it is primarily communication 
technologies that are unleashing their transformative effects on citizens across 
the globe. He speaks of the Wall Street trader with access to real time global 
pricing information, the South Korean teenager connecting with their friend in 
Germany through social networking site Myspace (which is owned by News 
Corp. Digital Media, a branch of Murdoch’s own News Corporation), and “the 
research scientist in Bangalore who can tap into the expertise of the best minds 
from around the world to help to improve crop yields in the poorest parts of 
India” (Murdoch, 2008b).	   
 
But this ‘golden age’ is also ushering in something more worrying for the 
media mogul – a threat to the business model that has secured his wealth for six 
decades through the sale of news, and with it, advertising (Murdoch, 2008b). 
The reason? Consumer choice. The same choice that provides the foundation 
of Murdoch’s global competitive free markets is challenging the source of his 
wealth and authority. Consumers of news now have more choice than ever 
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before, thanks in part to the digital technology that is eroding the geographical 
boundaries that once constrained news audiences. The news business model 
that was based on these geographically organised readerships is being 
threatened by the mobility of audiences, and with them advertising dollars 
which are moving online – but not at a rate that can sustain news in the digital 
form – cutting off print news’s lifeblood.  
 
Murdoch has responded to the present scenario by announcing plans to 
introduce what have become known in the news industry as paywalls around all 
News Corporation online content (Thorpe, 2009). These paywalls will require 
users to pay to see certain types of content, in an attempt to replicate the 
success of the paid subscription model of The Wall Street Journal – owned by 
News Corporation since 2007, with the largest circulation of all newspapers in 
the United States (US) – where subscribers pay considerable subscription fees 
for niche and premium content, often bundled with a print subscription. The 
Wall Street Journal online subscription model has generated 400,000 
subscriptions (Plambeck, 2010) and thus been deemed a success, though Crikey 
publisher Eric Beecher (2010d) argues that success is not always measured in 
profit – the Journal lost $US80 million last year despite its healthy subscription 
rates. A reason for this could be the inability to match the advertising revenue 
of print, online. But through the widespread introduction of paywalls, Murdoch 
hopes that choice and the free market, the very thing that poses a threat to his 
traditional business model, will provide his redemption. Consumers will simply 
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have to pay for their news even if they have become accustomed to getting it 
for free.  
 
But while Murdoch remains confident in the power of the free market to 
correct its own mistakes, others are less optimistic about the future of news in 
the digital environment. The rhetoric of the free web – that “information wants 
to be free” (Barlow, 1994) – is being increasingly challenged as the means of 
production online becomes increasingly consolidated1. While the early web 
seemed to promise a freedom and openness not found in traditional media, 
there is nothing to suggest this will remain the case. For instance, Scott (2005) 
argues that while there was initial optimism about the internet’s capacity to 
reinvigorate journalism, large media corporations – of which Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation is one – have acted with “unprecedented 
consolidation, concentration, and integration to severely narrow the scope of 
the press” (p. 111). For those who initially subscribed to a utopian view of the 
web, Murdoch’s move seems evidence of an approaching dystopia. But for 
journalism’s practitioners and observers, there is something of further concern 
in what Murdoch is addressing. His move to implement paywalls around online 
news is an attempt to stem the flow of revenue that is rapidly being bled from 
the news industry with the loss of print readers, the migration of advertising 
dollars online, and the current failure to ‘monetise’ increasing numbers of 
                                                
1 The rhetoric of consolidation is often found in discussions of the internet’s historical development, but 
it is one that Quiggin (in Quiggin & Potts, 2008) makes a strong case against. He argues that the 
internet is enabling a form of “cooperative enterprise driven by individuals and households rather than 
the market” (p. 145), often driven by altruistic motives rather than monetary incentives.  
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online audiences. In the face of this combination of factors, teamed with the 
threat posed by the rise of free, non-professional content online, traditional 
print news is floundering. The concern is that this threatens the financial 
position of print journalism and with it its traditional political role.  
 
Journalism occupies a privileged social position in many liberal societies, 
where it is seen as central to the fair and transparent functioning of democracy, 
as a fourth estate – an informal but vital pillar in the democratic system of 
checks and balances. It also provides for its audiences the constitution of 
particular social identities and with it a sense of belonging. But in order for it to 
achieve this, it must also thrive financially. Many are critical of Murdoch’s 
paywall decision, seeing it as contradictory to the inherent nature of the web. 
For instance, Rundle (2009) argues that Murdoch is demonstrating his “arsed-
up relationship with the internet” by refusing to acknowledge the extent to 
which digital technology has changed our relationship with news and 
information – “and to think otherwise is to believe that the middle ages could 
have uninvented block printing and gone back to the monasteries”. Huffington 
(2009), who also believes we are in the midst of a golden era, argues similarly 
that paywalls won’t work because they are based on an “old content economy”, 
rather than the new networked economy that thrives not on subscriptions and 
paywalls, but on links, online advertising, citizen journalism, and search 
engines.  
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Others argue that Murdoch’s paywall proposal poses a threat to the very 
nature of journalism itself. Crikey publisher Eric Beecher (2010b) argues that a 
move towards paid content, while necessary, further threatens the operation of 
quality local journalism online. Beecher suggests that with The New York Times 
now joining News Corporation publications in announcing plans to erect 
paywalls around areas of online content, lesser-known news sites will struggle to 
compete: “If I am forced to pay to read The New York Times online – which I will 
do willingly – there is far less chance that I will pay to read The Australian, The 
Age or The Sydney Morning Herald online”. Beecher continues to question the 
success of Murdoch’s “papers of influence” – The Times, The Wall Street Journal, 
The New York Post and The Australian – suggesting that Murdoch subsidises his 
prominent newspapers through other arms of his business in order to retain 
political influence in the polities in which he does business (Beecher, 2010d). In 
this environment, Beecher argues that smaller local sites will struggle to 
compete for audiences and thus for financial viability, rendering them less able 
to provide the sort of journalism that requires significant funding and is able to 
fulfil a democratic role.  
 
Journalism as a site of multiple rhetorics  
What this incident brings to the fore is a number of prominent rhetorics 
surrounding the development of online news, evident in Murdoch’s lectures, 
but also as I outlined in the introduction, proliferate around discussions of 
journalism’s future. First, there is Murdoch’s clear technological determinism in 
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his celebration of the approaching ‘golden age’. He positions technological 
advances as the clear driver of this radically different new era, suggesting that 
we are “in the midst of a shift from an industrial society to an information 
society”, and that those who do not keep up, risk being left behind like the 
Luddites of the Industrial Revolution who became “prisoners of the past” 
(Murdoch, 2008b). Such determinism pervades many accounts of the 
development of digital technologies and particularly online news, but fails to 
take account of the way in which technologies and their uses are social from the 
outset as well as in their design and implementation.  
 
The second prominent rhetoric in Murdoch’s lectures is that of the 
‘business model’ as central to the development and success of online news. 
Murdoch argues that “technology is destroying the business models we have 
relied on for decades” (Murdoch, 2008b), while Beecher (2009g) argues that we 
are in a time when “commercial media is grappling with a business model that 
may no longer sustain serious journalism”. In these and similar accounts which 
proliferate in discussions around the future of news in the digital era, the 
business model is presented as both the source of the crisis but also as the 
remedy that will cure the ills that are facing contemporary news businesses. 
Discussion of the business model becomes more complex in discussions about 
news than these analyses suggest because it usually fails to account for the 
complexity of the news business in which its routine objectives are often in 
conflict with its social objectives as the fourth estate. Thus when Beecher 
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proposes that it is necessary to consider philanthropic or public funding to 
preserve journalism’s democratic role (Beecher, 2009c), he is bypassing the 
uncomfortable fact that this is often secondary to the news’s commercial 
purpose – to make money.  
 
 The third prominent rhetoric is that of the ‘free market’ – the site of 
Murdoch’s challenge, as well as his solution. Murdoch positions the free market 
as the source of both individual and national growth arguing, for example, that 
for Australia to survive and compete against the rising superpowers of India 
and China, it must be less dependent on government – and more receptive to 
the opportunities of the global free market (Murdoch, 2008a) – while crediting 
the embrace of the twin forces of privatisation and liberalisation for the recent 
economic growth of these two Asian nations. However, the focus of the free 
market is ultimately the individual, who is both agent and benefactor in relation 
to this economic entity:  
 
Being pro-market, pro-business and pro-globalisation means working for 
a society where citizens are not dependent on the government … And it 
means smaller government and an end to the paternalism that nourishes 
political correctness, promotes government interference and undermines 
freedom and personal responsibility. (Murdoch, 2008a) 
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The rhetoric of the ‘global competitive free market’ infuses Murdoch’s 
leadership of his news empire, and is exemplary of the economic politics of 
advanced liberalism.   
 
The fourth prominent rhetoric in Murdoch’s lectures relates to the 
durability of journalism. Despite acknowledging that the form journalism takes 
in the future may change, Murdoch is confident that the task of giving readers 
“great journalism and great judgement” will persist (Murdoch, 2008c). Further, 
while many are forecasting the death of the newspaper (for example, see 
Meyer, 2004), Murdoch does not surrender to this popular rhetoric, arguing 
instead that “newspapers will reach new heights”. This rhetoric – or the 
opposed rhetoric of the imminent death of journalism – underpins many 
analyses of online news2. But a belief in the durability of journalism is also 
productive of tensions around issues of journalism’s changing political role, 
journalism professionalism, and the changing relationship between journalists 
and audiences, as my investigation will illuminate.  
 
These rhetorics, manifest in Murdoch’s lectures but extending well 
beyond them, begin to reveal some of the prominent ideas, arguments and 
discussions that presently surround the development and production of online 
news. Recognising them as rhetorics indicates that they mark out 
argumentative positions – made in response to other positions – and are thus 
                                                
2 For example, Philip Meyer (2004) predicts the death of the newspaper will take place in 2043, while 
others such as Jay Rosen (in Simons, 2008b) and Clay Shirky (2009) note that while newspapers may be 
facing imminent death, that doesn’t mean that journalism will be lost along with them.   
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often the site of great tension and conflict. The speakers who utilise these 
various rhetorical resources often have much at stake, whether financially or 
otherwise, in the persistence of these rhetorics. For instance, Murdoch’s 
demonstrated belief in the durability of journalism is not merely rhetorical; at 
stake in Murdoch’s position is the persuasion of shareholders, audiences and 
other business leaders who must be convinced of his legitimacy to speak and act 
on their behalf. I will now outline the way in which these rhetorics extend 
across the discussions that surround the changing shape of news in the digital 
era.  
 
News and journalism in crisis  
While Murdoch focuses on the threat to the financial sustainability of 
news, this is just part of the broader social crisis facing news businesses and the 
profession of journalism. Some argue that the crisis is caused by the 
“uncomfortable transition” that comes with the “active migration of news 
online” (Chung, 2007, p. 58), while others insist it is not about readership but 
the migration of advertising dollars online (Beecher, 2009b). Flew and Wilson 
(2008) argue that the crisis arises from “a growing disconnect between 
journalism as an organized and institutionalized professional practice, and the 
audiences and communities it intended to serve” (p. 3), while Flew (2005a) 
argues that the problem that has faced print in the transition online, despite the 
appeal of the new medium – is a cultural one, leading to the tendency to 
replicate print ways of doing things online (p. 89).  
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Gitlin (2009) cites these and other issues, outlining what he posits are the 
five elements that constitute this crisis: the precipitous decline in the circulation 
of newspapers; the decline in advertising revenue, which combines with the first 
to badly damage the profitability of newspapers; the diffusion of audience 
attention across a range of new media; journalism’s crisis in professional 
authority; and lastly, “journalism’s inability or unwillingness to penetrate the 
veil of obfuscation behind which power conducts its risky business”. In his fifth 
point, Gitlin is referencing the decline in journalism’s willingness or ability to 
occupy the investigative scrutiny of power across and outside of government 
that inheres to its traditional fourth estate role. This, combined with his fourth 
point about journalism’s professional crisis since early this century, a number of 
incidents have worked to undermine the perceived authority and objectivity of 
the press. In the US, these include the blogger-lead exposé that Dan Rather 
relied on faked documents in a report that then President George Bush evaded 
military service (Steinberg & Carter, 2004), the discovery that Jack Kelley at 
USA Today (Steinberg, 2004) and Jayson Blair at The New York Times (Barry, 
Barstow, Glater, Liptak, & Steinberg, 2003) had fabricated sources and stories, 
and the lack of critical coverage in the lead up to the Iraq war, particularly 
around Iraq’s alleged possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (Okrent, 
2004). Studies have found that public confidence in the press is plummeting in 
the US, with 45 per cent of Americans believing little of what they read in their 
daily newspapers (Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2005).  
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In the UK, reporting in the lead up to the Iraq war had an equally 
negative effect on the public image of journalism. In 2003, BBC reporter 
Andrew Gilligan reported that the British government had “sexed up” its 
dossier on Iraq, in particular, claims that it could have a missile ready to go 
within 45 minutes. The claims were traced back to an anonymous source – 
weapons expert Dr David Kelly, who committed suicide soon after he was 
publicly identified. A government inquiry into his death, the Hutton Inquiry, 
cleared the government of any wrongdoing, placing blame on the BBC and 
with responsibility laid at the feet of the broadcaster’s chairman and director-
general – although the results of the inquiry were viewed with scepticism by the 
press (see "Hutton report," 2011). While journalists are not known for rating 
highly on measures of public trust, this has declined rapidly in the UK – down 
by 33 per cent since 2003 across all platforms, and down 24 per cent at The 
Times, Daily Telegraph, and The Guardian, usually the country’s bastions of quality 
journalism ("ABCs," 2010). More recently, the UK tabloid News of the World has 
been accused of illegally hacking into private phone calls to attain stories, a 
scandal that has reached the current British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
with the resignation of his communications director, Andy Coulson, over 
allegations he may have authorised the use of phone hacking as editor of News 
of the World from 2003–2007.   
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In Australia, a 2006 survey found 85 per cent of respondents believe the 
media are “often biased” in reporting events, and a majority of those surveyed 
said they believed the media invaded people’s privacy unnecessarily (Roy 
Morgan Research as cited in Rodrigues, 2008). Rodrigues (2008) outlines a 
series of incidents in 2007 that raised questions about Australian journalists’ 
ethical standards. These included the theft and publication of an Australian 
Football League player’s medical records by television network Channel 7 
journalists; the release by three journalists (one television, two print journalists) 
of details of an off-the-record lunch discussion with then treasurer Peter 
Costello; and the revelation that a journalist at The Australian newspaper 
promised an independent political candidate coverage in return for the 
direction of voting preferences. More recently, former transport minister David 
Campbell resigned after Seven News broadcast footage of him leaving a gay 
club (Crook, 2010); and the New South Wales Health Minister, John Della 
Bosca, resigned after the media uncovered his affair with a younger woman 
(Ellis, 2009). Both stories raise questions about the extent to which the media 
can justify intrusions into the private lives of public figures, and whether their 
publication is in the ‘public interest’ (Simons, 2009a). Crikey and ABC TV’s 
Media Watch have also accused The Australian newspaper of running a long and 
politically-motivated campaign against Victorian Police Chief Commissioner, 
Simon Overland (Holmes, 2010b; Simons, 2010a).  
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However, while the reputation of journalism has suffered in recent years, 
the issue of how to adapt journalism, as well as the economic model that has 
sustained it in print, is also working to erode journalism’s traditional political 
role3. With the advent of online publishing models, increasing numbers of 
advertising dollars are migrating online, and the ‘rivers of gold’ – as classified 
advertising used to be known – that traditionally funded print journalism, are 
drying up. While advertisers are moving online along with print publications 
and audiences, the rates for online advertising are far lower than in print, and 
thus even combined with cover prices, fail to make up for the loss of print 
classifieds. Further, print newspapers are rapidly losing their audience. Print 
readership is in a long-term decline in Australia, the UK, the US and elsewhere 
– as I outline in more detail later in this chapter. While young readers have 
never traditionally made up large numbers of the print audiences, a US study 
suggests that they will no longer turn to newspapers as they age as previous 
generations did (Brown, 2005).  
 
But while print news appears to be crumbling in the face of the 
combined threat of shifting advertising markets, declining readership and a 
tarnished public image, online news is looking healthier than ever. While this 
might sound like good news for journalism, there is a twofold concern. First, 
though audiences are increasingly seeking out news online, this is taking a 
                                                
3 I use ‘traditional political position’ to suggest the liberal journalistic model that positions journalism as 
a fourth estate, providing an additional check to the operation of government power. I outline the 
origins of what has become accepted as the dominant, ‘traditional’, political journalistic model, as well 
as the problems with this ideal in considerable detail in Chapter Three.  
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different form than it did with the mass media of the 20th century. Second, 
despite the continued dominance of large media players, the increasingly ‘level 
playing field’4 of online news production means that it might also come from a 
number of non-traditional sources, or that readers are no longer as loyal to a 
single publication as they may have been with print. Further, there are 
concerns about the tendency for different kinds of news to excel online, 
particularly forms that are characterised as ‘tabloid’-style journalism. Tabloid 
journalism is positioned as the locus of concerns about the loss of serious, 
investigative, and public-oriented journalism, and its replacement with 
increasing amounts of ‘entertainment’. The fear, for critics such as Bob 
Franklin (as cited in Nolan, 2008), is that this sort of news production and 
consumption is chipping away at journalism’s traditional informative and 
investigative fourth estate role through the use of quite specific characteristics 
and techniques:  
 
The diminution of international news on television and the concomitant 
rise of sports and entertainment stories; the reduction of average story 
length on television; the proliferation of spectacular demonstrations of 
technological capacity, such as the increased use of live ‘on-the-spot’ 
interviews with other journalists; the grooming of ‘star journalists’, 
anchors and commentators; and the increased use of spectacular 
                                                
4 This could itself be read as a rhetoric that surrounds the production of news in the digital 
environment, and, as I have outlined, there is great argument about whether the internet indeed 
provides a ‘level playing field’, or whether it only further consolidates existing media power.  
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graphics and visuals, which are geared to the generation of increased 
programme ratings. (p. 103) 
 
However, while the increasing prevalence of these techniques and 
characteristics, especially online are concerns for some, for others they are 
cause for optimism about the ‘democratisation’ of the media (Hartley, 1996; 
Lumby, 1999; McNair, 2006). Following the work of Nolan (2008), in Chapter 
Three the notion of tabloidisation is repositioned as being part of broader 
tensions that arise around changes to journalism as a cultural technology. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to register these various positions in order to 
demonstrate tabloidisation as an issue that contributes to the growing, 
cumulative sense of a journalistic crisis.  
 
The second concern about journalism’s future is with the online business 
model. While readership online is soaring due to the disparity between online 
and print advertising, this doesn’t appear adequate to save traditional forms of 
print journalism. With new forms of news coming to the fore online5, the 
concern is also that journalism is being attacked from both within and without, 
by its failure to adequately monetise its product online as well as the ever-
proliferating number of online alternatives6. Both of these have the ability to 
                                                
5 By this I am referring to a range of online news offerings, including: news aggregators, such as Google 
News; news portals, such as ninemsn or Yahoo!7 News; independent news sites such as New Matilda and 
Crikey; the ABC’s online news analysis site, The Drum; and the panoply of blogs such as Lavartus Prodeo, 
Stilgherrian and Catallaxy Files, that are increasingly positioned as an additional critical perspective to 
mainstream news consumption.   
6 However, while online offerings might prove successful in an ‘attention economy’, they are often 
negotiating the same financial difficulties as their ‘traditional’ competitors, as New Matilda’s recent 
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compromise journalism’s traditional political role and are two sides of the one 
coin. If journalism can no longer provide serious investigative journalism that is 
seen as essential to the health of democracy, then its public standing in that 
democracy is challenged. Further, with the challenge to its business model that 
online news brings, traditional news institutions are no longer able to fund this 
sort of journalism, creating a cycle that is challenging and disrupting the 
production, use and funding of news across print and online.    
 
But while many decry the erosion of traditional print journalism online, 
and its implications for democracy, others argue that conversely the digital 
environment could renew forms of participation and engagement both in news 
and democratic processes. This is facilitated in part by the reduced barriers of 
entry to participation in the production process online and with it the break 
down of what has traditionally been a clear division between journalists and 
audiences, or content producers and content consumers, making this 
relationship itself more democratic. For instance, Rosen (2006) has coined the 
term “the people formerly known as the audience” to describe the more active 
consumers of content online, while Bruns (2007) has further developed this 
notion with his articulation of the prosumer. This melange of the producer and 
consumer makes active the work of the consumer and recognises its significance 
in the continual and open chain of production and meaning around digital 
media content.  
                                                                                                                                      
history suggests – announcing its imminent closure in late 2010 before making its comeback shortly 
after as a reader-funded site under the leadership of editor Marni Cordell.   
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Benkler (2006) argues that internet technologies are capable of radically 
reconfiguring the hub-and-spoke model of mass media, where news was 
collected by a few and distributed to many, into a networked public sphere of 
collaborative information gatherers and distributors. Gillmor (2004) makes 
similar claims in his manifesto for citizen journalism, arguing that the 
journalism of tomorrow will no longer be a lecture but a conversation in which 
users play an equal role to producers. These sorts of visions involve variations 
on the idea of citizen journalism, which in some cases have shown great 
promise in engaging citizens and fulfilling the rhetoric of the web’s 
democraticatising potential7. But it is by no means a perfect ‘model’ – with the 
world’s poster child for citizen journalism, South Korea’s Oh My News, facing 
continuing financial difficulties (Ihlwan, 2006), while an Australian exercise in 
citizen and “pro-am” journalism, YouDecide2007 demonstrated the need for the 
ongoing support of teams of trained professionals to manage the recruitment of 
citizen journalists and the nature of their contributions (Flew & Wilson, 2008).  
 
Beckett (2008) makes more cautious claims about digital journalism, 
arguing that in what he calls networked journalism audiences become central, but 
only in the way that they work with, and not in place of, trained journalists. 
This sort of news production has also been called ‘computational 
                                                
7 Some notable examples of successful citizen journalism sites include: Indymedia, an international 
‘grassroots’ news network; DigitalJournal.com, a digital news site populated with content from amateur 
‘digital journalists’ from around the world; and Wikinews, a collaborative news site managed by 
Wikimedia and run much like Wikipedia.  
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journalism’. For instance, the highly successful online site of The Guardian 
newspaper, guardian.co.uk, has pioneered a ‘web-first’ approach to news, as well 
as a number of innovative interactive publishing processes (“History of 
guardian.co.uk,” 2011), demonstrating great promise to engage audiences, 
utilise their skills, and maintain the authority of journalists in the production 
process, producing results with significant political relevance (Daniel, Flew, & 
Spurgeon, 2010). 
 
In one instance, explored by Daniel, Flew and Spurgeon (2010), 
guardian.co.uk made available the data relating to Members of Parliament’s 
expenses in a Google Document. Readers could then search this document and 
send any questions or comments to Guardian journalists who could then 
investigate these questionable claims and, where appropriate, develop them 
into stories. This sort of computational or networked journalism comes with 
more qualified claims about the potential for the internet to democratise news 
production processes, as well as political participation itself. But as the 
guardian.co.uk’s MP expenses example demonstrates, there is real scope for this 
sort of working relationship between consumers and producers of news to yield 
promising results. This sort of arrangement also works to coopt voluntary 
audience labour to allow the production of investigative journalism that is 
otherwise costly and time-consuming. For instance, in the MP expenses case, 
over 20,000 consumers participated with 170,000 documents viewed in the first 
80 hours. As Daniel et al. note, this worked to “enhance the reputation of The 
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Guardian for investigative journalism” (p. 14), with the related stories leading to 
a government inquiry.  
 
This example encapsulates the complex and often ambivalent relations 
news producers and consumers find themselves in amidst a changing media 
landscape. It is against the backdrop of these multiple debates, positions and 
rhetorics that I position my case studies. In the following section I outline my 
case study method, as well as the two cases chosen, providing a rationale for 
their selection in relation to a range of other possible cases.  
 
The case studies  
A case study can be understood as an “empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The phenomenon I am investigating 
(online news) is difficult to extract from the context of its environment. This 
includes the professional practices that surround online news, its audience, and 
its status as a business. Due to the multi-layered complexity of this 
environment, a case study offers the best way to explore these relationships. 
Case studies do not dictate a particular method but rather a project design, and 
it is their methodological flexibility that makes them so valuable to a range of 
research areas (Platt, 1999, p. 2). But the primary value of case studies to this 
research is their ability to get across the range and depth of detailed material 
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necessary to provide the ‘snapshot’ that this research seeks to form. Platt argues 
that it is the rhetorical value of case studies that enables them to provide the 
“rich and specific detail” (1999, p. 6) that will help compose this ‘snapshot’.   
 
In order to structure my case studies, I am undertaking a comparative 
approach considering both cases (The Age Online and Crikey), and their 
similarities and differences in terms of the four key areas of my analysis: the 
changing political role of news, journalism as a profession, the changing news 
audience, and news as a business. An example of a similarly structured 
comparative case study is Qiu’s (2008) investigation of the role of mobile 
telephony in two social movements in southeast Asia. He examines the People 
Power II movement in the Philippines and the Nosamo movement in South 
Korea through the lens of his analytical categories. These analytical categories, 
like those adopted in this study, were informed by the broader social context in 
which the social movements were situated, including: speed and scale, 
organisational form, historical and institutional context, and the inter-media 
relationship. By structuring my study similarly I can move through the key 
areas of analysis comparing two cases as I go, before moving on to a broader 
discussion of the overall similarities and differences between the two cases. The 
structure is evident in Table 1, below.  
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Table 1 
Structure of methods and cases 
Areas of analysis	   The Age Online	   Crikey	  
Political role	  
Material documents  
& artefacts	   Material documents  & artefacts	  
Interview	   Interviews	  
Similarities and differences	  
Professional status 
Material documents  
& artefacts	   Material documents  & artefacts	  
Interview	   Interviews	  
Similarities and differences	  
Audiences	  
Material documents  
& artefacts	   Material documents  & artefacts	  
Interview	   Interviews	  
Similarities and differences	  
Business	  
Material documents  
& artefacts	   Material documents  & artefacts	  
Interview	   Interviews	  
Similarities and differences	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What can also be seen in Table 1 are the two main categories of 
methods used: description and analysis of material documents and artefacts, 
and of interviews. Material documents and artefacts are my main sources and 
the primary means of assembling evidence for my argument about the 
development of online news. I use the term material artefacts to describe the 
websites I will be analysing – the sites of The Age Online and Crikey themselves, as 
well as other sites in the surrounding media landscape. I compare these sites to 
each other, as well as other examples; I also compare The Age Online to its print 
counterpart, The Age. In analysing these sites, I am broadly interested in what 
can be called their structural elements: their layout, sections, content types, 
modes of presentation and embedded technological capabilities. I use these 
various markers to determine the influence of professional practices, audience 
considerations and business factors on the structure and development of the 
site. While this sort of analysis is used to provide a broad comparison of the two 
sites, I also use many examples of particular news stories to provide the 
empirical detail that produces the ‘snapshot’ of each case. In these instances, I 
will be analysing not just the structural elements of the site, but also the content 
– from the cases themselves, as well as surrounding examples – in order to 
undertake a rhetorical analysis.  
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A rhetorical approach8 to communication dispenses with a familiar, 
exclusive focus on ‘meaning’, broadening its categories of description and 
analysis to attend to occasion, outcomes, composers, audiences and techniques, 
as well as argument (Leith & Myerson, 1989). It regards all language as 
rhetorical insofar as all language use inhabits a particular position, and is 
always, in some way, a response to another speaking position whether stated or 
otherwise. A rhetorical approach informs this study for a number of reasons: it 
is flexible, it suits a range of forms of address (whether a speech, a news story or 
website), and it is attentive to the material circumstances in which various forms 
of language are produced and deployed. As well as its attention to the 
materiality of communication, the rhetorical approach is appropriate for 
examining the rhetorics that surround the production and development of 
online news. It is these rhetorics that in part maintain the current notions of 
journalism’s social and political role. 
 
A rhetorical approach will be used to name, describe, and analyse the 
sorts of rhetorics that surround the development of online journalism and the 
                                                
8 It is necessary to note that the material definition of rhetoric, as outlined by Leith and Myerson and 
adopted in this thesis, meshes with Foucauldian notions of discourse in terms of power-knowledge 
relations. That is, a focus on the material techniques, occasions, audiences, and outcomes of persuasion 
finds itself aligned with a Foucauldian view of discourse as materially, institutionally and historically 
produced and deployed as an integral part of governmental power. If, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
government is made possible through modern intellectual technologies, such as journalism, then the 
textual forms produced and circulated through these technologies can best be analysed as instances of 
rhetoric: that is, as strategic uses of communication. In other words, this is an understanding of rhetoric 
that departs from its classical and more restricted sense as “a system of rigid categories” (Leith and 
Meyerson, 1989, p. xii) and is closer to the “new rhetoric” (Alasuutari, 1995, p. 100). Freadman’s 
(2009) account of rhetoric is further demonstrative of this broader view, focusing on the close relations 
between rhetoric, politics, and the negotiation of power. She usefully defines rhetoric as “a theory of 
use, of the strategic use of language to achieve specifiable effects, of the successes and failures of those 
strategies, and of the strategic uptake of utterance” (pp. 75-76).  
 
 42 
related changes that affect the online news industry. It will also be used to deal 
with the variety of textual materials and performances analysed throughout the 
thesis. Instances of rhetoric will be drawn from within the two cases, as well as 
surrounding media sources (both local and international), but also from 
company statements, reports on secondary data (such as audience and 
circulation figures), and from within academic analysis of the situation of online 
news. Practically, the task of rhetorical analysis of this range of materials 
involves using the key questions of the rhetorical approach, as outlined by Leith 
and Myerson (1989), to interrogate instances of rhetoric. These questions are: 
Whose words are these? To what are they replying? What argument are they 
proposing? To whom? On what occasion? To what persuasive effect? Using 
what materials and techniques? To what possible outcomes?  
 
My analysis of material artefacts and documents is supplemented by 
informal interviews with professionals involved with The Age Online and Crikey. 
These interviews are used as additional source material, which adds to the 
scope of rich detail provided by the two cases, allowing for an ‘insider’ 
perspective on each case. In this way they are a further source of rhetoric 
surrounding the development of online journalism as well as a source of 
historical detail. The interviews also provide an important point of reference for 
me to be able to cross-examine the material evidence I have amassed. This will 
allow me to confirm and add weight to my analysis of material artefacts and 
documents.  
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It is worth documenting that the interviews were not easily attained, 
particularly at The Age Online, where much resistance was encountered. As I 
outline further in Chapter Four, this resistance can be read as suggestive of the 
professional pressures currently being experienced by the industry9. Only one 
interview was gained at The Age Online, with that interview itself suggesting 
possible reasons for this, including tension between the print and online 
newsrooms. Interviews at Crikey were more easily attained, probably due to a 
pre-existing working relationship with the publication. This enabled three 
interviews with a range of staff in a variety of positions, allowing a breadth of 
perspectives to be documented. Ideally, this scenario would have been repeated 
at The Age Online, but despite repeated and insistent efforts, it was not. However, 
some insight can be gained from the relative silence at The Age Online, 
particularly given the tumultuous industrial conditions experienced at Fairfax 
during the course of this project, as I outline further in Chapter Six. From the 
point of view of this thesis’ research design, the paucity of interviews from The 
Age Online does not have serious implications for the reliability of the evidence 
provided by the case study; that is, the status of the interviews is an additional, 
                                                
9 It is also worth noting here something of the original shape this project had intended to take. This 
thesis was originally planned to provide an organisational history of the development of The Age Online. 
It was hoped that close contact could be formed with those involved in the site’s development, as well as 
those who presently work on it. In this earlier version of the research project, it was hoped that 
interviews would be numerous – with journalists, managers, designers, marketers, and so on – and that 
these would be supplemented by access to internal documents tracing various plans and decisions, as 
well as audience figures and financial forecasts. But this project was stopped short when access proved 
difficult. It seems that it was just the wrong time for this sort of project to be undertaken, though it is 
likely that such research will emerge in coming years when many of the current issues, arguments and 
debates are more ‘settled’. Further, it is worth noting that Margaret Simons, in her book The Content 
Makers (2007b) provides some of this (excellent) insider detail. But this was no doubt aided by her 
position as an industry insider, given her history as an Age journalist herself.  
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not primary source. Even one interview at The Age Online, with the three gained 
from Crikey, provides an additional source of rhetoric to analyse, access to 
important historical detail to bolster my snapshot of the two cases, and evidence 
to confirm my analysis of the other materials.  
 
The selection of cases  
The cases of The Age Online and Crikey were selected from among a host 
of other international and local possibilities. They were chosen partly for their 
location and ease of access, as interviews were sought to supplement other case 
study materials. As a former employee of Crikey, I began with a strong working 
knowledge of the site and its workplace structures and routines. This also 
allowed me access to interviews with the editor, Eric Beecher, and other 
editorial staff, which have been used to supplement other case study materials. 
Similarly, The Age Online was chosen due to its perceived ease of access – many 
former classmates and colleagues now work there, and it was hoped that 
interviews would be easily arranged. In fact, they were not, as I will outline in 
more detail as I discuss the methods further below. However, the rationale for 
the selection of the cases remains and the silence from The Age Online provides 
for a different sort of insight into the operation of a particular media company 
in a time of change.   
 
But the decision to focus on these two cases was not merely practical. 
Certainly it was beyond the scope of this project to travel internationally to gain 
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the kind of access to overseas publications needed to garner organisational 
detail. But the selection of two local cases was also informed by the wider need 
to undertake a close examination of the changing Australian media landscape. 
The experience of Australian media organisations is unique in comparison to 
their major global counterparts. In the English-speaking world, both the US 
and UK print news industries are feeling the effects of a changing news market 
more acutely than Australia. For instance, in the US from 2007–2009, 
advertising revenue has fallen 43 per cent, there are 15,000 less full-time 
reporting and editing jobs (or, “to put it another way, newspapers headed into 
2010, devoting $1.6 billion less annually to news than they did three years 
earlier”) and newspapers have lost 16.9 per cent circulation in these three years 
and 25.6 per cent since 2000 (Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
2010)10.  
 
These extreme conditions in the US, accelerated by the market 
conditions following the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2010, have 
resulted in the closure of a number of print newspapers while others have 
ceased their print operations, publishing solely online. For instance, The 
Cincinnati Post ceased production on 31 December 2007. The Post’s weekday 
circulation had fallen nearly 90 per cent in its last 30 years of operation, and its 
final circulation stood at only 27,000, compared to the 200,000-strong 
circulation of its major competitor, the Cincinnati Enquirer (Schulhofer-Wohl & 
                                                
10 For a compelling visual representation of the long-term decline of the US newspaper industry see The 
Awl’s excellent ‘Graphic History of Newspaper Circulation over the Last Two Decades’ (Sicha, 2009).    
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Garrido, 2009). The Post had only survived as long as it did due to a 
government-ratified Joint Operating Agreement with the Enquirer, which 
allowed the two papers to maintain a monopoly in the market by setting market 
prices for subscriptions and advertising so long as they maintained independent 
newsrooms (Schulhofer-Wohl & Garrido, 2009). While in other circumstances 
this behaviour would be against anti-trust laws, in this instance it was approved 
by the government under the Newspaper Preservation Act (1970) in order to 
maintain a diversity of media voices in the interests of press freedom 
(Schulhofer-Wohl & Garrido, 2009). The closure of The Cincinnati Post leaves the 
United States with only 15 cities with competing newspapers – a century ago, 
that figure was 689 (Schulhofer-Wohl & Garrido, 2009). Other recent losses 
have included Denver’s Rocky Mountain News, and Tucson Arizona’s Tucson 
Citizen, which continues online in a different guise through the work of citizen 
journalism and a network of blogs. While the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and The 
Christian Science Monitor ceased publishing daily print versions in 2009, the 
former remains in a slimmed-down online version, while the latter prints only a 
weekly hardcopy version while maintaining the website as a daily news source 
(Clark, 2009b; Cook, 2008).  
 
In the UK, a 2010 OECD report, ‘The Evolution of News and the 
Internet’, found that newspaper circulation fell by 25 per cent between 2007–
09, second only to the US where the decline was 30 per cent. Greece, Italy, 
Canada and Spain also faced serious circulation drops while Australia fared 
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exceptionally in comparison as I outline in the following paragraph. While the 
report outlines that most OECD countries saw a growth in their newspaper 
markets between 2004 and 2008, the UK, which also had one of the largest 
newspaper markets (behind the United States, Japan and Germany), lost seven 
per cent of its market while the United States lost a staggering 20 per cent. 
Recent annual figures demonstrate dramatic decline in circulation across all 
national metropolitan dailies in the UK. The largest declines include a loss of 
12.33 per cent at The Independent between 2007 and 2008, 13.22 per cent at The 
Times from 2008–2009, and 12.38 per cent at The Guardian over the same 
period ("ABCs," 2010). Figures compiled in 2010 to date demonstrate similarly 
dramatic year-on-year declines. There are signs however that the situation is 
beginning to improve, with the UK newspaper advertising market predicted to 
grow slightly for the first time in three years in 2010 (Sweney, 2010).  
 
The OECD report found that the GFC of 2007–2010 worked to 
intensify and accelerate some of the pre-existing problems facing the newspaper 
industry, particularly for the US and the UK. The US was worst hit, with 
significant drops in newspaper circulation figures, advertising sales, stock prices, 
and operating margins. As mentioned above, some US papers have closed 
altogether. The loss of newsroom staff is also linked to the GFC, and many 
newspapers in the US, including industry heavyweights, The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and The Boston Globe, have been shedding staff (Bensinger, 2009; 
MacAskill, 2009; Perez-Pena, 2009). Paper Cuts, a website that collates data on 
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newspaper job cuts in the US and represents them on an interactive map has 
traced more than 1800 job layoffs and buyouts around the country since 2007 – 
and that figure is not comprehensive (Smith, 2010). In the UK, the GFC has 
been most strongly felt in the steep decline in circulation of regional daily 
newspapers, with 60 regional titles closing between 2008 and 2009 and more 
than half of the approximately 1,300 remaining local titles expected to close in 
the next five years (Burrell, 2009; Oliver, 2009). Significantly, the UK decline 
in advertising revenues of 26 per cent in 2009 are the steepest in Europe 
(OECD, 2010).    
 
In the face of these dramatic international trends the Australian 
newspaper industry is outperforming the US and UK. The Newspaper Works, 
an Australian industry body formed by Fairfax and News Limited in order to 
increase advertising sales on newspapers, extrapolated from the data available 
that newspaper circulation has dropped by three per cent in Australia since 
2003, compared with eight and ten per cent falls in the US and UK 
respectively ("Australian Newspaper Industry," 2009). Similarly, the OECD has 
found that Australia’s newspaper publishing market only declined three per 
cent in 2007–2009, compared to drops of 30 and 21 per cent in the US and 
UK respectively (OECD, 2010). This trend is reflected in relatively healthy 
advertising revenues at newspapers, compared with dramatic declines recorded 
internationally, with The Newspaper Works finding a 12 per cent decline in 
advertising revenues in the UK, 17.7 per cent in the US, but only 0.6 per cent 
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for the same period in Australia ("Australian Newspaper Industry," 2009). 
Between 2006 and 2008, circulation of major Australian daily print newspapers 
dropped only 0.7 per cent (McKinnon et al., 2008) and in 2009, circulation 
even improved for some papers – with The Australian, The Age and The Sydney 
Morning Herald reporting a combined 0.2 per cent increase in their Monday to 
Friday editions. Further, the long-term trends over the past ten years in 
Australia are far less dramatic than in the US. Nonetheless, newspapers in 
Australia are still in a long-term decline, particularly when it comes to 
readership, with readership of weekday editions of print newspapers falling by 
21 per cent between 1993 and 2005, and most of that – over 15 per cent – since 
2000 (Este et al., 2008, p. 9; OECD, 2010).  
 
All of this is to say that while the Australian newspaper industry is in a 
downturn, its situation is different to the UK and US scenarios. One thing that 
accounts for this is the structure of the media industries in each country. While 
the UK has a strong history of public broadcasting, the US has a history of 
commercial networks. In both countries the commercial media – across print, 
broadcast and the internet – has been increasingly concentrated into fewer 
hands, particularly since the 1990s (McChesney, 2008). Australia’s 
broadcasting system is unique in its adoption and adherence to the ‘dual 
system’, which dates back to the 1930s. The dual system allowed for the 
coexistence of public service and commercial broadcasters, with the two sectors 
classified as either ‘A’ or ‘B’ class stations, with “the implicit labeling of 
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audiences according to the obviously hierarchically arranged categories of 
cultural consumption” (Johnson, 1981, p. 174). This history, while specific to its 
broadcast sector, sets up a set of expectations about the operation of media 
industries in general. While Australia has a strong history of public 
broadcasting in the form of the ABC (the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
– formerly the Australian Broadcasting Commission), its print newspaper 
ownership has been traditionally, and is increasingly held in very few hands, 
with Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation dominating the market. This 
combination of a strong history of public broadcasting, inherited from Britain, 
and an increasing trend towards concentrated ownership makes Australia a 
special case. But because of the increasingly shared concentration of ownership, 
especially News Corporation whose dominance spreads across Australia, the 
US and UK, this study may have implications for scholars and journalists in all 
of these countries.  
 
Thus far I have outlined the strengths of an Australian case study in 
comparison to choices from the US and UK media landscape. But what of 
other international possibilities? The OECD argues that while many national 
newspaper industries are in a serious decline, this must not be taken as the 
general global state of affairs:  
 
Large country-by-country and title-by-title differences and the data 
currently do not lend themselves to make the case for “the death of the 
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newspaper”, in particular if non-OECD countries and potential positive 
effects of the economic recovery are taken into account. (OECD, 2010, 
p. 7) 
 
While some newspaper markets in Europe are facing similar difficulties to the 
UK and the US, such as Greece, Italy and Spain – others like Austria, France 
and Denmark are more closely aligned with the Australian experience. Indeed, 
Eric Beecher, publisher of Crikey has suggested that Australia learn from the 
recent significant French government subsidy of the newspaper industry to 
ensure its survival as a vital part of the country’s democratic institutions 
(‘Crikey Says’, Crikey daily newsletter 27 January 2009). But conversely, in 
some European OECD nations, circulation has seen significant increases 
between 2000 and 2008, including Ireland (30 per cent), Poland (24 per cent), 
Turkey (20 per cent) and Portugal (10 per cent) (OECD, 2010, p. 24). Europe’s 
newspaper market is so diverse that it cannot be taken as a whole, and while it 
offers a range of possible future cases for comparison, it does not offer the same 
relationship with the US and UK markets that Australia does.  
 
Similarly, Asia is not facing a declining newspaper industry but a 
growing one. Manfred Werfel, of the World Association of Newspapers, argues 
that, “we consider the worldwide newspaper market as being currently divided 
into a stagnating market (in the west) and a fast growing market in Asia” 
("Asian newspaper industry," 2006). Asia is home to some of the most popular 
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newspapers in the world – Japan’s two largest dailies, Asahi Shimbun and the 
Nikkei, are the two most popular newspapers in the world (Tabuchi, 2010), 
while The Times of India is the world’s number one English newspaper across all 
its formats, both print and online ("TOI Online," 2009). Asia does offer a range 
of unique case studies, such as the citizen journalism model developed by Oh 
My News in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Malaysia’s independent 
online voice, Malaysiakini, or the negotiations between state control and a 
growing media market in countries like Singapore, China and Vietnam11. 
While these cases offer rich areas for investigation and comparison, and 
indicate future fields of study, they do not offer the same basis for comparison 
that the broader US and UK context does here. This is largely due to a specific 
relationship between the media industries in the three countries shaped by 
different media systems but also by a shared Murdoch-led move towards 
concentration of ownership. 
 
The two chosen cases, while both examples of online journalism, were 
also selected with a view to their relationship with print news. The newspaper 
industry is experiencing more acutely than other industries the tensions that 
arise when professional and cultural practices intersect with significant 
technological developments. While broadcast mediums12 are facing a more 
                                                
11 See, for example, Graham Brown’s (2005) work on negotiating space online for alternative political 
voices in Malaysia, James Gomez on the legislative challenges to internet publishing in Singapore 
(Gomez, 2002) and elsewhere in Asia (Gomez, 2004), and Chengju Huang on China’s changing 
newspapers markets (Huang, 2001, 2007).  
12 While the comparison of online news with newspapers might seem self-evident, it would also be 
possible to compare online news to television due to the similarity in the operation of scheduling and 
update. Despite this resonance, newspapers (and newspaper journalism) are the focus of this study 
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fragmented audience with less interest in news, television and radio, news still 
rates highly with Australian audiences, though this audience is ageing and it 
seems unlikely that the next generation will repeat its viewing and listening 
habits. But newspapers are the medium under the greatest threat from new 
sources of news online. Further, newspapers provide an appropriate point of 
comparison to online news as early forms of news online were drawn almost 
directly from newspapers. The internet was initially exploited for its textual 
capacity, and here its roots have remained: while video and audio now abound 
online, online news remains overwhelmingly textual. Finally, as I outlined 
above, I am interested in the extent to which the socially constitutive nature of 
news is maintained or reinterpreted online. The two chosen cases allow for this 
sort of comparison. While The Age Online is a digital incarnation of a print 
newspaper, allowing for direct comparison with its print counterpart, Crikey 
exists online only, in email and website form, allowing for comparison across 
the two cases about the impact of a news product’s provenance on its 
development.  
 
It is also for this reason that online news sites were chosen rather than 
various forms of social media such as blogs and Twitter. Both The Age Online 
and Crikey now incorporate many of these elements in their daily operations. 
Both publications run a number of blogs under their mastheads, and operate a 
number of Twitter accounts for a range of purposes, the main being promotion 
                                                                                                                                      
particularly because of the spatial and temporal identities entailed in their consumption and social use. 
However, the relationship between online news and television remains a possible area for future 
investigation.  
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of stories. Further, a number of key blogs, such as Larvatus Prodeo and Stilgherrian, 
have become a legitimate part of the Australian media landscape, while others 
have been subsumed into existing media organisations’ websites, such as Road 
to Surfdom, which became Blogocracy at News Limited’s news.com.au website, 
and The Poll Bludger and Pollytics, which were integrated into the Crikey 
network of blogs. While I acknowledge the success and importance of these 
blogs within the broader Australian media landscape, they do not fit the criteria 
for case studies needed to pursue my research question. While blogs are a part 
of the environment in which news finds itself online, they are not generally 
regarded as professional journalism. While this distinction is becoming more 
difficult to make, as blogs are coopted into professional news sites, it remains an 
important one for me in selecting my cases as I am interested in examining the 
extent to which professional journalistic practices influence the development of 
online journalism.  
 
In this context, The Age Online and Crikey are valuable as individual cases 
for a range of reasons. The most obvious contender as an alternative case is The 
Australian as it occupies a unique position within the Australian media landscape 
as the country’s only daily national newspaper. Further, its development online 
has traced a different path to The Age Online and Crikey as it exists both at its own 
site – theaustralian.news.com.au – but is also integrated into the News Limited 
online portal at news.com.au. Its ownership by News Limited also offers rich 
material for exploration given CEO Rupert Murdoch’s stance on new media 
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and paywalls (Thorpe, 2009). But the Crikey and Age case studies offer 
something else – they are in the unique position of being within the 
mainstream13 but operating against the Murdoch monopoly. While it would 
have been possible to compare the two cases of The Age and The Australian, in 
Crikey I am able to explore a publication that occupies a truly unique position in 
the Australian media landscape as the only independent, national, email news 
source. While Crikey is continually and vociferously derided from within the 
mainstream media for its lack of journalistic credibility, it has worked hard to 
position itself as a serious news source, breaking stories and reporting general 
news in its key areas of interest – politics, media and business. Crikey’s 
determination to be considered a mainstream news source can be seen in its 
three-year campaign to be admitted into the budget lock-in (Barns, 2007).  
 
While the new Fairfax online-only publications, WA Today and the 
Brisbane Times demonstrate a new willingness for traditional print media 
organisations to invest in online news they do not inhabit the independent 
position that Crikey does. Similarly, the revived National Times14 is not an 
independent news site, but an opinion-centred supplement to the news found 
on other sites under the Fairfax umbrella. Further, the daily nature of the Crikey 
email resonates more with print deadlines than it does with the fluid nature of 
                                                
13 Crikey’s mainstream status is highly contested, as I demonstrate in Chapter Four. But it is the very fact 
that its professional status is of such concern to established news sources like The Australian, who engage 
in the discussion of Crikey’s status on their editorial pages, that proves that Crikey poses a threat to their 
modus operandi, and hence its ever-increasing encroachment into the Australian mainstream media.   
14 From 1971–1987 the National Times operated as a weekly print newspaper providing analysis on 
politics, business and the arts. It now produces and aggregates opinion and analysis across the Fairfax 
Digital media network.  
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the online news continuous deadline. It is this interesting hybridity that Crikey 
embodies, situating it between new media and old, that makes it such an 
interesting case for comparison with an old media product that is encountering 
these same contradictions in the reverse. That is, while Crikey is an online 
publication adapting to the practices of print journalism, The Age is a print 
publication adapting these practices to the online environment. It is the 
intersection between these two processes and publications that makes them 
such excellent cases for study.  
 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, news and journalism, 
particularly in Western liberal democracies, faces challenges from a range of 
fronts encompassing a changing technological environment, economic 
challenges, a changing news audience and declining audience trust. However, 
despite these challenges, many are optimistic about what this changed 
environment might bring, suggesting that the capacities of the internet 
alongside altered relationships between content users and producers might spell 
the beginning of a more democratic age of media production. Against this 
background of multiple rhetorics I have selected two case studies – The Age 
Online and Crikey – to explore the navigation of these issues within the 
Australian context that provides a unique comparison to the experiences of the 
UK and US environments. In the following chapter I map my approach to the 
field of study that surrounds my topic, including news, journalism, 
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communication and technologies, before embarking on my analysis in 
Chapters Three to Six. 
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Chapter Two:  
Assembling an Approach to  
Online News 
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Introduction: the field of research  
As with other studies of media and communication, this study of online 
news falls into the broad category of qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998) map out the breadth of qualitative studies and the range of methods they 
encompass in this definition:  
 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring 
to them. (p. 3) 
 
Qualitative research can inhabit a range of epistemological positions, including 
positivist, interpretive, critical and constructivist, though often the boundaries 
between these are not clear, or multiple approaches are used. Qualitative 
research is adaptable, as there is no set methodological formula that must be 
followed, as in some types of quantitative research.  
 
Because of the seemingly ad hoc nature of qualitative research, the 
qualitative researcher is often called the bricoleur. Denzin and Lincoln cite Levi-
Strauss in defining the bricoleur as the “Jack of all trades or a kind of professional 
do-it-yourself person” (Levi-Strauss as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 3). 
The bricoleur makes use of whatever materials are available to solve the problem 
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at hand. Thus “the researcher-as-bricoleur uses the tools of his or her 
methodological trade, deploying whatever strategies, methods, or empirical 
materials are at hand” (Becker as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 3). This 
description of the “researcher-as-bricoleur” resonates with the way in which I 
have gathered materials from diverse fields to develop my approach to online 
news. In this chapter I outline the key literature around media and 
communication, technology, news and journalism in order to establish my 
critical approach to these areas.  
 
Defining news: institutionally located, socially constitutive 
‘News’ is a term that, despite – or perhaps because of – its widespread 
use, is rarely defined. Most broadly, news is the dissemination, via a form of 
media, of something new that will have some sort of social outcome. Mitchell 
Stephens (2007) defines news as “new information about a subject of some 
public interest that is shared with some portion of the public” – or more loosely, 
“what is on a society’s mind” whether it relates to politics or sport or celebrity 
(p. 4). Similarly, Harcup (2009) posits that “journalism informs society about 
itself and makes public that which would otherwise be private” (p. 3). Often, 
acknowledging the difficulty of providing a definition, news is reduced to the 
indefinable quality of ‘newsworthiness’, the recognition of which is cultivated 
through professional experience and expertise: “many experienced reporters 
are hard pressed to define exactly what constitutes news although they say they 
know what makes a good story when they find it” (White, 1996, p. 4). White’s 
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(1996) outline of the various uses of the term ‘news’ goes some of the way to 
considering news as part of its broader social context. These uses include 
providing stimulus for conversation, operating as entertainment in order to 
produce an emotional response, providing the necessary monitoring for 
citizenship, as well as providing information for making decisions about daily 
life (pp. 11–20).  
 
More useful is Michael Schudson’s (2003) definition of news as “what is 
publicly notable (within a shared understanding that judges it to be both public 
and notable)” (p. 6), because it is this sense of a “shared understanding” that 
signals the culturally formed nature of news as it is practised, understood and 
popularly defined. More broadly, his definition of news sits alongside his 
definition of journalism: 
 
Journalism is the business or practice of producing and disseminating 
information about contemporary affairs of general public interest and 
importance. It is the business of a set of institutions that publicizes 
periodically (usually daily) information and commentary on 
contemporary affairs, normally presented as true and sincere, to a 
dispersed and anonymous audience so as to publicly include the 
audience in a discourse taken to be publicly important. (Schudson, 2003, 
p. 11)  
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Schudson’s broad definition encompasses the professional practices that are 
bound up in the production of journalism and its public identity. It is also 
valuable because it situates journalism as a business, and recognises the 
centrality of the audience to news production. But, in particular, Schudson 
positions the field of journalism within the institutional context that facilitates 
its broader social function.  
 
The relationship between news and institutions is threefold: news is an 
institution, it is about institutions, and it requires institutions to operate 
(Hartley, 1989). Hartley positions news as both a social institution and an 
industry whose techniques have become so familiar to us that it can be 
delivered as a “pre-existing discourse” (p. 5), shaped by the practices of 
journalism and audience understanding. Following the threefold definition 
above, news is not only a public institution, it is also reliant upon other 
institutions for the supply of information: “news mediates the wider socio-
political environment to its audience, but in turn its content has been mediated 
by its reliance on how other institutions make information available” (Tiffen, 
1989, p. 32). Similarly, Hartley (1989) argues that news is given meaning and 
brought into being only in relation to other institutions operating at the same 
time, such as the state, the law, and the audience (pp. 8–9).  
 
 One aspect of news as an institution is its status as a profession for those 
who carry it out – primarily, journalists. Tiffen (1989) advocates an approach to 
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news content that gives primary attention to production processes that are 
embedded in institutionalised routines (p. 4). Similarly, Hartley (1989) argues 
that news must be understood in relation to the processes and conditions of its 
production:  
 
We have to understand the news not as a separate force, outside the social 
relations it seeks to report, but very much a part of them. Part of what 
determines the discourse of the news is the way the news-makers 
themselves act within the constraints, pressures, structures, and norms 
that bring the larger world of social relations to bear on their work. (p. 47)  
 
The processes of news production are largely governed by the temporal and 
spatial demands necessitated by the professional routines of journalism. News is 
routinely produced within a specific timeframe (for example, daily, hourly) and 
to set temporal-spatial requirements (such as column space, or a half-hour 
block within the television program schedule).  
 
This is complicated by the fact that often these factors are not made 
explicit or are ‘ hidden’ in the final product of news – both to news audiences 
and news producers. To those deeply involved in its production, and to those 
consuming it from a distance, news appears to be the result of the chance 
combination of chaotic occurrences. Schlesinger (1978) suggests that this is 
central to the myth that surrounds the production of journalism: “entrenched 
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in newsmen’s [sic] mythology about their work is the belief that news is 
somehow the product of a lack of organization” (p. 47). But by studying the 
production of news, Schlesinger found clear and organised systems at work in 
the processes of news-making, operating with a “determinate set of routines” 
which affect the news we read (p. 47). One of the most dominant routines 
structuring the news is its temporal cycles. These cycles of hourly, daily or 
weekly production and distribution structure not only the patterns of news 
making and its associated divisions of labour, but also the sorts of stories that 
are produced.   
 
While a number of journalism scholars argue that journalism constructs 
reality (Bird & Dardenne, 2009), the way that news is shaped by temporal 
cycles is suggestive of the ways in which news and journalism are socially 
constitutive. Hacking (1999) argues that a constructivist approach makes at least 
one of three conceptual steps: first, that a particular thing (or construct) is not 
inevitable (that is, that it is socially constructed); second, that that thing is quite 
bad as it is; and third, that we would be much better off if it was done away 
with or radically transformed (p. 6). Hacking argues that having once accepted 
something as socially constructed, the researcher can respond in a variety of 
ways, from accepting something as historically contingent to rebelliously 
questioning a social construct, or by taking a revolutionary approach to its 
upheaval. While it is possible to acknowledge the socially located-ness of 
notions of journalism, this requires attention to its historically contingent 
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development. Hacking argues that ideas occur within matrices of complex, 
institutional, social and material infrastructure and relations. For example, 
Hacking outlines the various material and social factors that work to construct 
the category of ‘woman refugee’:  
 
The matrix in which the idea of the woman refugee is formed is a 
complex of institutions, advocates, newspaper articles, lawyers, court 
decisions, immigration proceedings. Not to mention the material 
infrastructure, barriers, passports, uniforms, counters at airports, 
detention centers, courthouses, holiday camps for refugee children. (p. 
10) 
 
Similarly, understandings of journalism and its various social roles are formed 
within the matrix of professional practices, social expectations, audience 
relations, and business concerns. While my positioning of news and journalism 
as historically formed and socially constitutive does away with the notion that 
any of these social roles are ‘natural’, it nonetheless takes them seriously in 
tracing their historical formation and current operation.     
 
If news and journalism are socially constitutive, then they are active in 
the constitution of particular social relations and identities. Morley (2005) 
summarises Benedict Anderson’s (1991) seminal demonstration of the way in 
which communication brings particular kinds of social relations into being 
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through the example of community: “a community is not an entity that exists 
and then happens to communicate. Rather, communities are best understood 
as constituted in and through their changing patterns of communication” 
(Morley, 2005, p. 50). Communication of different kinds is active in the 
constitution of different types of social identities, relations, and ideas. As 
Anderson demonstrates – and as I outline in greater detail in Chapter Five as 
part of my discussion of the changing news audience – news, in particular, plays 
an active role in the constitution of national identities and relations15. In this 
thesis I consider the way in which changes in the nature of news may bring into 
effect changes in related identities and relations, particularly those of audiences.  
 
News and journalism as material culture  
While a focus on identities and relations may at first appear abstract, by 
attending to the constitutive nature of news and journalism, I am also marking 
out my historical perspective. This perspective requires attention to the 
material conditions that give shape to changing social relations. Thus this thesis 
is also concerned with news and journalism as instances of material culture that 
make up lived experience. Braudel (1992) argues that “material life is made up 
of people and things” (p. 31),  listing food, housing, clothing, luxury, tools and 
currency as examples. The elements of material life are potentially endless and 
constantly changing. Following Braudel, we can adopt a particular focus so as 
                                                
15 As I outline in Chapter Five, Anderson demonstrates the central role of newspapers in the 
constitution of a shared national identity. His development of this concept is taken up in the work of 
Mercer (1992), Schudson (2003) and Morley (2003, 2005), who explore the relationship between media 
and temporal and spatial relations.  
 67 
to notice and take serious the ‘things’ that make up material life, as well as the 
events that surround them:     
 
Everyday life consists of the little things one hardly notices in time and 
space. The more we reduce the focus of vision, the more likely we are to 
find ourselves in the environment of material life: the broad sweep 
usually corresponds to History with a capital letter, to distant trade 
routes, and the networks of national or urban economies. If we reduce 
the length of the time observed, we either have the event or the everyday 
happening. The event is, or is taken to be, unique; the everyday 
happening is repeated, and the more often it is repeated the more likely 
it is to become a generality or rather a structure. It pervades society at all 
levels, and characterises ways of being and behaving which are 
perpetuated through endless ages. (Braudel, 1992, p. 29) 
 
In this study I am interested in “the little things one hardly notices in time and 
space” and the way in which they become normalised and naturalised. I am 
interested in the way that journalism is shaped not only by large events, such as 
(apparently) sudden technological advances, but also by smaller, material 
factors, such as professional routines which have become everyday ways of 
embedding broader ideas about journalism, the way that it is practised and its 
social implications. The panopoly of ‘little things’ that online news entails 
invites just this focusing of vision entailed in Braudel’s approach.  
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In making a case for the study of material culture, Ian Hodder (1998) 
draws from Derrida to argue that “Western social science has long privileged 
the spoken over the written and the written over the nonverbal” (p. 111). 
Hodder argues that, just like written text, the meaning we attach to material 
artefacts is shaped by the historical context of their creation, interpretation, and 
possible reuse. So artefacts, when compared to documents and records, provide 
different but no lesser pictures of a particular historical context. In fact, in some 
cases, such as Hodder’s example of a path worn into a patch of grass, material 
artefacts can speak louder or more clearly than words. While records of popular 
pedestrian routes and interviews with pedestrians provide particular types of 
evidence, the material trace found in a worn patch of grass offers a visual 
resonance that speaks in itself of types of human activity.  
 
It is possible to extend Hodder’s approach to make a case for the study 
of websites as material culture. While individual news stories can be read and 
analysed textually, the meanings attached to a site itself are more complex, 
socially located, and practically formed. Hodder provides the example of a 
garlic crusher, which has no overt symbolic meaning, but through “a complex 
set of practices surrounding food and its preparation, [in the UK], the crusher 
has come to mean class through evocation” (p. 116). Similarly, the meaning 
attached to a newspaper is not limited to the symbolic content of the stories. 
Anderson (1991) speaks of the “extraordinary mass ceremony” (p. 35) 
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performed by thousands of anonymous readers of the daily newspaper through 
which the act of consuming the news gains a broader meaning and becomes 
imbued with notions of shared time and space. This resonates with Hodder’s 
argument that some material objects come to gather meaning through “sets of 
practices within individual experience” (p. 116). In considering the newspaper 
or news site as a material artefact, it is necessary to read it not just textually, or 
symbolically, but for surrounding social uses and attached meanings. These can 
be gained from close analysis of the artefact itself, as well as traces of the social 
uses and practices that grow around it – for example, through the study of 
audience data. Insights about the material, social significance of changing forms 
of news come not just from a reading of symbolic content, nor solely from 
audience studies, nor simply studies of journalism production. While I draw on 
all of these approaches, I also attend to a source that is often precluded by 
these: the materiality of the site itself and the culture that surrounds it.  
 
The genealogical approach  
This focus on the materiality of online news, by attending to the daily, 
the ordinary, the ‘little things’, dispenses with a view of the history of online 
news that seeks to locate present events within an over-arching, supra-historical 
narrative. While I take a historical approach, I don’t assume that the present is 
the already-written result of the past. The history of online news I am interested 
in contributing to is not ‘a history whose function is to compose the finally 
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reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself’ (Foucault, 2000, 
p. 379). That is, it does not seek to argue that online news, in the shapes it is 
taking, was always on the horizon, imminent in earlier incarnations of 
journalism. Instead, I aim to be attentive to the ways in which historical 
circumstances, events, and decisions have helped to shape present events and 
conditions. The current shape of online news is thus historically contingent but 
not pre-determined. In taking a historical approach to the study of online news, I 
am aiming to contribute to what Foucault has at times called a ‘history of the 
present’, and at others, a genealogy.  
 
Foucault (2000) outlines the way in which a genealogy resists the 
essentialising tendencies of narrative histories:   
 
“Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore unbroken 
continuity … its task is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in 
the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having 
imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes … [Genealogy] is to 
identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the 
complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to exist and 
have value for us …”  (p. 374) 
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As I have attempted to outline thus far, and will continue to aim to outline 
throughout the extent of this thesis, the history of online news has been replete 
with accidents, faulty calculations, and so on.  
 
Genealogy is also concerned with problems, or rather, the process of 
problematisation, through which particular areas of life are shaped up into 
commonly held problems. Problematisation is “the level at which the agenda is 
set for common problems under discussion in a particular time and place” 
(O'Farrell, 2005, p. 70). In seeking out problems, Foucault (as cited in 
O'Farrell, 2005) argues that genealogy is concerned with “the analysis of the 
way an unproblematic field of experience or set of practices which were 
accepted without question … becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, 
incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behaviour, 
habits, practices and institutions” (Foucault as cited in O'Farrell, 2005, p. 70). 
Foucault further explains the way in which particular ‘domains of action’ 
become problematised through the identification of changes and difficulties 
within that domain:   
 
Actually, for a domain of action, a behaviour, to enter the field of 
thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it 
uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a 
certain number of difficulties around it. These elements result from 
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social, economic, or political processes. (Foucault & Rabinow, 1997, p. 
117) 
 
As I have mapped out in this thesis thus far, journalism is a domain that has 
become problematised. Indeed, I have hinted at this in the previous chapter’s 
title: The Problem of News. As Foucault indicates, problematisation of particular 
domains of action – in this instance, the domain of action under consideration 
is ‘the media’, and more specifically, news organisations and the institutional 
practice of journalism – requires uncertainty and difficulties to inhere to these 
areas. With the ‘settling in’16 of internet technology, and a range of political and 
economic shifts, the domain of journalism has faced increasing uncertainty and 
difficulty, and has thus been shaped into a shared social problem. It is from 
within this problem that this research begins.   
   
As well as beginning from the point of a shared social problem, a 
genealogy produces a ‘history of the present’. By this it is meant that a 
genealogical approach does not seek its answers in the past, but is grounded in 
a rejection of “naïve empiricist accounts of historiography as a reconstruction 
of the past” (Dean, 1997, p. 9). Rather, history is mined not only as a source of 
continuities between past and present, but also for the discontinuities, errors, 
                                                
16 This is a term used by Thrift (2006) to describe the complex processes through which technologies 
settle into particular patterns of use. The process of settling entails the intensified processes of capitalism 
that bring producers and consumers into closer relations with one another, as I outline in Chapter Five. 
The idea of ‘settling’ is also adopted by Boczkowski (2004a), as I outline later in the present chapter.  
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and other possible ways forward. Writing about this in relation to the 
development of media, Boczkowski (2004a) has said:  
 
A historical perspective helps the analyst to elicit the influence of 
extended longitudinal patterns in the ways actors deal with new 
technologies, thus achieving a more sophisticated assessment of 
continuities and discontinuities in media evolution (p. 4). 
 
Present circumstances are positioned as the outcome of past conditions, but not 
inevitably so. A view to historical contingency looks not only for possible 
sources of what was, but also what could have been. In the case of the 
development of online journalism it does not seek a definitive ‘origin’ of present 
forms, but the various conditions and circumstances, the decisions, mistakes, 
oversights and miscalculations from which our complex present arose.  
 
An emphasis on historical contingency works against the tendency for 
technological determinism in discussion of the development of new 
communication technologies. Rather than positioning technology as the key 
driver in the development of new communication forms – in this case, online 
journalism – I follow Raymond Williams in refusing technology such a singular, 
abstracted status. Williams (1989) does this by defining technologies as socially 
formed, arguing that communication technologies cannot be abstracted from 
the social conditions of their development and use, proposing that such 
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abstraction routinely results from a confusion of technical invention, such as 
packet switching, and a technology, such as the internet:  
A technique is a particular skill or application of a skill. A technical 
invention is then a development of such a skill or the development or 
invention of one of its devices. A technology by contrast is, first, the body 
of knowledge appropriate to the development of such skills and 
applications, and, second, a body of knowledge and conditions for the 
practical use and application of a range of devices. (Williams, 1989, p. 
173)  
By beginning his definition with technique, at the level of human skill, Williams 
immediately locates the development of technologies within and not outside of 
the field of social action. The next step to a technical invention brings this human 
technique into play with a range of social, political, economic, and importantly, 
institutional factors (such as the science laboratory, the university department, 
government funding bodies, entrepreneurs, specialist businesses, and so on), in 
order to follow its development into an integrated invention. Finally, the 
definition of technology as the third stage in this three-step process includes 
these skills, techniques and devices, but also their associated, institutionally 
located knowledge and actual uses and applications. It is therefore possible, 
when starting with this broad definition of any technology, to see 
communication technologies as always fully social, and historically and 
institutionally formed. 
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While a historical approach often tends to highlight ‘key moments’ in 
the development of phenomena, it is important not to over-emphasise these 
instances. Bozckowski’s emphasis on the continuities and discontinuities, as well 
as Foucault’s call to consider equally the accidents, deviations and errors along 
with the ‘big decisions’ and triumphs, provide constructive remedies. 
Regarding the same problem, Allan (2006) carefully negotiates two moments 
that might both be seen as ‘tipping points’, a term he draws from Gladwell 
(2001) in the development of online news: Rupert Murdoch’s 2005 address to 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors;17 and the 2004 Southeast Asia 
tsunami, and the vast and immediate citizen response. Allan signals the danger 
of “reifying these ‘magic moments’”, arguing that news is far messier than these 
“formative instances” indicate (p. 11). He suggests that such key moments are 
better understood as:  
 
… indicative of a complex – and always contradictory – array of 
interrelated imperatives. To the extent that it is possible to discern the 
contours of these imperatives, especially with respect to the economic, 
political and cultural dynamics which imbue their logics, it is likely they 
will be more apparent in retrospect than they were at the time. In other 
words, when examining them from the vantage point of today, it is a 
                                                
17 Allan suggests that Murdoch’s (2005) address was a turning point for news businesses because of his 
overt recognition of the threat posed to traditional ‘business models’ by the growing dominance of the 
internet and the changing audience practices of ‘digital natives’ who have grown up with the internet as 
part of their daily lives (Allan, 2006, p. 2).  
 76 
challenge to appreciate the socially contingent, frequently contested 
nature of their lived negotiation. (p. 11) 
 
This does not mean that these ‘key moments’ should be ignored, but that it is 
necessary to be attentive not only to the key moments in the development of 
online news, but also the social context that surrounds them. This is why the 
attention to the social, cultural, political and economic factors and the 
decisions, debates and negotiations undertaken by key actors that shape the 
development of online news is so necessary, as it avoids endowing any moment 
or any of these categories with too much influence. Rather, online news is 
shaped in specific ways by a range of factors that come together in historically 
contingent circumstances.  
  
The development of online news   
Boczkowski (2004a) places similar emphasis on the importance of 
broader context as he outlines the development of online news, arguing that 
“new media emerge by merging existing social and material infrastructures 
with novel technical capabilities, a process that also unfolds in relation to 
broader contextual trends” (p. 4). Here, I outline in some detail an example 
from Boczkowski’s discussion of the broader contextual factors, as well as the 
smaller details of history that surrounded the development of online news in the 
United States. Boczkowski explains that US newspapers were already looking 
at alternatives to print before the boom in personal computing, in response to 
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changing socio-economic trends that saw less interest in print, particularly 
among younger audiences. These trends included a move towards urban 
sprawl and related work and commuting practices, the rise of broadcast media, 
and the gradual fracturing of the ‘mass’ audience. While these trends triggered 
experiments with new forms of news, such as facsimile editions, it wasn’t until 
the popularisation of the world wide web in the mid-1990s that print 
newspapers found a medium that offered a real alternative to their existing 
problematic form.  
 
Boczkowski goes on to map the way in which the development and 
acceptance of “the web” (along with the necessary browsers for accessing it) 
intersected with a time at which, in the US at least, “the print daily newspaper 
industry was quite profitable yet showing clear signs of economic decline” (p. 7). 
He explains that the signs for newspapers were not all bad: there was still 
revenue growth, and newspapers still lead the way in advertising, ahead of 
television and radio. However, circulation was already showing a long-term 
decline, and figures indicated that with the ageing population, young readers 
weren’t turning to newspapers like their predecessors. In this environment he 
suggests, “it is not surprising that many print papers launched online editions 
on the web during the second half of the 1990s” (p. 8). In the US, the migration 
online was swift – in 1995, 175 US newspapers were found to have developed a 
presence online, while in 1999 the figure was 702. Usage of online news showed 
a similar explosion of use so that for instance, in December 1998, 
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USAToday.com reported 2.5 million visitors to its website for the month; three 
months later that figure had soared to 923,000 users a day.  
 
Thus Boczkoswki demonstrates that the development of online news in 
the US was not simply the result of the availability of a new technology, as it 
has often been presented,18 but rather the result of the convergence of a range 
of social, economic, cultural and technological conditions, in a particular 
historical moment, which produced a particular and entirely contingent 
outcome. However, despite being attentive to contingency, technologies do 
become ‘settled’ in particular ways. Lievrouw and Livingstone (2006) argue that 
technologies, while often open to a range of possible uses, are not always and 
infinitely so. Rather, infrastructure – that is, the combined artefacts, practices 
and social relations around a technology – “can and do become routine, 
established, institutionalized, and fixed to various extents, and so become taken 
for granted in every day life” (p. 3). Similarly, Boczkowski (2004a) uses the word 
‘settling’ “to make sense of the passage from multiple options to a preferred 
one” (p. 19):  
 
I utilise the word ‘settling’ and weave together the notions of settling a 
dispute, settling in, and the actors as settlers … This leads to the notion 
of settling in as a development-oriented activity illuminating how 
                                                
18 Rupert Murdoch, for instance, a key global figure in the production of news, frequently deploys 
technologically determinist rhetoric, presenting the current changes to journalism as a direct result of 
the availability of the internet, in his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (2005) and 
his Boyer Lecture series (2008a, 2008b, 2008c).  
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sociotechnical options continue to unfold after the emergence of a 
dominant alternative, and to the notion of the actors as settlers moving 
into a territory new to them but having a preexisting social and material 
basis. (p. 19)  
 
The settling of communication technologies into particular, institutionalised 
forms and infrastructures means that particular care is needed when attending 
to what is ‘new’ about an apparently ‘new media’, such as online news.  
  
From ‘new’ to ‘digital’ media  
 Lievrouw and Livingstone’s (2006) definition of new media includes the 
artefacts, practices and social arrangements that arise around new 
communication technologies (p. 23). Flew (2005a) puts forward a similar 
threefold definition of media, encompassing the technological means of 
communication, the institutional and organisational forms through which 
media content is produced and distributed, and the informational and symbolic 
content that is received and consumed by readers, audiences and users. He 
suggests that the ‘newness’ of some supposedly ‘new’ technologies is often 
undermined by a careful attendance to history: “for instance, the technology of 
the digital video disc (DVD) is new when compared with the video cassette 
recorder (VCR), but appears less new when compared with the compact disc 
(CD), whose principle features it extends into audiovisual media” (p. 1). Rather, 
new technologies need to be understood as more than just a series of 
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incremental technical developments but in terms of the level of qualitative 
change they represent to old technologies.  
 
Thus while the term ‘new media’ opens up a number of heuristic 
questions about what is new and for whom, a more useful term for this thesis is 
‘digital media’. Digital media encompasses forms of media content that 
“combine and integrate data, text, sound, and images of all kinds, are stored in 
digital formats, and are increasingly distributed through the digital, networked 
environment” (Flew, 2005a, p. 83). The internet is both the greatest exemplar 
of digital media, as well as the place where a range of other forms of digital 
media are aggregated, shared and distributed. Flew explains that digital media 
often integrate existing media formats into digital forms – so that printed text, 
films, music and television are all interpreted in the digital environment. This 
helps to bypass the ‘what’s new about new media?’ question while at the same 
time acknowledging that when existing media forms enter the digital 
environment, there is the possibility for them to be reinterpreted and reshaped. 
Flew also flags two important characteristics of digital media: the more active 
role for users in generating content, and a blurring of lines between producers 
and consumers (explored in more detail in Chapter Five); and the transmission 
of material through broadband and personal computers, but increasingly on 
mobile digital devices. The social development and use of digital technology 
has contributed in large part to the ‘problem’ of news.    
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Defining online news and journalism  
In its early days, online journalism was commonly defined as the 
repurposing of content prepared for traditional journalism for a companion 
website (Massey & Levy, 1999).19 But today, digital news sites go far beyond 
offering a digital version of their print counterpart. Deuze (2003) uses the term 
‘online journalism’ rather than digital news, recognising the way that the 
internet has intersected with the existing institution of journalism to create “its 
own professional type of news work: online journalism” (p. 205). Bardoel and 
Deuze (2001) argue that the key characteristics of online journalism are 
interactivity, customisation of content, hypertextuality, and multimediality. 
Deuze (2003) further expands upon these characteristics:   
 
Online journalism is seen as journalism as it is produced more or less 
exclusively for the world wide web (as a graphic interface of the 
internet). Online journalism can be functionally differentiated from 
other kinds of journalism by using its technological component as a 
determining factor in terms of an (operational) definition. The online 
journalist has to make decisions as to which media format or formats 
best convey a certain story (multimediality), consider options for the 
public to respond, interact or even customize certain stories 
(interactivity), and think about ways to connect the story to other stories, 
archives, resources and so forth through hyperlinks (hypertextuality). (p. 
206) 
                                                
19 Massey and Levy are drawing on the work of Pavlik (1997) in this definition.  
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Deuze limits his claims about the determining influence of technology by 
framing this as a working definition, and it is necessary to display similar 
caution when considering the role of technology in the development of 
particular communicative forms. Certainly news has changed in radical ways as 
it has intersected with digital technology, but these changes have been gradual 
and socially grounded. When online newspapers first appeared in the mid-90s, 
they were, as Massey and Levy describe, simply a repurposing of an existing 
product in a new format. Much has changed since then and online newspapers 
now do far more than their print equivalents. In some areas they do less. But 
this change is not simply the result of technology, but rather the result of the 
social processes of the ‘settling’ of this technology.  
 
Nonetheless, news that is produced for online does have defining 
characteristics that set it apart from other forms of journalism, much as we 
separate print from television and television from radio news. Axel Bruns (2004) 
argues that online news has three key affordances20 that distinguish it from 
other forms of news: “the ability to combine text, images and audiovisual 
material in innovative ways; the possibility of involving news audiences in a 
highly interactive fashion; and the chance to use hypertext to create 
connections between published news items and the wider Web” (p. 178). 
                                                
20 Affordances are “the perceived properties of an object that suggest (but do not determine) how it might 
be used” (Rappert, 2003, p. 566 – original emphasis), and can also be thought of as the capacities or 
properties of a particular technology. The term affordances is particularly constructive as it avoids 
assigning a determining role to technology, instead recognising that actual social uses always influence 
the development of technologies, and fits with Williams’ view that technology is always fully social. 
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However, he points out that in Australia, at the time of his writing, most news 
organisations had failed to adopt these possibilities. Thus they remain potential 
capabilities, and not defining characteristics. McAree (as cited in Flew, 2005a, 
p. 89) argues that it is the interactive content, the scope for continuous feedback 
with audiences, dynamic content, the never-ending deadline, and the capacity 
for highly targeted marketing that differentiates online news from other forms.  
 
Boczkowski (2004a) outlines three key characteristics of online news: it is 
more user-centred than print news, it is no longer a unidirectional monologue 
(spoken by journalists to their audience), but it is now part of multiple ongoing 
conversations, and it has an increased micro-local focus when compared to the 
broader scope of news catering to a mass audience. In seeking a definition for 
online news, Boczkowksi argues that it is “what those contributing to its 
production make it” – and with the “reconstruction of news online”, more and 
different actors are involved in its production than in the print form (p. 83). 
That is, news is no longer solely the product of journalists and editors. It now 
increasingly involves more diverse groups of people, such as both print and 
online newsrooms (although increasing numbers of newsrooms are moving 
towards integration of the two)21, advertisers and marketers who have an 
interest in aligning their work with content, technical and design personnel who 
                                                
21 The rhetoric of structural integration has been central to the development of online news. In 
practice, the integration of print (or radio, or television) and online operations is productive of a range 
of tensions around the labour demands, routines, expectations and practices of journalists and other 
production staff. In 2007, The New York Times and the London Telegraph were two of the first newsrooms 
to integrate its print and online operations, and established as models for other newspapers to follow. 
While Fairfax Media, the company that owns The Age has announced plans to integrate its newsrooms a 
number of times, in practice, the print and online arms remain separate, as I will outline in Chapter 
Four.   
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manage the presentation and availability of multimedia and interactive 
material, and finally, the users (or audience) whose presence is felt through their 
contact with journalists and other users through comments, forums, email and 
so on. In this changing news environment Boczkowski argues that it is those 
who work to coordinate these various actors and roles that have a heightened 
importance in the news production process. 
 
 Others argue for the possibility of dramatically new forms of news 
online. For instance, Charlie Beckett’s (2008) formulation of  “networked 
journalism” (briefly outlined in the previous chapter), combines professional 
and citizen journalism. This networked journalism is reactive, user-led, 
collaborative, process-based, constant, cheap and unprofitable, setting it apart 
from traditional journalism, even as it is practised on the web, in a number of 
ways.  Similarly, Lasica (2003) argues that we are witnessing the rise of 
participatory journalism across a range of forms, from the incorporation of 
audience participation at mainstream news sites, to fully fledged participatory 
news sites such as OhmyNews, and everything in between. Dahlgren (2009) 
makes more qualified claims about what this changed media environment 
might mean for democracy, cautioning that “‘better’ technology does not 
always lead to ‘better’ journalism” (p. 174). But on balance, Dahlgren argues 
that greater access to the information and publishing channels that constitute 
“this new era of journalism” offers “enhanced possibilities for civic knowledge 
and access to a broader range of ideas and debates” (p. 175) that ultimately 
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benefits civic cultures. Whatever it is called, there is a growing international 
(though predominantly Western) chorus arguing that journalism is being and 
will continue to be transformed as it intersects with the internet in new ways – 
whether in the form of its production (Benkler, 2006; Gillmor, 2004; Glaser, 
2006), delivery (Shirky, 2009) or reception (Rosen, 2006).   
 
So how do I define online news? I suggest that online news appears on 
the internet, is designed for access via personal computers and laptops – and 
not mobile devices, around which even newer forms of news are developing22 – 
encompassing both material that has been repurposed from print, and original 
material produced for the online environment. Boczkowksi (2004a) speaks not 
of a new news online but of the “reconstruction” of news online (p. 183), 
indicating that content that might be seen as ‘repurposed’ for the online 
environment is in fact reconstructed for a different audience online. While 
‘digital news’ is a more precise descriptor of the form of news found online, it is 
precisely because of what may seem like a clumsy divide established between 
online and offline practices that makes ‘online news’ a useful term in this 
instance. ‘Online news’ illuminates the tensions that arise around new forms of 
production, delivery and consumption that arise when news is made digital. 
Thus the difference between ‘online news’ and ‘digital news’ is like that 
                                                
22 I have not included news on mobile devices in my analysis because the news format is generally 
tailored to that particular platform, and quite different to the newspaper it relates to. For instance, The 
Age’s mobile site is a condensed version of the website, with far less access to stories than its regular 
online ‘version’. Further, while The Age first faced heavy criticism for realising a PDF version of its print 
newspaper as its iPad app, it has recently followed The Australian to tailor its app to the tablet 
environment, mimicking the print experience, complete with pages the user can ‘turn’. These iPad 
versions, while opening up space for future investigation, particularly into the way in which they extend 
print metaphors on-screen, are quite different to what I mean by ‘online news’.   
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between ‘print news’ and ‘newspapers’. While ‘print news’ is a more accurate 
description of the form of the news, ‘newspapers’ encompass their print nature 
along with the cultural practices and assumptions that surround this form. Thus 
I adopt the term ‘online news’ along with the associated term ‘online 
journalism’ to cover the nature of news online, as well as the surrounding 
culture and practices of its production, delivery and use. Boczkowski (2004a) 
argues that the move from print to online news involves not only a technical 
but also a cultural change, and this cultural change extends beyond the 
material practices and infrastructure that surround news work to include the 
nature of news work itself. He argues that while US print newspapers initially 
tried to reproduce print practices online, “in doing this they have begun 
constructing a kind of newspaper that although it bears connections to its print 
predecessor, also differs qualitatively from it in its material infrastructure, 
editorial practices, and production routines” (p. 187).  
  
Having established my definitions for and approach to online news and 
journalism, in the next chapter I begin the first of my four stages of analysis of 
this shifting culture of news online by exploring the changing political role of 
news. I outline the traditional and still dominant notion of journalism as a 
‘fourth estate’ in a democracy, before demonstrating the way in which this 
relationship is currently under threat. I argue that it is not only the altered 
technological environment that is threatening this traditional relationship, but 
 87 
also, and more specifically, the changing political and economic conditions of 
advanced liberalism that are reshaping contemporary journalism. 
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Chapter Three: 
Journalism’s Changing Political Role 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the traditional relationship between journalism 
and democracy before considering how recent media developments have 
affected it. Arguments that arise in response to this changing relationship tend 
to fall into two broad categories: those that predict the demise of journalism’s 
democratic role in an increasingly digital environment and those that predict its 
renewal through new forms of engagement online. I use the example of Eric 
Beecher’s (2009b) argument for the preservation of what he calls “public trust 
journalism” – under threat from digital media and the migration of advertising 
dollars online – to demonstrate the latter. These two arguments sit at an 
impasse, speaking past each other of either the threats or opportunities that are 
found in a new media environment. In order to move beyond this stalemate, I 
present a range of arguments that suggest that the relationship between 
journalism and democracy has long been problematic and complex, and 
remains so as the digital medium develops.  
 
For instance, I consider Michael Schudson’s (2008) argument that 
journalism does not automatically equate to democracy. Schudson questions 
the definition of democracy that this assumption of easy equivalence is based 
on, and warns against the adoption of populist concepts of democratic 
participation, making a case for the continuing importance of representative 
democracy. Terry Flew (2009) suggests that arguments that tout the renewal of 
democracy online are based on the speculative argument that people want or 
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expect more from democracy than is already available to them in existing 
democratic arrangements. I also consider John Keane’s (2009) argument that in 
the digital era of “communicative abundance” we do have a new form of 
democracy: monitory democracy. However, while taking an optimistic stance 
about this new breed of democracy, Keane is far from celebratory. Rather, he 
is ambivalent about some of the effects of “communicative abundance” on the 
practice of journalism, despite being optimistic about the overall consequences 
of monitory democracy.  
 
Given the complex and often problematic nature of arguments about 
the relationship between journalism and democracy, in the latter part of this 
chapter I propose a different way to conceive of their entanglement. I argue 
that by moving beyond the notion of democracy and adopting a broader notion 
of politics and the concept of government, we can think of journalism as a 
technology of government, and more specifically of liberalism, and presently, 
advanced liberalism. With this repositioning, journalism’s relationship to 
democracy is no longer static or based on an ideal or lost ‘golden age’ that 
needs somehow to be recaptured, but rather can be grasped in relation to 
changing forms of liberal government. This allows for an understanding of the 
political role of journalism that extends beyond a fourth estate notion of the 
press to include other forms of journalism, on other mediums (including online), 
as well as the existence of journalism in non-democratic regimes. However, the 
transitions in the relationship between liberalism and journalism are not always 
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easy or comfortable. Returning to the example of Beecher’s call for the 
preservation of public trust journalism, I argue that his position embodies some 
of the tensions that arise around changing notions of democracy – or liberalism 
– and the associated changes in journalism. In comparison, I suggest that The 
Age Online demonstrates both tension and flexibility around these changes, 
suggesting it is better attuned to the demands of the changing political 
environment, but that its transition towards a changed form of journalism 
online will not necessarily be a smooth one.  
 
Journalism and democracy 
Journalism has, since the late nineteenth century, been associated with 
democracy, a relationship best embodied by the notion of the fourth estate. In 
this construction, news and the practice of journalism are seen to provide an 
additional ‘check’ to the democratic system of checks and balances in place 
between the legislature, judiciary, and the executive. Through a range of 
professional journalistic practices, such as objectivity and accountability, news 
is seen as fit to act as a ‘watchdog’ on the fair and just functioning of 
democracy. This sort of system also requires press freedom, which is often used 
as a diagnostic indicator of the health of democracies in developing nations.23 
However, as outlined earlier, journalism’s numerous recent crises include a 
crisis of public confidence that has seen its democratic role threatened as its 
                                                
23 This is typified by the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders which ranks nations 
according to the level of freedom afforded to their media in relation to a number of criteria, such as 
levels of censorship and other threats to journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2010).  
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ability to operate in a fair and balanced way has been considered 
compromised. 
 
This has been further challenged by the advent of digital media, which has 
paradoxically also been heralded in some quarters as the possible saviour of 
contemporary democracy and journalism. Indeed, the advent and development 
of digital news signalled a period of intense optimism about the new 
communication technology’s capacity to reinvigorate popular engagement in 
the public sphere (see, for example, Gillmor, 2004; Glaser, 2006; Lasica, 2003; 
Rosen, 2006). The nature of these arguments is that the internet would provide 
a space for more democratic participation both as a platform providing 
material for deliberation and in its potential to allow for more democratic forms 
of participation. These arguments are heightened as the boundary between 
producer and consumer is blurred in the process of content production online, 
particularly through the use of Web 2.024 applications. Schudson (2008) 
suggests that while discussions around journalism tend to focus on changes to 
its fourth estate role, these neglect the more positive changes that are occurring 
online: 
 
                                                
24 Web 2.0 has become a popular buzzword to periodise the latest era of the internet in comparison to 
the emerging web of the 1990s, and the accompanying technological, social, and economic 
developments. Matthew Allen (2008) argues that Web 2.0 encompasses a range of technological and 
social characteristics: the rise of web design that allows “the manipulation and presentation of data 
through the interaction of both human and computer agents”, enabling more interaction for users; a 
business model that more effectively targets audiences allowing the collection of more detailed audience 
data; the provision of services that enable a more active and participatory role for ‘users’; and an 
accompanying rhetoric of a more democratic web, internal to the activities of the web itself.  
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The public forum function of journalism has cracked wide open with the 
creation of the World Wide Web; the Internet opens up this journalistic 
function in the most wide-ranging and profound way. Its virtue is not 
individual but social, the virtue of interaction, of conversation, of an easy 
and agreeable democratic sociability. (p. 21)  
 
Here, the process of democratisation is linked not to journalism’s fourth estate 
or watchdog role, but to the process of journalism becoming more transparent, 
to interaction between journalists and audiences, and the notion of news as a 
dialogue. Also occurring is the democratisation of the production of content, 
with platforms such as blogs and Twitter granting a far greater role to non-
professionals in the generation and dissemination of news.  
 
However, optimism about the web’s democratic potential has been 
matched by pessimism about its capacity to threaten the economic model that 
has allowed journalism to inhabit its fourth estate role. With the migration of 
advertising dollars online, the so-called ‘rivers of gold’ that traditionally funded 
journalism are drying up, placing print newspapers, the harbinger of fourth 
estate journalism, under enormous financial pressure, threatening their ability 
to fund the sort of long-term, investigative journalism that fulfils their 
democratic role. The migration of advertising dollars online has followed the 
flow of news audiences who are increasingly seeking their news online. But 
online advertising is no financial match for the behemoth of print classifieds, 
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leaving online news sites struggling to find a business model to adequately fund 
their activities as they did in print. While news producers and organisations 
continue to test various business models and structures, such as paywalls and 
subscriptions, a successful, one-size-fits-all recipe for financially viable news 
production online remains elusive. Thus journalism online, without the 
resources that fuelled its print counterparts, has not yet demonstrated its ability 
to match its journalistic and democratic scope.  
 
An example of the complex problem facing journalism and democracy is 
embodied by Eric Beecher’s (2009b) concern about the threat to “public trust 
journalism” posed by digital news and its disruption of the traditional news 
business model. His definition of public trust journalism is that which:  
 
… applies scrutiny, analysis and accountability to governments, 
parliaments, politicians, public servants, judges, police, councils, the 
military, NGOs, diplomats, business and community leaders and the 
recipients of public funding.  
 
He argues that the existence of this sort of journalism is necessary to keep these 
various arms of democracy “open, honest and accountable”, but due to its 
costliness in terms of both time and financial resources, it is being challenged in 
the digital environment.  
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Beecher goes on to outline the operation of public trust journalism in 
Australia, explaining that it has traditionally been funded by both public 
broadcasters and privately owned newspapers – and specifically, the ABC, The 
Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age and the Financial Review. With the 
migration of advertising dollars from print to online sources, these five media 
outlets are no longer equipped to offer the “public trust journalism” they once 
had, suggesting that at present there is no publication (and Beecher includes his 
own publications in this judgement) able to fill the gap created by this 
downturn. He argues, “there is no hint anywhere of an emerging commercial 
model for the large-scale ‘public trust’ journalism I have described” (Beecher, 
2009b).  
 
Beecher describes the funding of public trust journalism through public 
broadcasters and privately owned newspapers as an “accident of commerce 
and history”:  
 
Most of this journalism has been funded by the profits from the highly 
lucrative classified advertising that appeared in the same newspapers 
that also undertook the ‘public trust’ journalism. And those newspapers 
and their owners loved it while it lasted: they got to make extortionate 
profits from the classified ads at the same time as they were basking in 
the power and glory of running ‘public trust’ journalism. Now, as 
classified advertising migrates from newspapers to the internet, that 
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funding source is disappearing.  
 
Beecher’s suggested remedy to this scenario is to fund public journalism from 
public sources, such as governments and NGOs. He argues that just as public 
funding is made available for education and the arts for the enhancement of 
society, so too must funding be made available for public trust journalism, 
enabling it to fulfil its democratic role.  
 
In support of this model, Crikey has suggested that Australia look to the 
French journalism funding model where there is already significant government 
subsidy of newspaper journalism, which has recently been increased as 
newspapers face growing threats to the basis of their operations:   
 
The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, makes no apology for increasing 
already significant government support for French newspapers by some 
600 million Euros over the next three years. In part this is a mess with 
quite specific regional characteristics, but in greater measure the troubles 
of French newspapers are no different to the situation in the USA, 
Britain, and of course, Australia. ("Crikey says," 2009)  
 
However, Crikey argues that when Beecher suggested a similar arrangement in 
Australia the year before the French move, “he was howled down”, his critics 
equating government assistance with government control:  
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It seems the French have a more sophisticated understanding of what 
Government subsidy to press and journalism might imply: rather than a 
government tainted media, it might lead instead to a healthy national 
discussion and a democracy refreshed by the free flow of news and ideas. 
("Crikey says," 2009) 
 
Beecher suggests that as a cultural pillar of democracy – like libraries, 
universities or theatre companies – journalism should receive partial 
government funding to ensure its survival but independence (E. Beecher, 
personal communication, 13 March 2009).  
 
Beecher’s argument and campaign is made within the circumstances 
and challenges of the migration of news online. However, I want to 
demonstrate that the relationship between news and democracy has long been 
troublesome not just in the area of funding, before outlining an alternative way 
to consider this relationship. I argue that Beecher demonstrates the discomfort 
that news professionals face as journalism changes its guise alongside changing 
guises of liberalism. The problem with Beecher’s argument, and those like it 
which proliferate in and around the media, lies with the way in which 
journalism is defined only in relation to Western liberal democracy and its 
associated fourth estate role, rather than the more diverse political 
arrangements in which it has operated and continues to operate. I suggest that 
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a more constructive way to think of democracy is a mechanism through which 
various forms of liberal government are achieved. As dominant forms of 
liberalism change, so too does journalism’s role in relation to liberal 
government. However, before outlining this argument in more detail, I will 
demonstrate some of the more general problems with the way in which the 
relationship between journalism and democracy is deployed.  
 
Journalism and democracy: a troubled relationship  
 One problem that arises around arguments about the democratic role of 
journalism is the tendency to automatically equate the operation of journalism 
or a free press, with democracy. Schudson (2002) argues that the notion that 
“news media should serve society by informing the general population in ways 
that arm them for vigilant citizenship … [is] … not a very good approximation 
of the role that the news media have historically played – anywhere” (p. 263). 
He points out that democracy and journalism are not the same thing, 
demonstrating that democracy existed before and without journalism, and that 
journalism has demonstrated its ability to exist without democracy: in Franco’s 
Spain, in 1980s Chile, and in contemporary China (Schudson, 2008, p. 12). 
Schudson argues that the slippage between journalism and democracy often 
occurs due to the tendency to equate democracy with populism, thus assuming 
that the provision of information to ‘the public’ as a generalised sovereign body 
facilitates automatic democratic participation. Thus it is necessary to define 
democracy not simply in terms of popular sovereignty with journalism both 
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informing the people and speaking its name, and so representing the public 
interest, but as a specific combination of political mechanisms: “voting systems, 
types of representative assembly, forms of control of governmental agency, and 
regulative and constitutional-legal framework” (Hirst, 1986, pp. 110–111).  
 
This definition of democracy treats journalism as an adjunct to, but does 
not make a necessary or automatic condition for, the existence of democracy. 
As Schudson (2008) argues, journalism can do certain things for democracy, 
such as informing the public and investigating the operation of power 
(particularly in government) – which can fulfil journalism’s fourth estate role. 
But it can also do other things for democracy, such as encourage social 
empathy in readers, provide a public forum for citizens and a range of views in 
society, and mobilising support for particular political programs. Not all of 
these things work towards similar goals, or even from a similar assumption. For 
instance, the task of mobilising the public is at odds with the objectivity and 
fairness assumed on the part of the journalist when providing information to 
the public. When these sorts of contradictions are considered, journalism’s 
apparently self-evident relationship with democracy becomes complicated and 
journalism becomes instead a site of multiple aims, of which fulfilling a fourth 
estate role is only one.  
 
Similarly, Terry Flew (2009) argues that many discussions of journalism 
and democracy are hindered by the fact that they work from one of two 
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assumptions: either that we are moving away from a democratic golden age of 
a Habermasian public sphere, or that citizens want any more from democracy 
than they already have – that is, the opportunity to vote for a representative 
government in multi-party elections. Flew argues that there is nothing to 
indicate that citizens are demanding democratisation beyond the representative 
vote in multi-party elections they now have. Dahlgren (2009) argues that there 
are many concerning reasons for the fading vitality of democracy in Western 
societies, including “economic insecurity, unemployment, low wages, declining 
social services, growing class cleavages, and ecological threats” (p. 26). 
However, he urges caution when attempting democratic deepening, pointing 
out firstly that “low levels of participation are nothing new”, and secondly that 
there is a tendency to measure participation against a normative “democratic 
imaginary” that is rarely met in reality (p. 13).    
 
Merrill (2000) argues that the relationship between democracy and the 
press is a myth, and that rather than providing citizens with the necessary 
information for engagement with political processes and decisions, it is 
occupied by the tasks of entertaining and making a profit. Or, when it does 
provide political coverage, Merrill argues that often it is “sketchy, superficial, 
generally negative, and quite often unreliable” (p. 198). Curran (2005) takes a 
similar position, suggesting that the connection between journalism and 
democracy is antiquated and easily shattered in comparison to contemporary 
reality: [m]any of the received ideas about the democratic role of the media 
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derive from a frock-coated world where the ‘media’ consisted principally of 
small-circulation, political publications and the state was still dominated by a 
landed elite (p. 122).  
 
Curran argues that in traditional liberal theory the media’s watchdog 
role overrides all other functions, but that this is “quixotic”, particularly given 
the small amount of coverage most news sources allocate to public affairs 
reporting and the investigation of official wrongdoing. “In effect, the liberal 
orthodoxy defines the main democratic purpose and organizational principle of 
the media in terms of what they do not do most of the time” (Curran, 2005, p. 
124; original emphasis). Further, Curran argues that this liberal conception of 
the press situates government as the seat of power, and hence the sole focus of 
press scrutiny. But this fails to take account of new forms of authority, such as 
the shareholder, that extend across public and private realms. Dahlgren (2009) 
argues that in the contemporary political environment25 “market forces and 
private enterprise have been given much greater rein to define the societal 
landscape, with a concomitant decline in democratic accountability of social 
power” (p. 18). In addition, the increasing conglomeration of various global 
branches of media business means that journalists are more likely to be 
constrained in their reporting by media, rather than political, influences.  
 
                                                
25 Specifically, Dahlgren is considering the challenges of civic engagement under neoliberal politics; but 
due to my later discussion (in this chapter) of this politics as advanced liberalism, I do not name this 
political rationality here, in order to avoid confusion.  
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Alongside the fourth estate rhetoric sits the rhetoric that the press is the 
‘voice of the people’ – representing the opinions and demands of ‘the people’ to 
those in authority. While this claim is generally presented in a downsized form 
of the press speaking for the people, it is still false, argues Curran. Firstly, it is 
based on the notion that news responds to the demands of the audience who 
are positioned as consumers within a competitive free market, but this 
overlooks the fact that the influence of the consumer is reactive rather than 
proactive (p. 130). Further, the extent of audience power over the media is 
constrained by the amount of choice available to them as consumers, which, 
despite market expansion remains limited due to the increasing global 
conglomeration of media companies, resulting in “corporate oligopoly” (p. 
132). Regardless of the commercial constraints upon the operation of the media 
as a ‘voice of the people’, politically “the ‘will of the people’ represented by the 
media tends to be defined by the ruling party” (p. 133). In addition, the pre-
eminent contemporary mechanism for capturing the ‘voice of the people’ – the 
opinion poll – has also been found to be problematic. Public opinion has 
disappointed even its champions by demonstrating ignorance or wishful 
thinking on the part of ‘the people’, and fickleness (through the malleability of 
results) on the part of those conducting the polls (Tiffen, 1989). Public opinion 
is thus revealed “not as an autonomous force, but as itself socially fashioned, 
while the political role of the polls has been a counsel of conformity, to some 
extent directing debate towards the familiar and immediately acceptable” (p. 
56).26  
                                                
26 Bourdieu (1979) argues that public opinion is constructed, through the use of opinion polls, on the 
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George Boyce (1978) traces the emergence of the idea of the fourth 
estate model of journalism in Britain to the early to mid-nineteenth century, 
arguing that news producers invented a “political myth” in order to ensure the 
press’s financial survival (p. 21). Boyce describes the press of pre-1840, in which 
journalists were either regarded as hacks or demagogues – either in the pockets 
of politicians, or political agitators. But as it became increasingly common for 
the illegal ‘pauper’ press to attack governmental interference (in the period 
from 1816), it prompted the legitimate press to consider developing an 
independent press in order to stave off its illegal but increasingly popular 
competitors. This financial edge could only be achieved “if a newspaper could 
claim in some way to be independent, to represent public opinion, and to be 
able to give the public an authentic and reliable news service” (p. 20). Thus the 
press had to position itself as a middle ground between the revolutionary tones 
of the pauper press, and the subservience to government interests the legitimate 
press currently occupied. In order to achieve this the press devised a series of 
practical arguments about the social role of the press – and the notion of the 
fourth estate was born. 
 
Schudson (2008) describes a similar history of the press in the United 
States where newspaper journalism was initially economically driven, highly 
localised, and decidedly partisan. But Schudson traces the move away from 
                                                                                                                                      
basis of three (incorrect) assumptions: one, that everyone is capable of forming an opinion; two, that all 
opinions have the same value; and three, that there is consensus about the nature of the problem and 
questions being asked.  
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partisanism and ‘boosterism’ and towards the notion of a neutral, objective, 
democratic press, alongside a range of other historical social shifts. One such 
shift was the Protestant Reformation of America in the late nineteenth century, 
which contributed to the wiping out of corrupt voting practices and throwing 
previously strong traditions of party loyalty into disrepute. This coincided with 
the 1896 introduction of the ‘Australian ballot system’, placing the preparation 
of the ballot and voting processes in the hands of the state, further distancing 
the voting process from the candidates so that “what had been an act of 
affiliation became an act of individual autonomy” (p. 31). This transformation 
of American political culture assisted the professionalisation of journalism, as 
“[r]eporters came increasingly to enjoy a culture of their own, independent of 
political parties. They developed their own mythologies (reveling in their 
intimacy with the urban underworld), their own clubs and watering holes, and 
their own professional practices” (p. 32).  
 
Bratich (2008) follows Schudson to outline the way in which journalism 
was professionalised in response to “particular types of progressive-era news 
reporting” (p. 59), namely ‘yellow journalism’ and the practice of ‘muckraking’. 
Yellow journalism was the derisive term used to describe the sensational 
elements of the press, and muckraking, a separate but intertwined early form of 
investigative reporting, focused on ‘digging up dirt’ on governments and 
corporations. Importantly, it was against these sorts of practices that journalists 
defined themselves in relation to: “[p]rofessionalisation cannot be said to arise 
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on its own, with internally generated values. It emerges on the back of a 
demonisation, or at least a polluted other” (p. 59). This speaks not only of the 
origins of a professionalisation of journalism, which I address in more detail in 
the following chapter, but also of the development of the liberal journalistic 
practices that are associated with the liberal press model, such as interviewing, 
and ideals, such as independence and objectivity. These ‘scientific’ methods 
were seen to empirically counter the problems of the press, and were informed, 
Bratich argues, by a “liberal political rationality, one whose freedom of thought 
depended on a moderate scepticism” (p. 58). For the moment, however, the key 
point is that these practices and ideals, and their associated political aims, are 
understood as historically contingent. This provides a different point of view to 
consider more recent journalistic practices, ideals or norms, and their political 
consequences.  
 
Keane’s ‘monitory democracy’ 
While the traditionally conceived relationship between journalism and 
democracy is under threat from a number of fronts, Keane (2009) argues that 
some of the conditions that have converged to compromise journalism’s 
traditional fourth estate role have, surprisingly, worked to enhance broader 
conditions of democracy. He argues that the current media landscape provides 
the necessary conditions for what he describes as a post-Westminster form of 
politics, to which he has given the name ‘monitory democracy’. Monitory 
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democracy is characterised by the proliferation of extra-parliamentary 
monitory bodies and power-scrutinising mechanisms, so that: 
 
All fields of social and political life come to be scrutinised, not just by the 
standard machinery of representative democracy, but by a whole host of 
non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies operating 
within and underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial states. 
(p. 5) 
 
These monitory bodies come in a multitude of forms and on a range of levels, 
from local to global, and their concerns range across elected governments, 
workplaces, businesses, the individual and so on, prompting Keane to comment 
that “the vertical ‘depth’ and horizontal ‘reach’ of monitory institutions is 
striking” (p. 6). Some examples of monitory bodies include international 
criminal courts, experts’ councils, local community consultation schemes, 
consumer councils, websites that monitor the abuse of workplace power and 
self-selected opinion polls (pp. 4–5).   
 
The formation of monitory democracy is linked firstly to the defence of 
democracy and human rights that arose in a post-World War II environment, 
and secondly to the growth of “multimedia-saturated societies”: “societies 
whose structures of power are continuously ‘bitten’ by monitory institutions 
operating within a new galaxy of media defined by the ethos of communicative 
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abundance” (p. 15). Communicative abundance describes the media 
environment in which access to the production and consumption of media has 
proliferated and infiltrated multiple and increasing areas of life. Keane argues 
that this media environment is best symbolised by the internet, but extends 
beyond it. Communicative abundance cuts across the liberal divisions of public 
and private. The contemporary media is at once increasingly interested in the 
private lives of public figures and in catapulting to publicity the private lives of 
previously private figures.  
 
Keane argues that this change has been driven in part by journalism’s 
crisis of public confidence, and with it the decline of its commitment to 
objectivity and an increasing trend towards sensationalism that has arisen in an 
environment driven by web hits. But Keane argues that while elements of the 
‘new journalism’ that come with communicative abundance may be unsavoury 
at times, its existence is necessary for the functioning of monitory bodies: “if the 
new galaxy of communicative abundance suddenly imploded, monitory 
democracy would not last long” (p. 16). This is because, firstly, despite 
journalism’s changing guise, it continues to seek out corruption and act as a 
mouthpiece for public objection to wrongdoing. Secondly, in the environment 
of communicative abundance, citizens are able to utilise a range of tools, such 
as mobile phones, bulletin boards, news groups, wikkis and blogs, in order to 
carry out monitoring of various institutions (p. 20).   
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Finally, the abundance of communication allows for the proliferation 
and circulation of information, and it is in this swirling galaxy of information 
that much monitoring is produced and distributed:  
 
Private companies are grilled about their services and products, their 
investment plans, how they treat their employees, and the size of their 
impact upon the biosphere. Questions are raised about which SUVs are 
most likely to roll over, and which companies retail the worst fast food, 
and which are the biggest polluters. (p. 19) 
 
However, Keane acknowledges that some problems arise from this state of 
communicative abundance. Pelted with information, citizens are not always 
engaged but also respond with cynicism, disaffection and inattention, or 
actively turn away from the ‘information overload’. But on balance, Keane 
argues that communicative abundance has positive consequences because it 
“nudges and broadens people’s horizons … tutors their sense of pluralism and 
prods them into taking greater responsibility for how, when and why they 
communicate” (p. 21).  
 
Keane’s account of monitory democracy further consolidates my 
argument that a positive relationship between journalism and democracy is 
neither a constant in journalism’s varied history nor guaranteed in the future. 
The ambivalence that Keane expresses towards some elements of the state of 
 109 
communicative abundance hints at the complexity of the relationship between 
journalism and broader political arrangements. Certainly, journalism is 
changing with the advent of digital media and the associated economic and 
social changes, but this change does not always bring about the negative social 
consequences that some commentators decry. Keane’s recognition that with 
changes to the operation of journalism come some distasteful journalistic 
practices, but also possible enhancements to our relationship with democracy, 
is far more useful than arguments that seek to return journalism to an 
unachievable golden age that Beecher argues occurred only through an 
“accident of history and commerce” that seems unlikely to be repeated.  
 
Just as Schudson demonstrates that the provision of news is not 
equivalent to the securing of democracy, so Keane argues that some of what 
journalism might produce is not necessarily good for democracy. But that does 
not mean that it no longer exists in relation to democracy. For instance, in their 
study of the communicative frames used to present television news, Cottle and 
Rai (2006) demonstrate that journalism can be conflictual and consensual, 
promoting difference as well as consensus and deliberation. In the section that 
follows, I work to broaden the understanding of politics usually brought to bear 
on the consideration of journalism and news. This enables another way of 
thinking about journalism’s democratic role that allows for, rather than seeks to 
arrest or counter-act, changes that occur in the practice of journalism over 
time. I draw largely on the work of Dean (2010) and Nolan (2008) to 
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demonstrate the way in which the changing relationship between news and 
democracy can be accounted for in terms of the changing rationalities of liberal 
government, and what these changing rationalities have meant for the practices 
of journalism. This view allows us to move away from positions that essentialise 
notions of journalism’s social and political role, and from associated value 
judgements about particular journalistic practices, towards an account of 
journalism that is politically situated and allows for consideration of its 
changing operation and practices in relation to broader political arrangements 
and doctrines.     
 
Journalism as a technology of (advanced) liberal government  
There is another way in which we can conceive of journalism, and that 
is not as a tool of democracy, but rather as a technology of government. While 
government is traditionally conceived of as the preserve of parliaments and 
elected officials, the notion of governmentality (literally, govern-mentality) 
provides a way of thinking about government more broadly. This approach, 
building on the work of historian Michel Foucault, proposes that government 
“entails any attempt to shape our behaviour according to particular sets of 
norms and for a variety of ends” (Dean, 2010, p. 18). Thus the task of 
governing might involve the work of actual government agencies, but its 
sources can also be found in a diverse range of agencies and institutions: the 
school, the media, the prison, the church, the family, the workplace, and so on.  
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With this broader sense of government, considerations of politics are no 
longer concerned only with the state and its possession or otherwise, of power. 
Rather, power is seen to be something that is relational and negotiated between 
governor and governed. Government, also known as the ‘conduct of conduct’ 
(Foucault as cited in Dean, 2010, p. 17), is predicated on the ‘free and self-
governing’ individual. The subject of government has the freedom to act in 
response to its governing; Foucault argues that once the subject no longer has 
the freedom to act, it is not power at work, but force (Foucault, 1981). Dean 
(2010) further outlines the relationship between government and the free 
human subject:  
 
Government concerns the shaping of human conduct and acts on the 
governed as a locus of action and freedom. It therefore entails the 
possibility that the governed are to some extent capable of acting and 
thinking otherwise. (p. 23) 
 
However, Dean explains that the free subject is paradoxically one whose 
“freedom is a condition of its subjection” (p. 193), so that freedom is what is 
acted upon in the task of government to produce certain dispositions, actions 
and subjectivities. The autonomous subject of government is central to the 
dominant art of government of the past three centuries: liberalism.  
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Liberalism is, primarily, a critique of excessive government (Dean, 
2010). It is also a practical art of government founded on the freedom of its 
subjects that “seeks to shape the capacities of individuals and collectivities 
through disciplinary and bio-political means” (p. 267). While liberalism’s 
critical ethos is founded on the suspicion of excessive government, as an art of 
government it is concerned not only with limiting the sphere of government but 
in locating other sources of government outside that sphere. Barry, Osborne 
and Rose (1996) argue that in this way, liberalism has involved practical 
techniques and inventions which brought into being ways of governing areas of 
life which fall into the sphere of  ‘civil society’ that become “both distinct from 
political intervention and yet potentially alignable with political aspirations” (p. 
9).  
 
As an art of government with a central ethos of critique, liberalism has 
the capacity for self-renewal. Thus there is not a singular form of liberalism but 
plural liberalisms, including “classic liberalism, economic liberalism, social 
liberalism, welfare liberalism, neo-liberalism (itself taking several versions)” 
(Dean, 2010, p. 65). Liberalism in its various guises is predicated on forms of 
specialist knowledges of the population and the economy that make the realm 
of government knowable and governable. These knowledges are productive of 
techniques of governing, and thus liberalism cannot be typified as an absence of 
government but rather the invention of new ways of knowing and governing. In 
the neo-liberal period, while this has involved the active critique of the state in 
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individual’s lives, nonetheless it has “provoked the invention and/or 
deployment of a whole array of organizational forms and technical methods in 
order to extend the field within which a certain kind of economic freedom 
might be practiced in the form of personal autonomy, enterprise and choice” 
(Rose as cited in Barry, Osborne & Rose, 1996, p. 10).  
 
Rather than ascribing the current dominant political rationality a 
singular label, suggestive of a unifying ethos, Dean (2010), following Rose 
(1993), uses the term ‘advanced liberalism’ to encompass the various forms of 
government of which neo-liberalism is the dominant ‘type’. However, other 
mentalities or rationalities of advanced liberal government include neo-
conservativism and communitarianism, which define themselves in opposition 
to neo-liberalism. Thus from these heterogeneous examples, advanced liberal 
rule is recognisable not by its declared ‘ethos’ but by its central elements. These 
include: 
 
The contrivance of markets in areas of formerly public provision, the 
employment of indirect means of regulation such as the calculative 
technologies of auditing and accounting, the dispersion and 
individualization of the management of risk, and the construction of 
multiple forms of agency through which rule is accomplished. (Dean, 
2010, p. 266)   
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These new forms of agency work to replace society as the realm in which 
populations are governed with a range of new spheres and quasi-markets in and 
through which governing occurs. As Miller and Rose (2008) argue, these new 
formations of sites of agency often take the form of community, but not always. 
Rather, the associations formed by the free subject of advanced liberalism are 
plural and mobile, according to the needs of government, and encompass the 
household, the family, the workplace, the shopping mall, and so on (Dean, 
2010, pp. 193, 200). The resultant style of advanced liberal government, argues 
Dean, is a reflexive form of government in which there is a folding back of the 
objectives of government upon itself. If, in advanced liberal government, we are 
to turn to the market for guidance then this reflexivity arises through the 
creation of more markets for the provision of guidance.   
 
In the art of liberal government, technologies are the tools employed to 
know and govern populations. Dean (2010) defines technologies of government 
as the “diverse and heterogeneous means, mechanisms and instruments 
through which governing is accomplished” (p. 269). Technologies of governing 
can take a diverse range of forms:   
 
Techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of 
examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys 
and presentational forms such as tables; the standardization of systems 
for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of 
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professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and 
architectural forms – the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, 
unlimited. (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8) 
 
Further, Meredyth, Ewing and Thomas (2003) outline the way in which what 
we consider new technologies (in that other sense of the word technology) have 
long been adopted for political aims and uses: “historically, the art of liberal 
government has involved the adaptation of technologies to shape citizens’ 
conduct, habits and aspirations” (p. 4).  
 
As new communication technologies are adopted and adapted by 
governments, Meredyth et al. argue that they become ‘liberal machines’: 
 
As new information technologies are modified and adapted to address 
the persistent problems of liberal government, it is possible to see public 
computer networks being reconstructed as ‘liberal machines’ … [which] 
refers to the ways in which technologies may become instruments for the 
continuing negotiation and regulation of limited freedoms. (p. 5)  
 
For instance, the provision to citizens of more information online can equip 
and enable them to undertake more of their own governing, instantiating the 
way in which ICTs can be seen as liberal machines. Thus technologies are not 
distinct from politics, but through “complex relays and linkages … tie 
 116 
techniques of conduct into specific relations with the concerns of the 
government” (Barry, et al., 1996, p. 13). Such an approach to technologies is 
valuable in this thesis’ investigation of both the technology of the internet and 
the technology of journalism and the way they become bound up in 
governmental programs.     
 
However, in recognising the way that new technologies are coopted for 
government use, Barry et al. (1996) warn against dreaming of some sort of 
technology-free alternative. However, within liberal rationalities of 
government, diverse technologies are put to diverse ends, about which there is 
debate, dispute and negotiation. The recognition of the multiple uses and aims 
of technologies counters notions of a simple exit from the realities of a 
technologised government. Considering the way in which liberal technologies 
are fluid and mobile, Nolan (2008) posits that journalism is a technology of 
liberalism, and that the contradictory demands of journalism’s democratic role 
arise from its relation to not only shifting political structures and practices, but 
also shifting models of democracy that are more broadly characteristic of 
political culture in particular periods and settings. Nolan argues that 
journalism’s ‘democratic role’ is “no more stable than the environment in 
which it is negotiated, but is rather subject to the shifts in socially prevalent 
models of liberal democracy” (p. 109).  
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When journalism operates in a liberal political, social and cultural 
environment, it is shaped up in relation to its changing dominant rationalities. 
In his discussion of the changing relationship between journalism and politics, 
Nolan traces the development of classic liberalism through social liberalism and 
to advanced liberalism, and concomitant shifts in journalism. He argues that 
classic liberalism’s focus on the moral individual saw the journalist as “a figure 
who lays claim to moral and (increasingly) technical authority” (p. 111). The 
moral position of journalism in this period meant adopting the language of 
natural rights and the public good, developing the position of journalism as the 
fourth estate, and legitimisation through the value of objectivity which allowed 
the journalist to act as a relay between sites of authority and ‘the people’. 
Specialised techniques, such as shorthand and the interview, allowed the 
journalist to fulfil this role of official recorder of information and communicator 
of knowledge to democracy’s public.  
 
With the shift in the twentieth century towards a form of social 
liberalism in the UK, US and Australia,27 came a turn towards a greatly 
expanded role for the state in ensuring that society best caters for the citizen, 
who is no longer perceived of as the moral individual, but rather as “a subject 
of needs, attitudes and relationships” (Rose as cited in Nolan, 2008, p. 113) 
which are figured and governed within the realm of ‘the social’. The related 
changes in journalism included the setting up of public service broadcasting, 
                                                
27 This shift was not a natural or inevitable evolution, but involved battles and struggles over the 
particular formation of liberal democratic arrangements, as Parekh (2005) notes in his etymology of 
liberalism in New Keywords.  
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and an emphasis on the values of “quality, pluralism and diversity in the 
media” (Nolan, 2008, p. 113). Similarly, journalism itself became less a site of 
moral authority and its social legitimacy “based more squarely on technical 
procedure” (p. 113), such as again, objectivity, balance, a dependence on 
official sources as a site of authority, a separation of journalism’s news and 
business operations, codes of ethics, notions of standards, the use of opinion 
polls and various modes of journalism such as the human interest genre.  
 
Just as social liberalism saw the refiguring of the moral subject of classic 
liberalism, so advanced liberalism sees the subject refigured again from one 
who in social liberalism is socially assembled, understood and governed in 
terms of their location in a myriad of social relations, to one who is individually 
assembled and understood as autonomous and able to freely choose the 
relations they enter into, and governed by a range of empowering new self-
knowledges. Alongside these political shifts are cultural ones, which affect the 
configuration and practice of journalism, aligned with the doctrine of choice 
and the primacy of the free market, expressed as a new “sensitivity and 
responsiveness to the perspectives, demands and predilections of news 
audiences, known through quantitative measures” (p. 115), an increased 
distrust of expert figures, an increased reliance on visual spectacle, a shift away 
from ‘public interest’ and towards those who may appeal to and ‘know’ their 
audiences – and with this the rise of the ‘star journalist’. It is also this distrust of 
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professional journalism as a field of expertise that makes way for the rise of 
citizen journalism.   
 
Bratich28 (2008) outlines the way in which the ‘public journalism’ 
movement in the US embodies some of the cultural changes within the practice 
of journalism that Nolan details. Positioned as a response to the growing, 
multifaceted crisis in journalism, public journalism was presented by its 
advocates as able to grasp the new affordances of digital technology while 
maintaining a place for journalism’s professional expertise in order to ‘revive’ 
not only the failing institution of journalism, but institutions of civic 
participation as well. Public journalism was concerned with civic engagement 
by bringing citizens in relation with journalists as well as with each other, and 
“this meant not just reporting on the civic renewal campaigns, but actively 
participating in them. Journalism could contribute to this larger movement of 
reviving civil society by mobilising people again as citizens and community 
participants” (p. 71). Bratich outlines the way in which this movement can be 
seen as an expression of neoliberal rationalities of government, with their 
increased emphasis on government in and through ‘the community’. Miller and 
Rose (2008) argue that in advanced liberal rationalities of government, 
governing occurs across multiple ‘communities’ in which: 
 
                                                
28 While increasing numbers of scholars are using the governmental approach within the broader field 
of media and communication, few are applying this approach to studies of journalism, which is why 
Bratich’s perspective is so helpful here, but also why Nolan’s detailed contribution looms so large in this 
thesis.  
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The subject is addressed as a moral individual with bonds of obligation 
and responsibilities for conduct that are assembled in a new way – the 
individual in his or her community is both self-responsible and subject to 
certain emotional bonds of affinity to a circumscribed ‘network’ of other 
individuals unified by family ties, by locality, by moral commitment to 
environmental protection or animal welfare. (p. 91) 
 
Through the activities of the public journalism movement, journalism is active 
in the governing of its populations through the communities it helps bring into 
being. As Bratich argues, “journalism, via its new civic form, would assist in 
bringing people together as a mode of good governance” (p. 72) – whether 
through forums, focus groups, the sponsorship of community gatherings, and so 
on.  
 
Nolan argues that other cultural changes within the practice of 
journalism are more often ascribed to processes of ‘tabloidisation’, much like 
the less positive elements of Keane’s communicative abundance. Like Bratich’s 
analysis of public journalism, Nolan works to position these cultural changes 
alongside changing conditions of liberalism. As dominant forms of liberalism 
are reinvented anew, so the practices of journalism change in relation to them. 
We can see now how this changes the way we think about journalism’s fourth 
estate role. Drawing on Nolan’s argument we can see that journalism’s fourth 
estate is tied to the concepts and practices of classic liberalism, which are out of 
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synchrony with the conditions of today’s advanced liberalism. It is the 
expectation of a form of journalism that is incompatible with its political reality 
that creates tensions for those invested in older models. While professional 
journalists and others in the media industry – as typified by the example 
Beecher provides – cling to the moral ethos and practices of the journalist of 
classic liberalism, journalism as an institution is increasingly embodying the 
practices of advanced liberalism.  
 
 Arguments made in terms of a simple ‘turning back’ to reclaim and 
recapture journalism’s democratic role are made on shaky ground, oblivious as 
they often are to the instability of the political form within which that role is 
historically fabricated. Rather, the political capacities and possibilities of 
journalism need to be recast within a broader understanding of politics, and 
within an understanding of the conditions of advanced liberalism. It is with this 
understanding that Keane’s monitory democracy, with its recognition of the 
ambivalence and complexity of the changes wrought by the conditions of 
advanced liberalism and communicative abundance upon the practice of 
journalism, can be recognised as a far more constructive way of approaching 
journalism’s changing relationship to democracy.29  
 
                                                
29 It is necessary to note that while Keane’s (2009) monitory democracy expands the field of political 
participation beyond formal mechanisms, he argues that “democracy is coming to mean more than 
elections, although nothing less” (p. 2; emphasis added), indicating that it provides a supplement, but not 
a replacement, for representative democratic arrangements.   
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Rather than get stuck between the two dominant modes of thinking 
about journalism and democracy in the digital age, which position journalism 
as either under great threat or facing great opportunity in a changing media 
environment, it is necessary to see journalism as a technology of dominant 
modes of liberal rule. This brings a grasp of the way in which journalism is used 
as a technology of government. It also allows for changes in journalism to be 
recast as neither threat nor opportunity, but in complex and close relation to 
the multifarious tasks of government in which, through monitory democracy, 
more opportunities are afforded for the scrutiny of power, but also through 
which journalism is part of the process in and through which populations are 
made knowable and governable.  
 
When Beecher calls for the preservation of journalism’s fourth estate 
role, he is embodying some of the tension that arises when journalism changes, 
alongside changing modes of liberalism. Those who decry the loss of quality, 
serious or public journalism as the future of print becomes increasingly tenuous, 
are embodying the discomfort that arises for those attached to social liberalism 
around the transition towards advanced liberal modes of journalism. It is 
impossible to completely preserve journalism’s fourth estate role, but as Keane 
demonstrates, it is not impossible to maintain a democratic role for journalism. 
Using a governmental approach grasps journalism’s status as a technology of 
liberal government, and as always political. Thus rather than pondering 
journalism’s ability or inability to act as a watchdog for democracy, it is more 
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constructive to be attuned to the way in which journalism is being created 
anew30 as a tool for governing, and to consider the consequences of this. Rather 
than asking what is lost in the changes to journalism, it is better to ask what is 
gained.31 In what new ways is journalism bound up in new forms of governing, 
and what knowledges, techniques and subjectivities is it active in producing?  
 
Journalism as expertise 
For instance, if journalism is a technology of liberalism, then it is possible 
to see journalists as one group of experts in the work of governing. Expertise, of 
various kinds, is involved in the technologies, or sets of techniques and 
knowledges, used in the governing of populations – statistical, medical, 
educational, welfare expertise, and so on. Barry et al. (1996) argue that 
“expertise plays a part in translating society into an object of government” (p. 
13), and in through their particular communicative expertise journalists play an 
active role in the government of populations. They are active in the training of 
populations, through addressing and educating them – on matters of health, 
finance, and of course, politics – on what it means to be part of their particular 
population. Through journalistic expertise in the sourcing, composing and 
relaying of stories about all manner of social activity, members of populations 
are brought into repeated connection with sets of norms and dispositions. But 
as Nolan (2008) and Dean (2010) assert, the rationality of advanced liberalism 
                                                
30 But not without resistance, as Beecher demonstrates. Foucault’s relational notion of power always 
entails the possibility for resistance.    
31 This is not to suggest an uncritical celebratory position; rather, what is gained from using the 
governmental approach is the ability to more accurately describe the historical shaping of the ‘problem 
of journalism’. This is followed by critical evaluation of this historical problem and its broader political, 
economic, social and cultural implications.  
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brings a new distrust of experts and expert knowledges because of their 
“disempowering presumption to speak on behalf of a ‘collective interest’ and 
for contributing to various forms of social dependency” (Nolan, 2008, p. 114). 
This is contributed to by a great populist distrust of experts, in which experts 
are seen as out-of-touch ‘elites’ whose knowledge is pitted against the more 
authentic mass knowledge of ‘the public’ or ‘ordinary citizens’.  
 
As part of this wider differentiation of democracy from populism, 
Schudson (2008) makes a case for the role of experts, arguing that democracy 
requires experts – and their expertise – to function. He gives the example of 
juries, who might be seen to serve an otherwise populist purpose, who are 
guided by the expertise of judges in making their decisions. Or, indeed, even 
politicians who Schudson argues are the “most distinctive and important 
political ‘expert’ in a democracy” (p. 120). Schudson adds historians, lawyers, 
economists, demographers, and statisticians to his list of political experts, 
arguing that the problem facing democracies is not the use of expert 
knowledge, but rather ensuring the expert has enough autonomy but also 
enough accountability to preserve democracy.  
 
I suggest that we add to this account of experts the category of the 
journalist. The journalist is a particular kind of expert, entrusted with filtering 
and recounting particular stories to its audience. The journalist is the relay 
between many other experts, such as politicians, academics, scientists and 
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economists, and their public. In this way we trust journalists to use their 
expertise to select, interpret and present to us these expert knowledges. But 
given our broader understanding of the relationship between journalism and 
democracy, we can also argue that journalists are experts in the sense that they 
play an active role in the governing of populations. Through their expertise, 
journalists are productive in shaping particular kinds of subjectivities.  
 
This gives us a more constructive way to think about the political or 
democratic role of journalists than the fourth estate model. If journalists are 
active in governing populations – how, and to what ends? These become the 
more constructive and pressing questions to explore around journalism’s 
political role. This refiguring of journalist-as-expert accommodates the changes 
that take place in dominant forms of liberal government, without getting stuck 
on questions about journalism’s fourth estate or democratic role. Thus I suggest 
that a useful way to think about journalism is as a technology of liberal 
government, a technology that is exercised through the use of expertise, 
relaying information and knowledges to its audiences, and thus active in their 
formative government and in the shaping of particular types of subjectivities, 
forms of conduct, dispositions, and social relations. The types of subjectivities 
and the sorts of practices it used in this task of governing vary, according to 
changing forms of liberal government. Questions of democracy and the need 
for the press to act as a public watchdog are not dismissed but they become 
only one, albeit important, part of a wider governing regime.  
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The changing political role of journalism at The Age Online and 
Crikey 
 Beecher suggests that the most pressing matter for Australian journalism 
as it faces the range of challenges I have outlined is securing its fourth estate 
role. For Beecher, this is about preserving what he calls public trust journalism, 
in which journalism becomes – at least to some extent – state-funded, in 
recognition of its centrality to the political health of a society. This journalism is 
positioned by Beecher alongside other social institutions that are operationally 
independent but, in part, financially dependent on the state – such as theatre 
companies and universities. However, as I have outlined in this chapter, 
Beecher’s argument represents an appeal to a form of social liberalism that has 
in many ways been superseded and replaced by the changing political and 
economic conditions of advanced liberalism.  
  
 While it is necessary to recognise the dominance and persuasiveness of 
the liberal journalistic rhetoric about the continued pertinence of the fourth 
estate press model, I propose a more constructive and flexible way of making 
sense of the changes affecting this industry in crisis. As I have argued in this 
chapter, journalism is better understood not in the terms given to it by the 
ideology of liberalism, but rather as a technology of liberal government, flexible 
and adaptive to changing historical forms of governing. From this position it is 
possible to trace the changes to journalism since the nineteenth century – and 
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more recently – making sense of the changes in its history and practice in 
relation to changing forms of liberalism, from the social liberalism of the 
twentieth century, to the advanced liberal government that takes a range of 
forms across global contemporary society.   
 
 In the following three chapters I outline the different ways in which 
these political and economic changes have been navigated by the organisations 
in the two case studies and have shaped the development of news for two 
different outcomes. I outline the way in which Beecher’s – and by extension, 
Crikey’s – attachment to a form of classic liberal journalism has shaped the 
development of online news there, while The Age Online has not demonstrated 
similar attachment. For instance, in the next chapter, I outline Crikey’s 
campaign to assert its professional status as a legitimate source of news within 
the mainstream media. Extending the view of journalism as a technology of 
liberalism, I argue that the rhetoric and practice of professionalism is a means 
to authority, employed by journalists to shape their autonomy within a cultural 
technology in particular ways. However, I also outline the way in which Crikey 
is paradoxically positioned in relation to professional status. While it wants to 
be recognised as professional, it still seeks to be identified as somehow more 
authentic than the mainstream media due to its unique technological 
characteristics. In seeking to straddle this line between ‘professional’ and 
‘authentic’ forms of journalism – and means to authority – Crikey undermines its 
own quest for mainstream recognition.  
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In comparison, The Age Online is increasingly less involved in discussions 
around journalism and its professional practice, particularly since the departure 
of media and communications editor, Matthew Ricketson. It is also navigating 
a problematic structural divide between the print and online arms of its 
newsroom. I demonstrate the way in which these factors have contributed to a 
changed professionalism for The Age Online, not based on the authenticity or 
traditional notions of professionalism sought at Crikey. Rather, The Age Online 
demonstrates more flexibility and attunement with the demands of the 
advanced liberal political environment, though this makes these changes no less 
concerning for those lamenting the loss of classic liberal forms of fourth estate 
journalism.  
 
Similarly, in the following chapter I consider the changing news 
audience, and the way in which journalist-audience relations are being 
reshaped under the conditions of advanced liberalism. I begin by outlining the 
relationship between news and notions of time and space, exemplified by the 
newspaper. As a means to examine the extent to which these relationships are 
changing online, I consider the topic of interactivity – an issue that has 
attracted much excitement about the internet’s potential to democratically 
reform the processes of journalism. However, interactivity is held more often as 
an ideal than it is adopted in practice. I consider some of the reasons for this, 
and consider its adoption in the two case studies. While Crikey currently exhibits 
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more interactive options, I suggest that this might not always be the case, given 
The Age Online’s demonstrated flexibility around the changing demands on the 
contemporary media environment. I link this discussion with Thrift’s 
conceptualisation of the sped-up processes of production and consumption 
online in order to demonstrate that interactive options can have lasting 
consequences – for audiences and news producers.   
 
 Finally, in Chapter Six, I consider the economic imperatives that are 
driving the broader changes to journalism mapped out in the previous chapters. 
I begin by considering the example of Rupert Murdoch’s introduction of 
paywalls at his news sites and the media response in order to demonstrate the 
way in which, in economic discussions about journalism, the business model is 
upheld as an explanatory frame. That is, the possession of the correct business 
model is presented as the guarantee of the success of a news site just as its lack 
can spell its demise. However, I outline the way in which the business model is 
an insufficient explanatory frame for the way in which it often fails to take into 
account the demands of the range of business and social stakeholders – which 
can be diverse and in conflict with each other. For instance, the stakeholders of 
a news site could include its shareholders, whose economic demands might well 
be at odds with the demands of its audience who expect a particular style of 
journalism which requires high business costs to produce.  
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It is in this chapter that the various threads of analysis are drawn 
together in relation to the discussion of the economic development of news – 
dominant, given its foregrounding in the politics of advanced liberalism. Thus it 
is also a space to consider the way in which the development of news is 
economically driven, positioned and understood. While The Age Online has 
demonstrated flexibility and attunement with this economic politics, Crikey 
demonstrates more discomfort around the changed news environment and the 
overt discussion of its business model. However, although I argue that The Age 
Online is more flexible and adaptive to the current media environment, this does 
not mean its adaptation is necessarily to be welcomed. Crikey’s discomfort 
demonstrates that in historical shifts and political changes invariably certain 
things are lost. In the conclusion, I consider what the loss of public trust 
journalism could mean for populations in Australia and elsewhere, and where 
its social imperatives might be met elsewhere within a changed political, 
economic, cultural and technological environment. 
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Chapter Four:  
From Rhetorics of Professionalism  
to the Politics of Professional Status 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I begin with a consideration of news production studies 
in order to demonstrate the different ways in which the production and 
development of news and journalism have been positioned. From this 
discussion of the political-economic, organisational and cultural elements that 
shape journalism, I hone in on one element of journalism in particular: the 
development and practice of news values, and outline the way in which news 
values operate to inform and structure a professional practice of journalism. In 
order to demonstrate the operation of professional rhetorics in practice, I 
outline Crikey’s battle for recognition as a trustworthy mainstream news source.  
 
Considering a range of conceptualisations of journalistic professionalism, 
I present it as a means to authority, in which the autonomy of journalists is 
central to this claim for authority. Treating journalism as a cultural technology, 
this autonomy can be viewed as the means by which journalism helps to govern 
individuals for a range of outcomes. Forms of professionalism are changing in 
relation to changes in dominant political logics. I outline the way in which 
Crikey is actively engaging with discussions about journalistic professionalism in 
order to govern its own professional status, while The Age Online seeks to 
maintain its professional status by distancing itself from such debates. 
Returning to my concern with the elements that shape the development of 
journalism, I outline the way at The Age Online that professional identities have 
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been shaped by cultural factors, including a structural divide between the print 
and online newsrooms.   
 
The field of news production  
The study of news and the processes of its production have traditionally 
occurred across three main areas of sociological inquiry: first, political 
economy, in which news organisations are examined in relation to their private 
ownership and the state; second, the social organisation of news work; and 
third, from a cultural perspective (Schudson, 2002). These approaches are not 
employed discretely, but often intersect. For instance, Simon Cottle (2003) 
argues that the cultural output of the media makes them unique as industries:  
 
In late-modern societies the symbolic forms of media output are 
implicated in the constitution of society: in its routines and rhythms of 
daily life, in the representation of social relations and in the conduct of 
politics, as well as in the affirmation (or challenge to) wider cultural 
values, traditions and identities. (p. 4) 
 
However, he also contends that while political economy and cultural studies 
both provide valuable perspectives on media work, more work is needed to 
bridge the two fields – and this is the preserve of news production studies. He 
stresses the need for an “understanding of today’s news ecology, its 
organisations, cultural forms and associated practices” (p. 6). Outlining the way 
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such a project would unfold, Cottle presents us with two (traditionally) 
competing frameworks for media analysis: political economy and cultural 
studies. In political economy it is the marketplace that shapes culture and its 
relation to audiences, while in cultural studies production is displaced in favour 
of consumption, which becomes a site of production of meaning and pleasures 
for active audiences. While this is a simplification of these two complex areas of 
debate and scholarship, nonetheless Cottle presents them as in unremitting 
conflict: “these theoretical differences of approach, based within different ideas 
of social ontology, epistemology, methodology and politics, cannot be 
theoretically wished away nor simply accommodated in a new theoretical 
synthesis” (p. 11). What Cottle proposes instead is the “relatively underexplored 
and theoretically underdeveloped ‘middle ground’ of media organisation and 
production” (p. 4) – it is here, he argues, that real, empirical work can be done 
to counter the generalising or deterministic tendencies of the political economy 
or the “problem of inference” (p. 5) that begins with the text, in cultural studies.  
 
Schudson’s recent work around the history of journalism traces his 
changing thoughts around the factors that influence the production of 
journalism. Initially, he argues that the cultural elements of journalism are of 
central importance, but not at the cost of an attention to the political, 
economic, or organisational factors:  
 
 135 
News is a form of culture. It is a structured genre or set of genres of 
public meaning-making. But this is not to suggest that it floats in a 
symbolic ether. It is a material product and there are political, 
economic, social, and cultural dimensions to understanding its 
production, distribution, and appropriation by audiences. (Schudson, 
2002, p. 251)   
 
Schudson’s investment in arguments about the cultural element of news work is 
clear when he argues that journalists play a part in the construction of reality, 
but he qualifies this statement so that it does not place total emphasis on the 
role of the journalist:  
 
Journalists not only report reality but create it. To say that journalists 
construct reality in producing the news is not to say they do so without 
constraints. In this case, after all, the crimes the papers reported really 
took place. To say that journalists construct the world is not to say they 
conjure the world. Journalists normally work with materials that real 
people and real events provide. But by selecting, highlighting, framing, 
shading, and shaping in reportage, they create an impression that real 
people – readers and viewers – then take to be real and to which they 
respond in their lives. (Schudson, 2003, p. 2)  
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In later work, Schudson (2005) focuses on the way in which journalism cultures 
are shaped by empirical realities, instead of pressing the point about the 
cultural role of journalism:  
 
Is the fact that the press normally operates on a daily basis structural or 
cultural? Is there some basic primacy to the daily cycle of the press, of 
business, of government, of sleeping and waking, that makes the 
institutions of journalism inescapably human and person-centred in 
scale? (p. 188) 
 
In this period he questions his own previous position that the combination of a 
range of social factors could be said to account for the production of news. He 
now argues that “it is simply not true that social, cultural, political and 
economic factors separately or together can explain why news is the way it is” 
(p. 172). While he previously had argued that journalists were involved with the 
task of ‘producing the news’, Schudson now qualifies these claims with the 
acknowledgement that journalists do not produce all events – and nor is all 
news structured by these social, cultural, economic and political forces. 
Journalists and social forces “do not produce news out of nothing. They act on 
something in the world. The ‘something’ they work on are events, happenings, 
occurrences in the world” (pp. 172–173).   
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But while Schudson displaces the former centrality of the organisational 
approach to news, with its focus on the relationship between journalists and 
official government sources, he does not discount it entirely. With an historical 
focus that places organisational structures as contingent, this line of enquiry is 
still relevant. In the following section I consider one of the most prominent and 
durable forms of organisational structures – news values. News values provide 
the link that exists between the culture of journalism and those ‘real world’ 
occurrences that Schudson argues shape the news in unpredictable ways. News 
values respond to external realities by framing them within cultural practices. 
This discussion of news values will be of considerable importance when we turn 
to close scrutiny of the way in which online news sites govern their own 
professional status.  
 
News values 
One of the most dominant organisational routines structuring the news 
is its temporal cycles. These cycles of hourly, daily or weekly production and 
distribution, structure not only the patterns of news making and its associated 
divisions of labour, but also the sorts of stories that are produced. Schlesinger 
(1978) found that where temporal demands – such as the need to fill the 
bulletin (or the column) – are one of the main routines that structures news 
production, the nature of news is reactive. That is, it responds to events rather 
than seeks them out. Similarly, Tiffen (1989) suggests that two of the key factors 
in the production of news are the deadline and the news hole, both of which 
 138 
put the spatial or temporal demands of the routines of news production before 
the availability of any given news: “whether it is a heavy or light news day, 
news is essentially produced according to set times (deadlines) and to a format 
of pre-determined size (the news hole)” (p. 15). Schlesinger outlines a number of 
other ways that news is routinely produced and structured through work 
practices – such as the daily editorial meeting, the discussion of “angles”, the 
combination of staff and skills to write and sub-edit stories, and so on. The 
result of these institutionalised routines is a familiar and, Schlesinger argues, 
homogenous style of news that is limited by the planning and organisational 
structures to produce particular kinds of news. This news is homogenous, and 
tends not to be investigative, Schlesinger argues, because of the way it responds 
to these structuring elements, rather than the available news of the day itself 
shaping the routines and structures.  
 
Boczkoswski (2004a) also argues that newspapers are homogenous and 
predictable – but this is what maintains their ubiquitous position in society. 
This ubiquity is achieved through a range of practices that work together to 
ensure standardisation across a range of news(paper) products: 
 
The ubiquity of newspapers is tied to their significant standardization … 
This standardization results from a relatively stable ensemble of 
technical, communication, and organizational practices. Such a stable 
ensemble ensures that input consisting of information about often 
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heterogenous and unpredictable events is turned into a relatively 
homogenous and predictable daily product. (p. 6)  
 
One of the most significant professional practices that enables the 
standardisation of news production is the adoption, operation and adherence to 
news values. Tiffen (1989) argues that news values are embedded in the 
journalist’s consciousness to the extent that they are perpetually aware of their 
existence, a seemingly naturally-attained set of values: “individual journalists 
talk as if there were some force of newsworthiness, independent of them and 
over which they have no control, which constrains and guides their work” (p. 
66). The appeal to journalists of this construction of news values is that they are 
able to invoke them in order to “transform difficult decisions into routine 
choices” (p. 66) and “minimise the role of individual attitudes, so that news 
judgments transcend the preferences of the individuals producing it” (p. 67).  
 
Despite many protestations within the literature about the enigmatic 
nature of news values, many work to define them. Sally White (1996) assembles 
a list of elements of news which fall under her two broader categories of news –  
matters of consequence (that which is in the public interest), and matters that 
captivate the imagination (that which is of interest to the public). Her values 
are: impact or relevance, timeliness, proximity, prominence, conflict, currency 
and the unusual or novel (pp. 11–20). Galtung and Ruge (1965) provided the 
most influential and cited list of news values in their 1965 study of foreign 
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events and the factors that influence their development into news stories. Their 
resultant list of values included: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, 
meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, 
reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to persons, 
reference to something negative. Harcup and O’Neill (2001) revisited the 
Galtung and Ruge study, extending their earlier list and proposing a 
contemporary set of news values. These were: the power elite, celebrity, 
entertainment, surprise, bad news, good news, magnitude, relevance, follow-up, 
and newspaper agenda.   
 
Also working from the vantage point of the 21st century, Kovach and 
Rosenstiel (2007) set out in their research to uncover the elements that 
constitute journalism as a profession. Following a series of interviews with a 
range of US-based news professionals, they came up with 10 elements of 
journalism that they claim are, first, agreed upon by journalists, second, have 
stood the test of time, and third, are adaptable. These defining elements are: 
that journalism’s first obligation is to the truth; that its first loyalty is to its 
citizens; that its essence is a discipline of verification; that its practitioners must 
maintain an independence from those they cover; that it must serve as an 
independent monitor of power; that it must provide a forum for public criticism 
and compromise; that it must strive to make the significant interesting and 
relevant; that it must keep the news comprehensive and in proportion; that its 
practitioners have an obligation to exercise their personal conscience; and that 
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citizens, too, have rights and responsibilities when it comes to the news (pp. 5–
6). Kovach and Rosenstiel argue that ‘traditional’ news values have little 
relevance to today’s journalist. Noting the absence of familiar terms such as 
“balance and fairness” in their list of elements, they argue that a number of the 
values often cited by journalists and journalism scholars were “too vague to rise 
to the level of essential elements of the profession” (p. 6), suggesting that what 
are often assumed to be durable values central to the practice of professional 
journalism are in fact only regarded symbolically as ideals.  
 
Indeed, compiling news values into an authoritative list is impossible, 
argues Tiffen (1989), given the very nature of their operation. News values are 
largely reactive, adaptable, and relational, according to the nature and context 
of the production of the news in question. It is somewhat easier to define what 
news values are not: they are not necessarily universal, nor are they universally 
held or adhered to, they are not necessarily consistent, they are not necessarily 
reliable, but rather, are adaptable according to a range of tensions and 
demands that may exist at once (Tiffen, 1989, p. 68). News values are better 
understood as responses to some of the pressures of the newsroom – largely 
commercial – than as an imaginary list of characteristics. Rather than relying 
on the term “values”, Tiffen instead directs us to the concept of the “format”.  
 
Formats are, according to Tiffen, the structures that shape the news, in 
style, presentation, and content, but which are usually rendered invisible by 
 142 
their familiarity, making them the tools that achieve the standardisation across 
newspapers perceived by Bozckowski:  
 
Formats … are structures into which content is organised. All types of 
institutionalised communication develop formats which shape 
expectations for both senders and receivers and which define rules of 
relevance, procedure, style and standards. (Tiffen, 1989, pp. 62–63)  
 
Formats navigate audiences in their consumption of media, clearly signalling 
what they are going to consume. Formats operate on a broad level – for 
example, the total mix of programs on offer – but also on a much smaller level. 
For example, the notion of a ‘story’ is a format in operation, and one that has 
implications for producers and consumers of news, about what qualities that 
product will possess, the way in which the information will be structured and so 
on. Formats guide and inform audiences, and enable them to feel comfortable 
and knowledgeable as consumers about what they are going to consume, as 
well as providing them with common patterns and structures.  
 
Similarly, Hartley (1989) argues that news values are an “informal 
paradigm” (p. 76) used by journalists as part of the selection process in news 
production – but they can equally be invoked as a means of hiding the 
underlying “ideological determinants of a story” (p. 80). The truth often 
obscured by the invocation of news values is that they lack the very objectivity 
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they claim to aspire to. News values, says Hartley, carry the assumptions and 
values of those who formulate and promulgate them – “white, middle-class 
men, generation upon generation of them, forming opinions, imposing them, 
learning them and passing them on as Holy Writ. We have inherited a 
hierarchy of news values” (Coote as cited in Hartley, 1989, p. 80). The result is 
the familiar news formats and standardisation that shape the news product that 
we consume day after day: “What are the major stories of the day? The 
economy, industry, politics … foreign affairs, and so on, down the scale” (Coote 
as cited in Hartley, 1989, pp. 80–81). The journalist, even when aware of the 
ideological relations implicit in news values seems “unable to escape their 
institutionalised force (presented as the right way of doing journalism)” 
(Hartley, 1989, p. 81). In fact, according to Hartley, news-makers use the 
structures of news to make sense out of life, in a routine manner. That is, news 
shapes society as much as society shapes the news. The sort of social world that 
it shapes is fragmented into distinct spheres, such as sports and politics, 
composed of individual persons in control of their destiny, hierarchical and 
consensual by nature.  
 
Echoing Kovach and Rosenstiel’s findings that many news values 
operate more commonly in theory than in practice, Schultz (1998) argues that 
objectivity persists as a professional value, even though most journalists 
recognise it as impossible to achieve in practice (p. 43). Further, she outlines the 
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commercial underpinning of the notion of objectivity, which runs counter to 
the idea that it is an important part in securing journalism’s independence:  
 
Objectivity had its origins, in part, in the commercialisation of the press 
– in order to reach the widest possible audience publishers avoided one-
sidedness in reporting – but it has outlived this early rationale to be 
reinterpreted as fairness, and remains an underpinning ethic. (pp. 43–
44) 
 
Nonetheless, Australian journalists have demonstrated a commitment, at least 
in theory, to adhere to news values: Australian journalists who subscribe to the 
Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (the industry’s union) commit 
themselves to practise honesty, fairness, independence, and respect for the 
rights of others ("Journalists code of ethics," 2010). Despite the numerous 
problems with the definition and historical operation of news values, they 
remain central to the journalists’ processes of self-definition, and one of the 
ways in which they govern their own professional behaviour and status. As I 
demonstrate in the next section, Crikey has worked to establish its professional 
status in the Australian media by actively taking part in discussions around 
professional values and practices.  
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News values online: Crikey’s battle for professional recognition 
In this section I outline the way in which Crikey has fought vigorously to 
be seen as a professional and independent alternative to the Australian 
mainstream media, and particularly the Murdoch and Fairfax presses. I outline 
in some detail an ongoing ‘war of words’ between Crikey and the Murdoch-
owned broadsheet The Australian, and consider the effect this has had on Crikey’s 
relationship to professional standards in its maintenance of its public image. I 
use this to move into a discussion of professionalism, demonstrating the way in 
which the rhetoric of professionalism is used in order to gain authority over the 
particular jurisdiction of journalism. Considering discussions of journalistic 
professionalism, I demonstrate the limitation of the way in which many of these 
discussions are framed, and work to reframe professionalism within journalism 
as a cultural technology, established in Chapter Three.  
 
Crikey publisher Eric Beecher has described the publication as 
“aggressively independent” (Money, 2010), arguing that “a close analysis of 
Crikey’s content would absolutely confirm its independence based on publishing 
a wide range of views, reporting and editorial commentary from all 
perspectives, ranging from anti-‘left’ to anti-‘right’ to pro and anti everything in 
between”. Elsewhere, Beecher has boasted that the publication has not faced a 
single writ in the five years to 201032 and that Crikey takes its approach to 
                                                
32 I outline more of Crikey’s history in Chapter Five as I discuss its changing negotiation of interactive 
options for its audience, but at this stage it is necessary to provide some brief historical detail. Crikey was 
established in 2000 by ‘shareholder activist’ Stephen Mayne, who developed a media profile during his 
campaign for the parliamentary seat held by Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett, when his campaign 
website, Jeffed.com, gained widespread media attention. Mayne initially ran the weekly email 
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accuracy and defamation “very seriously” (Jackson & Elliott, 2010). This has 
since changed with Daily Telegraph columnist and blogger Tim Blair signalling 
his intention to sue the publication for defamation in March 2010 over a blog 
post on Crikey’s website that suggested he was pseudonymously commenting on 
his own blog posts to gain extra comments (Nicholls & Mahar, 2010). 
Nonetheless, Crikey’s recent track record remains significant, given the 
publication’s reputation for inaccuracy after facing three defamation writs – all 
of which were settled out of court – in its first five-and-a-half years of 
publication under owner-editor Stephen Mayne (Mayne, 2006). Crikey’s 
perception of the need to work hard to maintain their reputation is, in recent 
years, fuelled by their editorial ‘battle’ with The Australian newspaper over 
Crikey’s legitimacy and position in the Australian media landscape. While Crikey 
is openly critical of The Australian and the Murdoch press more generally, it is 
even more critical of the Fairfax press, and more importantly, has explicitly 
positioned itself as a critical and independent voice in the Australian media 
landscape. The Australian’s response has been to wage a ‘war’ with Crikey in its 
editorial pages – never, it must be noted, unprovoked, always in response to a 
story or statement from Crikey or one of its contributors – apparently seeking to 
                                                                                                                                      
newsletter out of his house with the help of two interns. It soon became known for its insider 
information on politics and the media, and increased to daily publication, but was plagued with legal 
troubles, with Mayne forced to sell his house in 2003 to settle defamation cases brought against Crikey 
by radio presenter Steve Price and ALP senator Nick Bolkus. In 2005, Crikey was bought by Private 
Media Partners, the company owned by Eric Beecher, Diana Gribble and Chong Weng Ho. Today, 
Crikey is a daily email newsletter that arrives into subscriber’s inboxes around 1.00 pm each day, with 
around 20 stories, divided into the following sections: top stories; politics, the universe, etc.; 
media/arts/sport; business, comments, corrections, clarifications, and c*ckups. Stories from the 
newsletter are anchored in the Crikey website, some of which are reserved for subscribers only. In 
addition to Crikey original content, the website selects and features content from a range of international 
online sources, and hosts a number of blogs under its masthead.  
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strip it of its legitimacy and draw attention to what it sees as its editorial bias 
against the Murdoch media.  
 
This ‘war of words’ has employed the column space of the daily editorial 
in The Australian, as well as prominent columnist Mark Day as weapons, 
launching attacks in response to what it sees as hostility in the daily Crikey email, 
website, and the network of its contributors. One such attack took place in an 
Australian editorial published on 3 July 2009, following an address to the 
National Press Club of Australia by News Limited Chief Executive Officer John 
Hartigan on Wednesday 1 July 2009 (Hartigan, 2009), in which he challenges 
the assumption that newspapers are unanimously facing a global crisis, arguing 
that the Australian newspaper industry has a bright future. He also criticises 
Crikey and sites like it (The Huffington Post, Newser and the Daily Beast in the US, 
and Mumbrella in Australia) for their lack of original content and dependence on 
wire sources and mainstream mastheads. During the speech, which was 
broadcast live on ABC Television, Crikey political reporter Bernard Keane 
provided a running commentary via his Twitter account. This was followed by 
an article in Crikey (Keane, 2009) on the same day, describing the address as “a 
savage attack on online media” that over-emphasised News Limited’s recent 
changes and position in the global media landscape.33  
 
                                                
33 The sorts of changes Hartigan was referring to included utilising the News Corporation global 
network of journalists in the development and production of stories, diversifying into other online sites, 
such as the Australian recipe repository, taste.com.au, and moving towards increased newsroom 
integration.   
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Two days later, The Australian published an editorial, ‘Old Media, By 
Crikey’, in response to Keane’s Twitter commentary (and not, interestingly, his 
piece in Crikey) describing the series of 140-character messages as “light on for 
facts and awash with anger that Mr Hartigan, CEO of the company that 
publishes The Australian, dared to predict a positive future for the print media” 
("Old Media, By Crikey," 2009). According to the paper, Keane’s response 
demonstrated why “newspapers will survive while parasitical publications like 
Crikey will come and go”. Repeating the message of Hartigan’s speech, the 
editorial argues that Crikey is dependent on newspapers for survival, and light 
on original content, demonstrating the publication’s inadequacy as a major 
player in the media landscape. The editorial places these online news sources in 
direct contrast to traditional newspapers, such as The Australian, in order to 
demonstrate their comparative inferiority:  
 
Crikey, and its many peers in the US and Britain, are not newspapers. 
Rather, they are the work of small groups of passionate people with big 
barrows to push. In contrast, great newspapers, and their websites, are 
professional products staffed by men and women who combine deep 
knowledge of specific subjects with a talent for finding and reporting 
facts. ("Old Media, By Crikey," 2009) 
 
The editorial seeks to demonstrate the continued legitimacy of newspapers in 
the face of a changing media landscape by describing the things that 
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newspapers are capable of that Crikey is not – such as breaking big stories, 
maintaining foreign bureaux, and providing detailed policy analysis. This is 
something that Crikey publisher Eric Beecher has himself acknowledged in 
maintaining the necessity of quality journalism. But The Australian argues that 
“Crikey sells itself as the future of quality journalism, but it isn’t”. Rather, in 
order to position itself as synonymous with progress and the ‘future of 
journalism’, the paper undermines Crikey’s position as a (technologically) 
progressive publication, arguing instead that “Crikey is what newspapers were in 
the 18th century, a small-circulation propaganda sheet, read by people less 
interested in news and debate than having their prejudices confirmed”. This 
editorial is symptomatic of the general tone and content of the form of criticism 
levelled at Crikey from The Australian in this ‘war of words’. A leading voice in 
this war is Mark Day.  
 
Day is a columnist and media writer at The Australian, and long-time 
employee of News Limited. One of Day’s attacks on Crikey originated in 
response to Crikey’s denouncement of Australian avenues for media regulation 
in one of their editorials ("Can't we just turn them off?", 2009). Specifically, 
Crikey was responding to the “timid and toothless” response of the Australian 
Press Council to their complaint over the publication of what turned out to be 
fake nude photographs of Australian politician Pauline Hanson in the News 
Limited-owned Sunday Telegraph, as well as the latest gaffe by shock jock Kyle 
Sandilands (in this case, he suggested that actress Magda Szubanski would lose 
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weight more successfully in a concentration camp than on her public campaign 
with Jenny Craig). In response, Day announced that the editorial betrays 
Crikey’s status as a “deliberate meddler in the processes that establish media 
regulatory boundaries” (Day, 2009). He argues that “Crikey has become a bore; 
a daily platform for fixated characters who appear to share an obsession with 
little more than the goings-on at The Australian and within the global media 
business of the Murdoch family.” The criticism that Crikey is little more than a 
tool to express its publishers’ anti-Murdoch obsession runs throughout the 
papers’ many attacks. Specifically, Day’s contempt is directed towards Crikey 
under its Private Media ownership.34 He forgives it its past sins due to its 
demonstrated strength of character, suggesting that under the direction of Eric 
Beecher, it has lost its original charm: 
 
Crikey used to be a media gadfly with a kind of insouciant charm. It 
traded off the same need, deeply embedded in society, which sustains 
Sandilands – we all love to hate a bad boy. It is now a crushing, 
insufferable bore.  
 
In contrast, former owner and editor Stephen Mayne is forgiven his ‘bad boy’ 
behaviour while at the helm: 
 
                                                
34 That is, Day’s criticisms are directed at Crikey once it was purchased by the company owned by Eric 
Beecher, Diana Gribble and Chong Weng Ho. Beecher is the public face of Private Media, and 
significantly, a former News Limited employee who ‘defected’ to work at Fairfax, before moving to 
publishing at Text Media, and then Crikey.  
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Mayne admitted he was too busy as a one-man-band to bother with 
small niceties such as checking his facts, but boasted he was never wrong 
for long. As soon as he was told he was wrong, he put up a correction. 
 
Now, Day suggests, Beecher is using Crikey to drive a campaign against The 
Australian, using its position as an online publication to criticise mainstream 
media and further his own business interests. Michael Wolff (2008) argues that 
this sort of distrust of defectors – Beecher was formerly (and briefly) editor of 
the Murdoch-owned Herald and Weekly Times – is common among Murdoch 
staff, who cultivate a feudal and fiercely loyal outlook.   
 
 Day launched a similar attack after Crikey published an article by regular 
contributor Margaret Simons under the headline “Did the Herald Sun kill Carl 
Williams?” (Simons, 2010b). In her piece, Simons suggested that the 
publication by the Murdoch-owned Herald Sun of the revelation that Victoria 
Police was paying the school fees of the underworld figure Carl Williams’ 
daughter might have contributed to his subsequent murder. Simons argues that 
the implication of the story was clear: “the Herald Sun effectively announced on 
its front page that Williams had done a deal with the police”. Hours later, 
Williams was brutally bashed to death in prison. Simons suggests the paper 
could have been unwittingly used as a tool by sources who would have 
benefited from the information becoming public – this, she suggests was “not so 
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much conspiracy, as opportunism”. She criticises the paper for publishing 
without adequately considering the possible consequences:  
It would be nice to think that the Hun’s senior editorial team thought 
about the rights and wrongs of publishing in this context. But we all 
know that, particularly under the paper’s current gung-ho leadership, it 
is far more likely that they looked no further than the scoops on offer. 
Publish, and let the cards fall where they may. (Simons, 2010b) 
The following week, Day (2010a) responded with a vigorous defence and attack 
on Crikey’s position within the local media landscape. He begins with a response 
to Simons’ suggestion that the Herald Sun was wrong for publishing and letting 
the ‘cards fall where they may’. That, argues Day, is precisely the job of 
journalism:  
If it is legally possible to tell the truth without issues of public concern 
then it must be told. To suggest that editors actively engaged in a plot to 
engineer the assassination of a criminal in jail is absurd. To suggest 
reporters and editors conspired or were used in committing criminal 
activity is outlandish and defamatory. (Day, 2010a) 
He goes on to attack Crikey more specifically, and in particular, its place in the 
Australian media landscape, working to discredit it as a serious or mainstream 
news source:  
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Crikey’s position in the media world is left of centre, anti-establishment 
because it has nowhere else to go. If it were not a gadfly, a pricker of 
pomp and pretension, it would be nothing. It breaks virtually no news; it 
relies on controversial comment for its existence and carefully crafts this 
formula to keep the subscriptions rolling in. (Day, 2010a) 
 
Again, as with his earlier attack on Crikey, he suggests that the problem lies with 
its more recent owners: “Crikey publisher Eric Beecher is a former News editor 
with an axe to grind”. The suggestion is that when Crikey was a powerless pest 
under the leadership of incorrigible ‘bad boy’ Stephen Mayne, its critical 
position was indulged and tolerated. It had a narrow readership, and posed 
little threat to the media heavyweights at News Limited. But under the 
authority of a “former News editor” Crikey is something else entirely – a source 
of genuine disturbance to the likes of Day that must be firmly put, and kept, in 
its place.     
  
In response, Crikey has not restrained itself when it comes to criticising 
The Australian or the Murdoch media empire. Most notably, Beecher has 
accused the paper of being self-obsessed, demonstrating a “narcissism of the 
kind that can’t be found in any other substantial English-language newspaper” 
(Beecher, 2010e). However, Crikey is equally critical, if not more so of Fairfax 
newspapers, as well as the independently owned West Australian newspaper (see 
Beecher, 2008a; Beecher, 2008b; Simons, 2007a), and the ABC (Beecher, 
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2009g), and more importantly, has sought to position itself as overwhelmingly 
critical in general, as an independent voice in the Australian media. Indeed, 
Crikey publisher Eric Beecher has spoken out in praise of The Australian despite 
its stance towards Crikey, saying it is “the originator of Australia’s liveliest ideas 
and commentary” (Beecher, 2009f, p. xv). He argues that while it may 
represent a conservative position on certain political issues, it has demonstrated 
a continued commitment to political commentary and the resources necessary 
to carry it out.    
 
Similarly, The Australian has shown its willingness to work with Crikey 
when it has interests in common. For instance, the paper ran a story on 
Beecher’s objection to the ABC’s commentary site The Drum, which he suggests 
“seriously and dangerously compromises the ABC’s editorial integrity” 
(Sinclair, 2010). He also says, “I can now fully understand why the BBC has 
limited its online activities, especially in the commentary arena” (Sinclair, 
2010), which is significantly in keeping with News Corporation’s stance on 
public service broadcasters, the extent of their remit in a changing media 
environment, and their potential to stifle competition, particularly in the online 
arena. For example, Chairman and Chief Executive of News Corporation’s 
Asian and European operations, James Murdoch, attacked the BBC’s online 
expansion in his MacTaggart lecture for the Edinburgh International 
Television Festival in 2009. He suggests that the extent of the BBC’s reach, 
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particularly online where it offers high quality news for no cost, is threatening 
the future of other commercial news providers in that medium:  
 
Dumping free, state-sponsored news on the market makes it incredibly 
difficult for journalism to flourish on the internet. Yet it is essential for 
the future of independent digital journalism that a fair price can be 
charged for news to people who value it. We seem to have decided as a 
society to let independence and plurality wither. To let the BBC throttle 
the news market and then get bigger to compensate. (Murdoch, 2009) 
 
Thus when the Murdoch press sees Crikey, or at least its publisher, as an ally, it 
is able to bury the hatchet. The same article described Crikey under Beecher’s 
leadership as “a forum for more measured commentary in recent times” 
(Sinclair, 2010), rather than the dull and irrelevant product deprived of 
Stephen Mayne’s trademark ‘charm’. Even Mark Day seemed to have softened 
his stance. In a column published on the same day as Sinclair’s piece, he 
suggested that Crikey “has evolved into a more considered, even ponderous, 
vehicle for soft-left political punditry and media commentary” (Day, 2010d) – a 
far cry from his usual position on the publication under its Private Media 
ownership.  
 
However, it is because of campaigns like the one waged in the editorial 
pages of The Australian, as well as events like its exclusion from the annual 
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budget lock-in (Barns, 2007), that Crikey has worked hard to position itself as a 
serious source of journalism. This has cultivated a form of defensiveness within 
Crikey, centred on its adherence to professional standards. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Beecher has positioned himself as a spokesperson for the 
cause of quality journalism in Australia. When asked about the key strategies 
that have shaped Crikey’s development, Beecher is quick to shift the emphasis 
from factors such as technology and the business model to professional values, 
arguing that it is the editorial position the publication inhabits that has most 
influenced its direction and success:  
 
I think the overwhelming thing has nothing to do with the technology, 
or marketing or whatever, all of which are important. But the 
overwhelming thing is editorial priority – that we see editorial content of 
a particular kind, and continuing to invest in that to the extent that we 
can – as being 1, 2, 3, and 4. (E. Beecher, personal communication, 13 
March 2009) 
 
Similarly, Beecher is quick to dismiss the idea that Crikey’s success is driven by 
the fact it is an online news source – and one with a successful business model – 
at a time when traditional news is floundering. Rather, he suggests that it is the 
professional journalism and its values that inform it, which have shaped Crikey:  
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You can have the best technology, and the best marketing in the world, 
and if we don’t have the content that appeals to people, and that’s not 
just, you know, analysing it story by story, it’s tone, it’s the editorial 
culture that we create, it’s the irreverence. It’s also making it more and 
more accurate all the time – so, you know, Crikey’s still not the most 
accurate media outlet in the world, but it’s no longer, you know, one of 
the least accurate – so that’s really important to us. (E. Beecher, personal 
communication, 13 March 2009) 
 
Beecher is defending the legitimacy of Crikey against criticism from those within 
the mainstream media whose legitimacy is not in question. What is at stake for 
Beecher and for Crikey is their journalistic authority, the basis on which 
journalistic professionalism is measured.  
 
Notions of professionalism and journalistic authority  
Studies of journalistic professionalism have often turned to the sociology 
of professions, or what Schudson and Anderson (2009) refer to as “trait 
studies”, against which they measure the extent to which journalism is, or is 
not, a profession. Larson (as cited in Schudson and Anderson, 2009) argues that 
“ideal typical constructions do not tell us what a profession is, only what it 
pretends to be” (p. 89). Nonetheless, discussions that measure journalism 
against an ideal type remain dominant, and are exhibited in Day’s critique of 
Crikey’s standards, and Beecher’s defence. Schultz (1994) suggests that 
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discussions of journalism framed around the possession, or lack of measures of 
professionalism, are inherently limited. She argues that the paradox of 
professionalism for journalism can be found in the deep ambivalence that 
surrounds the adoption of professional standards. For instance, Schultz found 
that Australian journalists have a strong commitment to the idea of the media 
as the fourth estate, the independent watchdog of power, rather than seeing it 
“as just another business” (p. 44). This, despite the fact that while in a 1992 
study of 247 Australian journalists, 90 per cent of those surveyed were 
personally committed to the idea of the press of the fourth estate, but nearly 
half believed that “in reality, it was just another business” (p. 44). Similarly, 
while journalism has met many of the benchmarks of a profession – such as 
autonomy, and the adherence to ethical codes – “there is limited evidence that 
the media have become substantially more credible or reliable” (p. 38). The 
problem with professionalism for journalists, Schultz argues, is that the 
autonomy it affords them as a profession can also serve to lead them to become 
insular, inward looking, and arrogant.   
 
Schultz argues that the professionalisation35 of journalism is incomplete, 
and that journalists resist some of its common processes, such as the statutory 
registration that applies to other professions because of a commitment to the 
media as the fourth estate (p. 37). In fact, Schultz outlines that as journalists 
                                                
35 ‘Professionalisation’ here indicates that journalism’s recognition as a profession has been a historical 
process, as outlined in the previous chapter’s discussion of the development of ‘scientific’ practices and 
values, such as objectivity, to set professional journalism against the highly partisan and economically-
driven practices of the pauper press in the UK and yellow journalism in the US.   
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have asserted their professionalism – which has occurred slowly since the turn 
of the last century – the public has come to trust journalists less (p. 39). In 
return, journalists see this situation as inevitable, and newspapers have a poor 
record at acknowledging or correcting mistakes. They view their poor 
reputation as originating in sensationalism and inaccurate reporting – which in 
turn they see as the result of trying to satisfy the demands of their audience 
within the constraints of time and resources. This produces a kind of gridlock in 
which journalists and their audiences become isolated from each other, each 
seeing the other as a necessary evil, each inhibiting in some way the production 
of quality journalism. Professionalism, then, operates as rhetoric around the 
practice of journalism. It works to indicate journalism’s progression and 
development away from its partisan and commercial history, and towards a 
more objective and trustworthy form of journalism. Rhetorics of 
professionalism thus work to bring into view an ideal type of journalism – 
historically, the model of journalism as a fourth estate. The remainder of this 
chapter is concerned with demonstrating the way in which this professionalism 
depends on journalistic autonomy and authority through which journalism is 
active in governing its professional status.    
 
Schudson and Anderson (2009) argue that struggles for professionalism 
in journalism are about establishing an area of jurisdiction in which journalists 
can exercise their authority. Following the work of Abbott, they define 
jurisdiction as “the day-to-day manner in which a profession both concretizes 
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and displays its base of ‘abstract knowledge’ or, in the peculiar case of 
journalism, knowledge real and expert but by no means abstract” (Schudson & 
Anderson, 2009, p. 89). Abbott (as cited in Schudson & Anderson, 2009) argues 
that journalism (in the US at least) has claimed jurisdiction over “the collection 
and distribution of qualitative, current information about general events” (p. 
96). In the collection and distribution of this information, the method of 
objective reporting is what gives journalism its “unique jurisdictional focus by 
claiming to possess a certain form of expertise or intellectual discipline” (Abott 
as cited in Schudson & Anderson, 2009, p. 96). Schudson (2001) argues that the 
objectivity norm is central to the practice of journalism in the US, and it 
operates in order to maintain the social cohesion, control and identity of 
journalists as a group, for historically contingent reasons, so that “journalists 
work in Germany or China or Cuba or Argentina with norms that differ from 
the objectivity norm” (p. 17).  
 
Armed with this particular account of objectivity as a key if contingent 
element in establishing jurisdiction, we can revisit Beecher’s efforts. In his work 
around quality journalism, Beecher is trying to establish a norm or set of norms 
that grants jurisdictional authority to a particular type of journalism. That is, in 
response to journalism facing challenges from technological, economic and 
social pressures, Beecher is trying to secure the jurisdictional authority of what 
he labels ‘quality journalism’ in a field riddled with different or lesser examples. 
 161 
For Crikey, this means asserting a particular type of professionalism, which, as I 
outline below, exhibits paradoxical elements.   
 
Crikey’s paradoxical professionalism  
While professionalism can operate as a means to journalistic authority, 
conversely, it is the rejection of this means of authority through which some 
alternative forms of journalism establish their own form of authenticity:  
 
Forms of “alternative” and “citizen” journalism are premised precisely 
on a principled refusal of professional identity and associated forms of 
practice that, simultaneously, claim to represent a more radical and 
authentic embodiment of such journalistic ideals as representing the 
public, speaking truth to power, and operating as a means through 
which members of the public can both gain access to knowledge that 
supports an informed exercise of citizenship and engage in collective 
debate. (Nolan, 2009, p. 660) 
 
This kind of plea to authenticity is found in an opinion piece by former Crikey 
editor Jonathon Green, published in The Australian – clearly during a peaceful 
period in relations between the two publications. Green’s piece is a defence of 
Crikey, arguing that the publication could be measured against traditional 
journalistic values, and not found wanting:  
 
 162 
People won’t let it go. How credible is Crikey, they ask? It’s online, isn’t 
it? Is that real journalism? And this is what I say: that after working 
through a media epoch that has reduced the majority of Australian 
newspapers to journalistic zombies – some selling, some not, but all 
driven by ideology, populism or commercial desperation – the stuff we 
do at Crikey is a return to something simple, wholesome and traditional. 
(Green, 2009) 
 
In this piece Green is, paradoxically, making a claim for Crikey’s professionalism 
by mainstream measures, but then also rejecting these measures by suggesting 
that Crikey offers something more authentic than the mainstream press. Green 
suggests that Crikey offers adherence to journalistic principles that have been 
abandoned by most within the current Australian media landscape, 
representing a “breath of fresh and journalistically earnest air” compared to its 
mainstream competitors. While most publications have become driven by the 
economic imperatives of their board, Green argues that Crikey “is as close as 
I’ve been in decades to a journalistic product that pursues and presents the 
story in simple, unambiguous terms”. Here, Green’s paradoxical position 
embodies the difficult territory that Crikey navigates. On the one hand, it is keen 
to exploit its position as a new media product offering something alternative, 
authentic and thoroughly different to the mainstream media. On the other, if it 
is to be positioned as a real competitor to this media, it must gain its journalistic 
authority not by rejecting the norms that grant broader journalistic jurisdiction, 
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but by adopting these. Thus Crikey finds itself in the strange position of being 
both critic and bedfellow of The Australian and the mainstream media in 
general. It is defined both by and against the professional standards exhibited 
by the mainstream media. Crikey gains its authority by demonstrating the short 
fallings of these mainstream offerings, but at the same time must acknowledge 
their centrality to its existence and necessity in the overall media landscape – as 
Beecher (2009c) does.   
 
The complexity of the position inhabited by consciously ‘alternative’ 
online news offerings is also detected by Bruns (2004), who argues that the 
labelling of independent online news sites of Crikey’s ilk as sources of alternative 
journalism can be misleading:  
 
While they are able to exploit the web’s low news production and 
delivery costs to set up their own operation and gain nationwide 
notoriety, journalistic practices on these sites – except for their 
deliberately confrontational, no-holds-barred approach to news 
coverage – is not much different from that in traditional news 
organizations. (p. 179)  
 
Bruns specifically critiques these sorts of sites for their lack of innovation, 
particularly in the area of editorial processes where, contrary to what many see 
as the underpinning amateur-oriented nature of online content production, 
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they still “leave their staff journalists well in control of news content” (p. 174). 
What Bruns is railing against is a perceived lack of authenticity in the rejection 
of the mainstream values central to the positioning of these sites, but which 
cannot be maintained if they also want to seek authority within the jurisdiction 
of traditional journalism. Rather, it is the extent to which online news sites seek 
and value this authority that determines the extent to which they are bound by 
its rules (including perceived professional standards). For Crikey, establishing 
and maintaining its authority within the jurisdiction of traditional, mainstream 
journalism takes precedence – particularly under its Private Media ownership – 
over maintaining its position as an alternative source. Under the previous 
direction of Stephen Mayne, Crikey was positioned less as a mainstream, more 
as an alternative news source, and was thus governed by a range of different 
professional norms. It is this change in direction, from a rejection to an 
acceptance of professional journalistic norms and to a position of authority 
within the jurisdiction of journalism that has prompted, in part, Crikey’s 
vigorous defence of its professional status and The Australian’s efforts to 
challenge or destabilise Crikey’s move into its professional territory. For other 
publications, professional authority is less important than other forms of 
authority, as I argue later with evidence of The Age Online being less bound by 
the norms of journalistic professionalism, but through a cultural disconnect, is 
governed more by financial concerns.  
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The politics of professional status  
Given the ambiguities that surround the notion of professionalism, it is 
more constructive to define it as a means of authority, and following Nolan’s 
(2009) governmental reworking of the concept, one that produces a range of 
diverse and sometimes contradictory outcomes. Working through a critique of 
the concept, Nolan argues that debates about journalistic professionalism are 
too often idealistic or used to cloak the myriad social factors that constitute the 
practice of journalism. He is similarly critical of discussions that move from 
journalism as a profession to journalism culture – for instance, Zelizer’s (1992) 
work that positions journalists as “interpretive communities”, within which 
journalistic authority is established and negotiated. While Schudson and 
Anderson (2009) critique Zelizer’s work for overemphasising the rhetorical 
dimension of journalism and overlooking the social structures that inform it, 
Nolan questions the definition of culture upon which this sort of approach is 
based. Rather than positioning culture as an interpretive framework, abstracted 
from the economic, social and political practices that inform its production, 
Nolan argues for the adoption of a governmental approach to culture.  
 
Within such an approach, and as discussed in detail in Chapter Three, 
journalism can be understood as a cultural technology, shaped by a range of 
specific social, economic and political conditions and practices. This changes 
the way in which journalistic autonomy, a means by which journalism gains 
authority, is understood. Within rhetorics of professionalism, journalistic 
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autonomy – from the state, capital and management – is central to claims for 
journalistic authority. Journalism’s claim to independence allows it to fulfil its 
objectivity norm and thus to demonstrate authority over its jurisdiction. 
However, as Nolan outlines, Schudson has demonstrated that journalistic 
autonomy is “not resistant to forms of state authority” (Nolan, 2009, p. 665) but 
rather journalism relies on state and commercial sources to provide 
information, structure and narrative to news. While still treating journalistic 
autonomy as a central means of journalistic authority, adoption of a 
governmental approach changes the way in which this is conceptualised. 
Autonomy can now be grasped as the means through which journalism can be 
acted upon from a range of agencies and institutions, in its operation as a 
cultural technology: 
 
Practices of governmental power seek to target, shape and work 
through, rather than undermine, forms of autonomy to achieve 
particular ends … “autonomy” is not something that stands opposed to 
power, but [is] its concrete realization through processes of 
subjectification that seek, in Nikolas Rose’s perspicacious phrase, to act 
upon subjects’ particular “powers of freedom”. (Nolan, 2009, p. 666) 
 
Thus autonomy remains the means through which journalists exercise their 
authority, but the way in which this authority or power operates is significantly 
different under the two different approaches.  
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While rhetorics of professionalism position journalistic autonomy as 
what separates journalism from the economic and political conditions in which 
it is practised, a governmental perspective demonstrates that these conditions 
are what shape the “powers of freedom” available to journalists in the exercise 
of their autonomy and authority. Indeed, their autonomy is the very way in 
which journalists not only exercise their authority, but through which they are 
also acted upon, constituting particular kinds of journalistic cultures of 
professional norms, standards and practices. This is not to say that journalistic 
autonomy and authority, and indeed journalistic professionalism, is a “sham”, 
as Nolan is careful to point out. But, rather, a governmental approach to 
journalism includes within its purview the examination of the way in which 
rhetorics of journalistic authority are deployed, for what means, and within 
what constraints. It allows consideration of the way in which journalism is 
being shaped as a cultural technology under changing conditions of liberalism, 
and how this includes changing notions of journalistic authority and 
professionalism in both broad and specific ways.  
 
As already discussed, for Crikey this has entailed a complex and at times 
paradoxical shaping of its professional identity, allowing it to inhabit the space 
it has marked out as an independent, online, but professional news source. It 
must straddle the twin identities of alternative and professional, navigating the 
complexities this entails for its identity, beset from challenges from those who 
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seek to question its legitimacy in both spheres. Specifically, in its engagement 
with media deliberations around its adherence to particular professional 
standards, Crikey is involved in the self-government of its own professional status 
despite the fact that this maintains its contradictory position between 
professionalism and authenticity. For The Age Online it has signalled the 
introduction of a changing form of professionalism, which challenges and is in 
tension with the authority of its print version, brought about by cultural 
differences and a structural disconnect between the print and online 
newsrooms. However, despite perceptions that The Age Online represents a 
rejection of the professional values embodied by its print predecessor, I argue 
that this demonstrates not a disavowal of professionalism, but rather a 
reshaping of professionalism online. I also suggest that this is brought about by 
the jurisdiction through which The Age Online seeks to claim its authority. While 
the print Age gains its authority in the jurisdiction of traditional journalism 
through the adherence to professional norms and standards, The Age Online 
seeks a different form of professional authority that is more attuned to financial 
imperatives.  
 
Professionalism at The Age Online  
Indeed, it has been suggested that The Age has all but disavowed its 
professional status – which once saw it as one of the best regarded media outlets 
in the Australian media landscape – thanks to a range of financial decisions 
made by its management and board (Beecher, 2008d). There is evidence that 
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could suggest that this observation is correct. For instance, while Crikey has been 
actively involved in public debates about the preservation of quality journalism 
in Australia, Fairfax has responded with apparent silence. Beecher has 
commented on this very matter, arguing that “there’s an intense debate about 
the future of journalism and newspapers vibrating across the Australian media 
– except in the media owned by the company which ignited the debate in the 
first place” (Beecher, 2008e). Beecher is referring to the 2008 move by Fairfax 
to cut 550 members of staff across its operations, as I discuss in more detail in 
relation to the economic factors that influence the development of online news, 
in Chapter Six. The sackings were what sparked Beecher’s vocal stance on the 
need to protect quality journalism in Australia, and he notes “a distinct odour 
of internal censorship” within Fairfax itself when it comes to reflecting on the 
impact of the management decision on its editorial practices.  
 
As an outside observer with little access to the internal workings of 
Fairfax, and specifically, The Age Online, it is difficult to assess the mood and 
approach to the changing media landscape. However, what can be noted is a 
failure to engage with current debates surrounding the future of journalism in 
Australia. Further, it may be possible to detect in this silence an unwillingness 
to do so. The Age journalist interviewed for this research suggested that while the 
silence from their quarters could be partly blamed on the journalists’ 
characteristically large workload, as well as their reticence to answer questions 
– “despite calling other people for a living many [journalists] are, ironically, 
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unwilling to do the same (or even correspond) for anyone else if there is no 
obvious benefit for them” – it was also likely that it was driven by a “reluctance 
to stick their head up at a time where job security is far from what it once was” 
(J. Hogan, personal communication, 10 August 2009). This is not to say that 
The Age (online and in print) has failed to engage in debating broader media 
changes and trends per se. Thanks to the presence of Media and 
Communications editor Matthew Ricketson from 2006 to 2009, the paper was 
attentive to a range of issues facing the Australian and global media.   
 
Ricketson’s columns covered a diverse range of media issues, including 
reflection on journalistic practice, consideration of ethical issues, and discussion 
of current and future trends. For example, columns reflecting on journalistic 
practice covered such issues as journalists’ experiences reporting Victoria’s 
Black Saturday bush fires (Ricketson, 2009), news that ABC’s Radio National 
was cutting specialist programs in order to fund more digital projects 
(Ricketson, 2008b), and coverage of the departure of US veteran television 
news anchor Dan Rather from CBS after 24 years (Ricketson, 2006). Columns 
around issues of media ethics included the discussion of the injunction against 
Channel Seven’s use of information gained from football players’ private 
medical records (Ricketson, 2007b), and debates around the changing 
perceptions and trust of journalists in the shifting media landscape (Ricketson, 
2008a). Ricketson was perceptive of and engaged with debates about the 
implications of the rise of digital communication technologies on the future of 
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news and newspapers (Ricketson, 2007a). While Ricketson did demonstrate a 
tendency to highlight the necessity and durability of newspapers, particularly in 
a number of reports during 2008, this angle often emerged through the 
headline, and so is not necessarily of Ricketson’s doing but an editorial concern 
(Ricketson, 2008e, 2008f).  
 
But regardless of any perceived positioning, these issues were covered 
with insight and analysis. With Ricketson’s departure, this seemed to cease. 
While a media and marketing section remains in the business pages, with media 
business ‘guru’ Harold Mitchell a regular columnist, it covers a wide range of 
media news with a more specific focus on advertising, and lacking the reflection 
on media practice that Ricketson’s columns provided. So while Crikey has 
consciously and publicly engaged with these issues as part of its claim for 
journalistic authority, The Age, both online and in print, appears to have 
disengaged with these sorts of discussions with the departure of its Media and 
Communications editor. Rather, differing notions of professionalism and 
journalistic authority highlight a pre-existing structural divide between the print 
and online newsrooms at The Age. A journalist who has worked for both print 
and online at The Age outlines the way in which this divide manifests around the 
professional positioning of each part of the paper:   
 
I think probably these days the biggest issue between print and online is 
the difference in tone sometimes between what is in the paper and what 
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is in the website in terms of the prominence given to stories. I’d say that 
these days that’s probably the biggest source of angst between online 
staff and print staff. (J. Hogan, personal communication, 10 August 
2009) 
 
The journalist then goes on to outline the way in which this professional divide 
is underpinned by a structural divide between the two newsrooms:  
 
Online has a more salacious, tawdry approach than the paper, I mean 
it’s quite common to have your three main stories during the day all sort 
of showbiz related and giving prominence to stuff that in the paper, 
mightn’t get in there at all. But … that’s really an issue because the print 
side and the website are actually controlled by different parts of the 
company, so while it’s the same website, the guy, even the editor in chief 
of the newspaper, while he can suggest what goes in the website, in the 
end that’s not his call. (J. Hogan, personal communication, 10 August 
2009) 
 
Because despite Fairfax Media’s claim to be a “fully integrated media 
company” ("Fairfax Media," 2009), the company is split in two, with Fairfax 
Digital governing its online operations and the parent company remaining in 
charge of print. Despite the company’s claims of media convergence 
(Australian Press Council, 2007), the two arms of the company remain 
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operationally separate. Rather, what has taken place has been architectural 
convergence – with a new headquarters in Melbourne housing the operations 
of The Age newspaper, 3AW Radio, Fairfax Digital and the Melbourne bureaux 
of the Australian Financial Review and Business Review Weekly ("In-depth focus," 
2010) – and the convergence of management of the online versions of the two 
metropolitan mastheads – The Age Online and The SMH Online – both of which 
are under the leadership of Online editor-in-chief Mike van Niekerk (Beer, 
2006).  
 
 As mentioned above, this structural divide between the two newsrooms 
creates a gulf between the perception of the print and online versions of the 
paper. Importantly, this divide is seen to be financially-driven, so that while the 
print newspaper is working on an ‘old’ business model based on the sale of 
advertising tied to the quality of the print content, and thus the economic 
demographics of its audience, the online version is driven by the need for a 
higher volume of page views and clicks less dependent on a particular ‘class’ of 
reader. This results in the prominence of material on the front page of the 
online paper that is designed to attract more readers and clicks. Given the 
different nature of reading and engagement online, this material is not often the 
sort given similar prominence in the print newspaper. Visual evidence of the 
evolution of The Age Online supports this perceived growing disconnect between 
the tone and style of the two versions of The Age. For instance, Image 1 shows a 
2007 version of The Age Online before a redesign later that year that saw it take 
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the shape that remains, more or less, today. To the right of the main content is 
a flash box where a story on Hollywood actress Angelina Jolie is one of the 
rotating options. Below the top stories is a ‘Time Out’ section, featuring a 
number of lighter pieces. Image 2 shows the front page of The Age newspaper of 
the same day. There is an obvious difference between the two versions, but the 
prominence of celebrity news, gossip, and lighter stories in The Age Online is less 
marked than the difference between the treatment of top news stories. It is 
evident that The Age Online has made breaking news far more prominent than 
the top stories from the day’s paper. In comparison, Image 3 demonstrates the 
redesign that occurred in 2007, in which celebrity-oriented news became far 
more prominent. Image 4 is a 2010 version of The Age Online, which 
demonstrates that celebrity-oriented news has remained prominent in the three 
years since the 2007 version shown in Image 3. Image 4 shows the cover of The 
Age on the same day as Image 3, demonstrating that while The Age Online has 
remained consistent since its redesign, so the print Age has remained consistent 
in its difference to its online counterpart.  
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Image 1 
The Age Online 2007 (a)  
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Image 2 
The Age Newspaper 2007 
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Image 3 
The Age Online 2007 (b) 
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Image 4 
The Age Online 2010 
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Image 5 
The Age Newspaper 2010 
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Through these images I wish to suggest that it is both a divided 
newsroom and a different treatment of news content that shape the 
development and practice of journalism at The Age Online. Attention to 
professionalism allows for an examination of both structural and cultural 
factors as it encompasses the ideas that shape journalistic culture as well as its 
practical manifestation. As I have demonstrated, the development of online 
news at Crikey is shaped largely by the need for adherence to and promotion of 
notions of professionalism. In the case of Crikey, both the culture of 
professionalism and its demands on journalistic practice have shaped the 
development of the publication and its broader public identity. In comparison, 
at The Age, the culture of professionalism is used as a measure of the difference 
between online and print operations. Differences in culture emerge in the 
editorial tone and approach, and the selection and placement of stories. 
However, this cultural tension is also influenced by structural factors. In the 
case of The Age Online, its separate editorial identity, facilitated by split print and 
online newsrooms, is what creates this cultural difference and resulting tension. 
Thus in the development of online news in the two cases, both cultural and 
structural factors, focused around notions of professionalism, play a part.  
 
While it could be argued that the structural divide between The Age and 
its online counterpart, and the associated disconnect between the featured 
content at each represents an abandonment of the sort of professional standards 
embodied by the print Age, such as a commitment to the sort of investigative 
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journalism and political news that is part of the ‘fourth estate’ ideal, I suggest 
that this represents the development of a different sort of professionalism 
online. Indeed, Nolan (2009) argues that while the conditions for the practice of 
a sort of ‘public interest’ (or ‘quality’) journalism as represented by the 
traditional image of The Age newspaper have been undermined, this does not 
result in an associated demise of professionalism. Rather, while aspects of an 
older professionalism once embodied by The Age have been displaced, they have 
also been “replaced by alternative discourses and practices of journalistic 
professionalism” (Nolan, 2009, p. 666). As I outlined in the previous chapter, 
Nolan (2008) traces the development of journalism as a cultural technology 
under the changing conditions of liberalism. He argues that under the current 
conditions of advanced liberalism a different form of professionalism is 
emerging, embodying a range of different journalistic values:  
 
These have frequently involved an appeal to more quantitative 
techniques for knowing, and claiming to represent, a measured public. 
Here, we may include increasingly sophisticated audience and 
demographic surveys, ratings and circulation measurement, practices of 
public opinion polling and various forms of feedback and accountability 
mechanisms that seek to demonstrate, and act upon, a more detailed 
knowledge of ‘actual’ publics … Such transformations, are, however, not 
best understood as an abandonment of professional concerns to 
represent the public. (Nolan, 2009, pp. 666–667)   
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Rather, these professional concerns now draw on new forms of marketing 
expertise, allowing claims of greater responsiveness than ever to ‘what the 
public wants’ and a corresponding ability to represent it. The case being made 
here is that these different forms of professionalism can account for the gulf that 
exists between The Age in its print form and The Age Online.  
 
 Thus The Age newspaper and The Age Online find themselves working to 
different measures of professionalism. This is heightened by a structural divide 
between the two newsrooms, which ensures that the practice of journalism in 
each case is governed by a clearly distinct set of norms and practices. Further, it 
means that each is seeking to claim their authority over different areas of 
journalistic jurisdiction. The print version of The Age is seeking its authority via 
the jurisdiction of traditional journalism and its public service remit, while The 
Age Online is seeking its authority via the jurisdiction of a new sort of 
professionalism online, one that is more attuned to market populism brought 
about by the changing political-economic environment, as I evidence in the 
following chapter. The resulting difference in the content found in each version 
leads to tensions between the two newsrooms and concerns over the future of 
‘quality’ journalism, given the downturn facing the print product and the 
growing online audience.  
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A return to an older version of professionalism does not represent an 
easy way forward for a news product such as The Age. While Crikey has 
demonstrated its ability to navigate this field, it has also come up against the 
inherent complexity of this position. Whether it proves sustainable or not 
remains to be seen. However, with an eventual merging of the print and online 
newsrooms likely at The Age36, it is more probable that the print Age will be 
increasingly governed by the new standards of professionalism that govern its 
online arm. A disavowal of these values would be feasible if The Age were to 
move to present itself as a less ‘professional’ but more authentic form of news, 
as found in some examples of public or civic journalism in the US (Bratich, 
2008). However, Crikey has demonstrated the reluctance with which even an 
independent publication is able to dissociate itself with notions of 
professionalism. In the following chapter I outline the way in which The Age 
Online is reshaping its relationship with its audience in ways that are suggestive 
of its changing professional status – one that is more attuned to market 
populism than to older notions of a fourth estate.  
 
                                                
36 The implementation of an integration strategy was among former Fairfax Media CEO Brian 
McCarthy’s recommendations in the strategic plan he released shortly before his resignation 
(presumably a result of an “underwhelming” ‘vision’ for the company’s future) (Bartholomeusz, 2010b).  
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Introduction  
I begin this chapter by outlining some of the more recent shifts in the 
way in which the relationship between audiences and media has been 
understood, before considering in more detail the relationship between media 
and temporal and spatial identities. In particular, I outline the significant work 
of Benedict Anderson (1991) in mapping out the way in which media, and 
particularly newspapers, have constituted for audiences a sense of shared 
‘nation-ness’, as part of an ‘imagined community’. With changes in media 
come changes in the organisation of audiences around temporal demands and 
routines. But what remains the same is that media routinely organise audiences. 
They also assemble audiences, to bring into being particular subjectivities 
according to particular (and diverse) political objectives. I draw on the work of 
Paul Langley (2008) and Melissa Gregg (2008) to demonstrate the way in which 
various (often mundane) media work as cultural technologies, productive of 
specific subjectivities. Through the analysis of an advertisement for The Age 
Online, I demonstrate the way in which this publication works to assemble its 
audience in order to produce a particular subjectivity, amenable to the 
demands of the online environment and the conditions of the ‘information 
economy’.  
 
One expectation in the online environment is for increased interactivity 
between producers and consumers of news (and other) content. However, in 
the case of many online news publications, interactivity is held more as an ideal 
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than an accepted practice. I argue that it is an attachment to journalism’s 
traditional liberal role that inhibits the adoption of interactive options in 
general and in the two case studies – and particularly at Crikey – where this 
attachment is most ardently demonstrated. However, a consideration of 
interactivity as a break with ‘traditional’ journalistic practices limits the analysis 
of its historical operation. Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas and Dan Hunter 
(2010) provide a more constructive way of considering interactivity, by 
positioning ‘user generated practices’ – a term that encompasses many of the 
practices that fall within the definition of ‘interactivity’ – within the field of the 
informal economy. Considering interactive activities as part of the informal 
economy places them on a (historically changing) spectrum between the formal 
and informal economies, shaped by a range of social, political and economic 
factors.     
 
 This conceptualisation of changing producer-consumer relations also 
encourages attention to the changing social and economic conditions in which 
they operate. Nigel Thrift (2005, 2006) argues that in the current economic 
environment, the relationship between producers and consumers is being 
reconfigured by a sped-up temporality, a “fine-grained approximation of time” 
(2005, p. 131) and the production of ‘fast subjects’ that can perform – creatively 
– within this temporal environment. I argue that this new producer-consumer 
relationship can be demonstrated by the incident that saw Age columnist 
Catherine Deveny sacked after a flood of negative readers’ comments in 
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response to her comments on social networking site Twitter. This incident also 
brings to the fore the prominence of market populism in all areas of business – 
including the practice of journalism. I draw on the work of Thomas Frank 
(2001) to demonstrate the way in which market populist rhetoric is 
transforming the practice of journalism, making it more responsive to the 
demands of the audience, as the Deveny example so clearly illustrates.  
 
  A form of market populism also informs the operation of ‘social network 
markets’ – the feature that separates the ‘creative’ from other industries, 
according to creative industries scholars (Potts, et al., 2008). Thus in the final 
section of the chapter, I take what might at first appear a considerable detour 
through the landscape of the creative industries scholarship and debates, 
because beyond the description it provides of the industries within which 
journalism (and its practices and education and training) sits, it is also 
performative, in the sense that its arguments help to constitute and bring into 
being the ‘creative industries’ – and thus the kind of creative intellectual work 
of future styles of journalism – that it seeks to map. I finish this chapter by 
making some comments about what the creative industries research and policy 
agenda might mean for the continuing development of journalism – and in 
particular, its relationship to citizenship.  
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Conceptualising ‘the audience’ 
The interaction between various media and their audience(s) has long 
been a concern in media, cultural and communication studies. Indeed, the term 
‘audience’ has itself become contested in the era of digital media, in which 
audiences are enabled to engage in more active ways with both texts and 
producers. Leah A. Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone (2006) reject the term 
‘audience’ and its increasingly common alternative ‘users’ to describe the 
people who engage with the internet, preferring that unembellished word itself 
– ‘people’. They argue that ‘audience’ is too limited a term to describe the wide 
range of activities that people engage in online, while the term ‘users’ is too 
broad and instrumental, and opens up the unhelpful contrasting category of 
‘nonusers’. Rather, they favour the neutral term ‘people’ for the way in which it 
addresses audiences as both individuals and members of a collective group, and 
“puts people’s agency and action at the centre of new media studies, rather 
than the labels or categories we apply to them or the devices they use” (p. 8).  
 
Pertti Alasuutari (1999) traces the way in which audience studies have 
shifted their focus from concerns with the ‘message’ of the media text to an 
ethnographic concern with the interpretive practices of audiences themselves, 
and more recently, to a concern with the way in which audiences are 
constructed. This more recent constructionist turn signals that audiences are 
not homogenous masses waiting to be known and measured, but are formed 
through a range of constitutive practices. For instance, Schudson (2003) argues 
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that audiences are not pre-existing entities but are produced in part by the 
institutional practices of the media: “the media organize not just information, 
but audiences. They legitimize not just events and the sources that report them, 
but also readers and viewers” (p. 31).   
 
Similarly, Antoine Hennion and Cecile Meadel (1986) outline the way in 
which media and their audiences “reciprocally construct one another” (p. 281). 
In their study of music programming at French radio station RTL in the mid-
1980s, Hennion and Meadel illustrate the way in which, through processes of 
music selection, scheduling, and technologies for ‘knowing’ the audience, the 
radio station and its audience are mutually constructed. They demonstrate that 
the RTL audience is brought into being through a range of specific techniques 
and processes, such as a “series of mediators, representatives, systems of 
measurement and witnesses by means of which the professionals, in reality, 
make the audience appear and respond” (p. 298). This does not mean that the 
audience is an entity that can be mysteriously conjured into existence, but 
rather, that it is only knowable through quite specific interventions and 
mediations: “the public doesn’t exist anywhere except in that series of 
reciprocal and recurrent mediations which make it appear at specific places, in 
specific forms, through authorized representatives and negotiated 
representations” (p. 300).  
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Time, space, place and news  
One particularly notable way in which media socially organise audiences 
is in relation to spatial and temporal identities. The work of Anderson (1991) 
has been seminal in illustrating the constitutive relationship between 
communication artefacts and notions of time and space. In his study of the 
constitution of nations as ‘imagined communities’, Anderson outlines the way 
in which the newspaper and the novel work as cultural technologies, 
constituting for their readers a sense of ‘nation-ness’, enabling them to feel a 
shared national identity with an anonymous, geographically dispersed but 
territorially bounded population. This came about, firstly, through a changed 
conception of time, allowing for the first time an understanding of the idea of 
simultaneity. With this it becomes possible to grasp the concept of ‘meanwhile’ 
– a narrative technique that shapes the organisation of time within the novel 
and the newspaper. This transformed conception of temporality makes possible 
a changed spatiality, allowing the nation to be brought into being. Anderson 
suggests that “the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through 
homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which 
is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history” (p. 
26).   
 
These changed notions of time and space inform the conventions of the 
novel and the newspaper, which in turn constitute for their readers particular 
spatial and temporal relationships and identities. Anderson describes the 
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“essential literary convention of the newspaper” (p. 33) as the physical 
juxtaposition of otherwise unconnected events, so that a story about Soviet 
dissidents is positioned alongside an account of a coup in Iraq on the same page 
of the newspaper. Benedict argues that, for the reader, their linkage is 
imagined, achievable through the use of two specific techniques. First, the 
“calendrical coincidence” that sees the otherwise unrelated stories appearing 
under the newspaper masthead on the same day, grouped together by a sense 
of universal time (p. 33). In this way, “the date at the top of the newspaper, the 
single most important emblem on it, provides the essential connection – the 
steady onward clocking of homogenous, empty time. Within this time, ‘the 
world’ ambles steadily ahead” (p. 33).   
 
Second, it is the newspaper’s mirroring of the novel, and its success on a 
mass scale – its “ephemeral popularity” – that allows for the “extraordinary 
mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of 
the newspaper-as-fiction” (p. 35). This ‘ceremony’ allows for a sense of shared 
experience between otherwise anonymous members of the nation-space, 
brought into relation through the act of consuming the news. Thus “the 
newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed 
by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured 
that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life” (pp. 35–36). Along 
with the horizontal anonymity of ‘nation-ness’, Michael Schudson (2003) 
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argues that newspapers give readers a sense of democratic participation, due to 
the sense of public inclusion that imbues the practice of shared reading:  
 
That you and I read the same front page or see the same television news 
as do the president of the United States and the chairperson of IBM is 
empowering; the impression it promotes of equality and commonality, 
illusion though it is, sustains a hope of democratic life. (pp. 31–32) 
 
As Schudson demonstrates, the spatial and temporal organisation of 
anonymous, dispersed, but geographically bounded individuals as an audience 
can bring about their social organisation in other ways. The nation thus 
becomes a space that can be organised and shaped into being around a range 
of changing objectives across time, through such communication technologies 
as the newspaper.  
 
Colin Mercer (1992) draws on Anderson’s work to examine the role of 
the newspaper as habitus during the 1988 Australian bicentenary. Mercer argues 
that newspapers “know about the quotidian” (p. 26). They are concerned with 
the “banal and prosaic qualities which, as any traveller knows, are just those 
that define this culture rather than that” (p. 26). They tell us about a place, a 
nation. But more than that they are a “mannering technology”, a site of the 
“rituals, daily practices, techniques, institutions, manners and customs which 
enable the nation to be thinkable, inhabitable, communicable and thereby 
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governable” (p. 27). The newspaper is a “technology of affiliation” operating as 
a site of national learning, “a daily regular form of reading and training in 
knowing where you are and how to best do things there” (p. 31). A variety of 
techniques on the part of both the producers and the consumers of the 
newspaper achieve this work of “affiliation”. Journalistic practices such as the 
use of ‘snapshots’ of places at particular times, the representation of different 
groups of people, the correspondent as a figure who can “lay claim to certain 
powers of ethico-moral reconciliation and persuasion designed to be exemplary 
for publics and populations” (p. 35), and similarly, the coverage of lifestyle 
issues, work together with techniques of reading and imagining on the part of 
the reader to create in the newspaper a relationship between time – the daily – 
and space – the bounded territory – to constitute a sense of nation-ness to its 
readers.  
 
The connection between news and time predates many of the things we 
associate with news today – written language, print technology, the newspaper, 
and the understanding of measured, clocked time. In fact, for as long as there 
has been such a thing that could be identified – even retrospectively – as news, 
it has been linked, somehow, to time. In his work on the history of news, 
Mitchell Stephens (2007) demonstrates that even for pre-literate cultures the 
value of news has long rested in its timeliness – not in the sense of 
contemporary news values, but in relation to ideas of physical proximity, 
impending threats, and natural temporal cycles such as the seasons. He writes 
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of the Rwala Bedouins who sought news of fertile grazing grounds, and so 
would send a scout to collect a patch of grass from surrounding fields, its colour 
and vigour speaking of the fertility of local pastures. This patch of grass – the 
object itself – is what constituted the news for the Bedouins; it was the 
newspaper of its time. But it was not only the ‘news product’ (the grass), but 
also the time of the telling that was important: “had those Bedouin scouts 
brought back clumps of brown grass to show that a pasture had been fertile a 
month ago, it would not have been newsworthy – timeliness was all important” 
(p. 26).  
 
While time for the Rwala Bedouins may have been measured in the 
colour of grass or the passage of the sun, the invention and use of the clock 
revolutionised the extent to which people were able to ‘know’ the time. The 
widespread adoption of a standard, clocked, measured time meant that 
knowing the time – exactly – became not only a matter for people of power, 
but also a personal standard, a matter for the self. Graeme Davison (1993) 
argues that it was through the knowledge of and ability to measure time across 
the personal, domestic, local and national spheres that time became something 
to be kept, saved, and adhered to. The clock and its rhythms permeated the 
social and industrial lives of Australians, “as personal habits of time-thrift 
became the standard of public life” (p. 3). Time, as something to be managed, 
has since informed the temporal organisation of media and its audiences. For 
instance, Lesley Johnson (1981) outlines the way in which radio broadcasters 
 195 
developed regularity in their programming, and “set out to establish a 
corresponding regularity of listening habits in their audiences” (p. 169). In this 
way, radio programs were developed in relation to the routines and schedules 
of a woman’s daily life inside the home, while at the same time attempting to 
regulate these very routines around the new patterns of the radio schedule. 
Similarly, John Ellis (1991) writes that broadcast television is a “profoundly 
domestic phenomenon” (p. 113), and its temporal organisation is made to work 
within this domestic setting. Organisational techniques such as the use of 
segments, particular forms of narration, the series and serial format, and the use 
of regular, repetitive scheduling organise television in relation to viewer’s lives, 
but also allow audiences to organise themselves in relation to television.  
 
In light of contemporary developments in communication technologies 
and the consumption of news, Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel (2007) argue 
that “the internet has begun to disassociate journalism from geography” (p. 29). 
Indeed, it is important to ask whether something happens to the “mass 
ceremony” of newspaper consumption when the newspaper can be read online, 
at any time and in any number of places around the world, rather than at the 
breakfast table or on the morning train. Certainly our consumption of news is 
changing, and it follows that this will affect our spatial and temporal 
relationships and identities. But David Morley (2003) suggests that, contrary to 
claims that the internet is breaking down barriers of time and space, there is a 
“continuing desire to reterritorialize the uncertainty of location inherent in 
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online worlds” (p. 440). This is perhaps best illustrated by the persistence of the 
question, ‘Where are you?’ – whether addressed to strangers in internet chat 
rooms or to family members in mobile phone conversations. Beyond the 
geographical located-ness of media use, Morley reminds us that media cannot 
be removed from the materiality of its development and operation:  
 
For all their wonders, these technologies are only as good as the 
material, social and institutional structures in which they are embedded, 
from the reliability of the local phone lines to the electricity supply, to 
the efficiency of the relevant bureaucracy. (p. 441)    
 
Thus rather than removing the constraints of temporality and spatiality, new 
media are just as linked to physical and material bounds as their older 
counterparts. Moreover, the way in which we use space online can tend to 
mirror our use of physical spaces. While ‘virtual’ space is often thought of as 
open and unbounded, Morley suggests that in reality it often becomes a space 
of “withdrawal into closed communities of the ‘like-minded’” (p. 441).  
 
But while new technologies remain anchored by the materiality of their 
development and operation, they are still able to shape our temporal and 
spatial relationships and experiences in new ways. Tracing the way in which 
the television became a domesticated technology – moving from a stranger in 
the home to gaining admission to the more intimate domestic spaces of the 
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kitchen and bedroom – Morley suggests that a similar pattern can be traced in 
the domestication of digital media technologies. However, in the case of 
personal and miniaturised forms of technology, such as smartphones, netbooks 
and tablet devices, these “might more properly be conceptualized as ‘body 
parts’” (p. 444). These devices become extensions of the body, highly 
personalised, and in the case of mobile phones, the virtual address of its owner, 
as the use of landlines is increasingly phased out. Now, Morley suggests, family 
relationships are increasingly mediated by technology, with “busy, middle-class 
‘dual career’ families” using email and mobile phones to negotiate parenting, 
while these “multiscreen household[s]” are increasingly fragmented (pp. 447–
448). What this signifies, suggests Morley, is not a domestication of these new 
technologies, but rather the remaking of domestic spaces around technology so 
that “the technologies are no longer merely supplementary to, but constitutive 
of, what the home itself now is” (p. 450).  
 
 Media and audiences then are bound up in a complex relationship of 
mutual construction and constitution. Media can constitute for their audiences 
a range of temporal and spatial identities, as well as, as Morely suggests, 
affective relationships and identities. In the following section I extend upon the 
approach outlined here to demonstrate the way in which audiences are not just 
organised, but assembled in order to produce particular subjectivities for specific 
political objectives. To illustrate, I consider Paul Langley’s (2008) work on the 
way in which audiences of a particular demographic in the US are assembled 
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as investors, as well as Melissa Gregg’s (2008) study of the way in which female 
professionals are assembled as flexible workers in the new economy. I build 
upon these examples through the analysis of an advertisement for The Age 
Online, to demonstrate the way in which this particular audience has been 
assembled in order to instil a particular subjectivity.  
 
Assembling the audience  
Langley (2008) outlines the way in which a range of communicative 
artefacts and techniques has worked to assemble a particular mode of 
subjectivity in the contemporary US: the ‘everyday investor’. Langley describes 
the way in which these artefacts, such as brochures, websites, seminars and 
‘how to’ books on financial products and decisions, work to inculcate a changed 
and specific form of financial sensibility among ‘ordinary’ US citizens. Langley 
traces these changes alongside a transformed perception of Wall Street – once a 
site of deep suspicion for those who inhabited the rhetorically juxtaposed ‘Main 
Street’ of the ‘ordinary citizen’ – to a site of emancipation, the source of the 
‘democratization of finance’ and the ‘shareholder nation’. While many have 
positioned these changes as occurring at the level of global finance, Langley 
seeks their origin at the level of changes in the everyday savings and borrowing 
practices of ‘everyday’ Americans.  
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Langley argues that these changes have been wrought by a range of 
governmental programs37 concerned with “the making of everyday investor 
subjects” (p. 90) in the US. What is of interest here is the way in which Langley 
describes the production of this changed subjectivity as the result of a process of 
assembly:  
 
The processes of change that feed the predominance of investment as a 
form of everyday saving also entail the assembly of a neo-liberal 
subjectivity, the calling up subjects who make sense of investment in 
relation to their own security and freedom. (p. 90 – emphasis added) 
 
Thus the changed subjects of everyday finance are assembled through a 
complex and sophisticated combination of governmental objectives,38 expressed 
through a range of often mundane communicative artefacts and techniques, 
such as the educational government pension guide produced by the US 
Department of Labor, exhorting its subjects to save and invest responsibly for a 
comfortable and secure future. Here, I want to compare Langley’s illustration 
of the assembly of the investor subject to Gregg’s (2008) discussion of the 
                                                
37 Langley is using the broad, Foucauldian sense of government here, as outlined in Chapter Three.  
38 While the terms ‘governmental programs’ and ‘governmental objectives’ can suggest unified 
objectives and action in the more traditional sense of the term ‘government’, Langley indicates that this 
is not often the case. Government, in the broad Foucauldian sense used here, can entail the production 
of contradictory subjectivities and can be met with resistance. As Langley outlines, “the assembly of 
everyday investor subjects is proceeding in a highly problematic and contradictory manner” (p. 103) – 
in part because of the way in which the practices of investment are at odds with the practices required 
of consumer-subjects, “who express and communicate their freedom, aspirations and individuality 
through commodity ownership and acts of consumer choice” (p. 110), and further, because of the way 
in which the risky practices investor-subjects are required to engage with in order to attain a ‘stable’ 
future are in no way guaranteed to produce the promised outcome. Thus such government is only ever 
piecemeal and fragmented, and often contradictory in the behaviours and aspirations it demands of its 
subjects.  
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production of a particular type of neoliberal subjectivity in Australian female 
workers through the representation of ‘flexibility’ in advertisements for the 
digital products that typify the information economy¹. I consider these two 
examples in some detail in order to demonstrate the way in which 
advertisements can be seen as part of the broader project of subject assembly.  
 
 Gregg outlines the way in which advertisements for ICT hardware and 
software work to normalise a particular female subjectivity, one in which 
women’s preference for flexible (‘creative’39) work is positioned as natural, 
based on their assumed position as the primary family caregiver. The 
advertisements Gregg analyses represent professional women in positions 
suggestive of flexible labour practices, so as to suggest that a preference for 
these conditions is natural and desirable. For instance, in an advertisement for 
a Sony Vaio wireless laptop, Gregg describes an attractive female worker 
defiantly holding a laptop while wearing a bikini she has apparently fashioned 
out of her pinstriped suit, the remnants of which are scattered on the floor 
around her. Gregg argues that the slogan, “work where you want”, underscores 
the sort of prescribed flexibility normalised by the demands of the neoliberal 
information economy, in which the choice becomes not whether to work, but 
rather, where and when you work:   
 
                                                
39 This example resonates also with the way in which I will outline the politics of the creative industries 
later in this chapter.  
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In light of previous (failed) visions of labour solidarity, the worker is 
asked to recognise and accept his or her mobility as the only form of 
freedom now possible or desirable. The freedom to work anywhere is 
the trade-off for constant contactability and the ever-present possibility, 
if not the outright expectation, of work … In all these examples, the 
dominant utopian image is no longer freedom from work but freedom to 
work, albeit at times and in locations that are personally convenient. 
(Gregg, 2008, p. 290) 
 
Through her analysis of advertisements, Gregg is illustrating the assembly of a 
particular form of female subjectivity in which such advertisements are just one 
communicative element of a much broader governmental program to 
normalise particular types of choices around (female) work practices. Like the 
advertisements Gregg considers, Langley’s pension brochures contribute to the 
assembly of a particular but different form of individual subjectivity. What I 
want to suggest is that communicative artefacts, and specifically advertisements, 
are among a range of techniques that work to assemble particular subjectivities 
in relation to specific political objectives. From this position it is possible to 
consider the way in which online news – and The Age Online in particular – 
assembles a particular sort of subjectivity through one of its advertisements.   
  
 In one advertisement (see Image 6) for The Age Online, an attractive 
young woman sits at her desk in an ambiguous urban building. It could be an 
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inner-city office, given the scene of urban buildings outside her window. But 
equally, it could be an inner-city residence, where she is working from home, or 
alternatively at leisure. The woman’s desk is sparse, housing only a stylish table 
lamp – and a laptop computer – which, significantly, is the distinctive tool of 
‘creative’ workers, the Apple Mac40. Across her desk, in miniature form, play 
out a number of dramatic scenes, making literal the campaign’s tagline: “news 
straight to your desktop”. A figurine of a man stands head in hands next to an 
upturned car; nearby a number of figures are fleeing from the scene; a 
helicopter hovers above, and in the background is a police car and a number of 
figures clustered together, one seemingly under arrest. Behind this tableau sits 
the young woman, impeccably groomed, hair flowing over her shoulders, and 
in a fitted dress with a plunging neckline. The woman’s gaze is not directed at 
the scene playing out on her desk, but rather, directly at the camera and thus at 
the audience. Her expression is blank, almost provocatively so. 
                                                
40 While the laptop’s logo is not shown in the print version, the advertisement runs in conjunction with 
a MacBook Pro laptop giveaway. 
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Image 6 
The Age Online Advertisement   
 
 
 The advertisement can be read as an address to a young, professional, 
and predominantly female audience who are increasingly the focus of 
advertising and marketing efforts across a range of media forms. While it was 
the business man who was traditionally the primary audience of the print 
newspaper, it is the female consumer, who, as Gregg demonstrates, is 
increasingly found in work, family and leisure environments that demands 
flexibility – the type that is illustrated in this example by the prospect of 
‘catching up on the news’ from the work (or home) desk. This woman, like the 
ones in Gregg’s analyses, occupies a space made intentionally ambiguous – is it 
home, or office, or home office? – her appearance representing her ability to 
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move with ease between the spaces and demands of work and leisure. The 
woman in the advertisement is not dressed in traditional work attire, and her 
level of grooming indicates that her attendance to her professional life has not 
detracted from her ability to maintain her physical appearance. Notably, the 
woman in this advertisement sits calmly and at ease. For her, the task of 
consuming the news is not a chore. It is not work – but nor is it leisure. Rather, 
it is integrated seamlessly into her ‘everyday life’ – as much a part of her work 
routine as it is those leisure activities for which we can assume her attractive 
outfit is for.   
 
 For the woman in this advertisement, time spent consuming online news 
does not impinge upon her professional and social personae. Rather, this task 
heightens her ability to perform these social roles. It is the consumption of this 
news upon which the woman’s professional status and desirable social life – 
marked out by her clothing and appearance – rests. Further, there are no paper 
products on the woman’s desk, only a laptop – the symbol of her fully digital 
(work) life. The absence of papers – newspapers included – signifies that her 
consumption of news online is an entirely separate task to the consumption of 
print news. The occasion of the advertisement’s appearance – both within the 
pages of The Age itself, as well as on inner-city billboards and bus stops – 
suggests that it is targeted at a highly mobile, urban audience for whom The Age 
Online offers a solution to their particular digital knowledge requirements. While 
the print newspaper might remain a product for the home, before work, or over 
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coffee on a Saturday morning, the online version is a product for creative 
professionals updating their knowledge throughout the day, whether from the 
comfort of their desk, at home, or while in transit – providing the sort of 
convenience they have become accustomed to in their largely digital lives and 
providing them with the sort of knowledge they require to adequately perform 
as informed workers and (highly social) members of society.  
 
From this advertisement it is possible to infer some of the ways in which 
The Age Online assembles its audience. The audience addressed by this 
advertisement is a creative knowledge worker, with a need to remain constantly 
informed. They may already be a newspaper reader, but one for whom the 
digital medium offers heightened convenience and relevance. They are, or 
desire to be, Mac-users – or indeed, The Age Online intends them to be so, by 
attaching this ad to a competition to win one of the laptops it features. Further, 
the audience identifies with this woman – either because they too are young, 
attractive, professional females, or because they (whether for reasons of 
identification or attraction) find her alluring. The likely and intended audience 
is increasingly female professionals who, for the reasons outlined by Gregg, 
require flexibility, and for whom reading the news is a part of their professional 
and social identity, one which can now be ‘squeezed’ into their day through the 
convenience of the digital product.  
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What this advertisement also communicates is the notion that digital 
readership does not eliminate the need for print readership, but rather that it 
can provide a supplement, creating a new need for a vigilant yet passive 
attention to the news throughout the day rather than at daily intervals. 
However, the passivity of the woman in this advertisement is also problematic 
because it is at odds with the expectations of many audiences in the digital 
realm for whom some level of interaction with news content and producers – if 
not the news-making process itself – is becoming the norm. As I outline in the 
following section, it is also at odds with the way in which The Age Online is 
shaping its digital product in relation to these audience demands and 
expectations. In the following section I outline some key issues in discussions of 
interactivity – in general, and as it relates to news – before outlining the way in 
which, despite its persistence as a rhetoric, is rarely adopted in practice at 
online news sites. 
 
Interactivity: in theory and in practice 
In their seminal discussion at the time of the internet’s emergence as a 
‘serious’ field of study, Newhagen and Rafaeli (1996) name interactivity as a 
defining characteristic of the medium, inherent in its architecture, central to 
human communication more generally, and the property that could set the 
internet apart from traditional media. This is symptomatic of the way in which 
interactivity is discussed as a defining characteristic of the internet, yet it is 
difficult to find a uniform definition of the term. Pavlik and McIntosh (2004) 
 207 
present a three-part definition of interactivity as: first, a dialogue that occurs 
between a human and a computer program; second, this dialogue occurs 
simultaneously or close to it; and third, the audience has some measure of 
control over the media they see and the order they see it – whether via a 
personalisation or a hyperlink. These themes of control and personalisation 
recur in many discussions of the topic. For instance, Downes and McMillan 
(2000) define interactivity as a “multi-dimensional construct” which enables 
more active and flexible communication and a greater sense of control, 
responsiveness and exchange for the user (pp. 172–173). The authors also note 
the prominence of the idea of ‘feedback’ – or the extent to which the roles of 
sender and receiver become interchangeable – which is gaining new resonance 
with the rise of Web 2.0 applications. Similarly, Massey and Levy (1999) 
outline their markers of interactivity, which include the range and diversity of 
content available to the reader; the potential for user responsiveness; the ease 
with which the user can add information to the system; the extent to which the 
site offers itself as a digital conduit for synchronous one-to-one interpersonal 
communication between readers; and the immediacy of content – that is, the 
speed with which the online newspaper can report on events.   
 
For Deuze (2003), “interactivity can be seen as a broadly defined 
concept with many implications for mediated communication of all kinds, and 
for journalism in particular” (p. 214), recognising that interactive 
communication is not exclusive to the internet. However, Deuze is 
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differentiating his definition of interactivity in this context from pre-web forms 
to encompass “a different mode of addressing the news audience: as active 
instead of passive media consumers” (Pavlik as cited in Deuze, 2003, p. 213). 
He follows Massey and Levy’s definition of interactivity outlined above, 
translating their elements of interactivity into his own definition particular to 
online news. Thus he outlines three types of interactivity: the first is 
navigational interactivity, for example, the ability to scroll on a web page, and 
the use of back buttons; the second is functional interactivity, which allows 
some user participation through email links and comment sections; and the 
third is adaptive interactivity, in which “every action of the user has 
consequences for the content of the site” – and the site is fully adaptable and 
customisable by the user (p. 214). Deuze argues that mainstream news sites, like 
The Age Online, with their focus on content and their history of hierarchical 
relations with audiences, generally offer only navigational interactivity, while 
interactivity increases as more emphasis is placed on the role of the user – 
generally at news sites outside of the mainstream, where Crikey is often 
positioned. 
 
Leopoldina Fortunati (2009) has developed an index of features, 
including: reachability, or the ability to easily ‘reach’ journalists by a range of 
contact methods; interaction with users, whether through letters, comments, or 
forums; the discussion of articles, whether in the form of polls, requests to 
comment, or the possibility for email response; interactivity of content, that is, 
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the ability for user personalisation; multimediality in articles through audio, 
video and images; and finally, the use of hyperlinks (p. 73). Or, to characterise 
these as features, interactivity may take the form of polls, links, comments, 
forums, emails, live chat, and personalisable options.    
 
Boczkowski (2004b) defines interactivity as “the use of many-to-many 
and one-to-one communication spaces such as forums, chat rooms, and user-
authored sites, in addition to the one-to-many mode of traditional media” (p. 
199) – indicating the sorts of spaces and features that news sites might 
incorporate in order to heighten interaction between users and producers. 
More simply, Lievrouw and Livingstone (2006) define interactivity as “the 
selectivity and reach that media technologies afford users in their choices of 
information sources and interactions with other people” (p. 7), a definition 
which is useful for the way in which it positions interactivity as an affordance, 
but not necessarily an affordance that will be adopted (at least not to its fullest). 
Indeed, Fortunati (2009) argues that of all the traditional media, the newspaper 
is the least endowed with interactive capabilities, so it is not surprising that its 
migration online has been slow to make use of its interactive potential. Further, 
she echoes Lievrouw and Livingstone to argue that “it does not happen that 
people use an invention because it exists” (p. 81), challenging the 
technologically determinist notion that because a medium has a range of 
interactive possibilities, they should necessarily be exploited to their fullest. In 
this way, the print newspaper has never been as interactive as radio and 
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television, particularly since the use of telephony, and now digital media, to 
further engage audiences. This is not to say that newspapers themselves are 
lacking interactive potential. For instance, Fortunati cites the example of a 1990 
Italian publication, La Pubblicazione, which was written entirely by ‘users’, but 
which only lasted a few months. It is not the technical existence of interactivity 
that is central to an understanding of online news then, but the distinction 
between interactive potential and actual interactivity.    
 
Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock (2008) makes a similar distinction in 
developing her typology of interaction. She outlines three levels of interaction 
that coincide with the European Convention on Human Rights’ principle of 
Freedom of Information, as well as the extension of communicative abilities 
through the development of Web 2.0 potentials. She divides her typology into 
three levels:  first, the right and ability to search and retrieve information from 
all available sources; second, the right and ability to send, circulate and 
transmit information. She notes that with the extension of Web 2.0 technology 
to increasing numbers of people, “for the first time in history, all 
communication rights are technically operable, as they are enabled by this new 
integrated network” (p. 4). The third and most advanced level of interactivity 
comes with the increasing ability for people to interact globally, enabling 
“forms of empowerment and of emancipation from the bounds of place” (p. 4). 
Kaitatzi-Whitlock argues that the web has the potential to enable great forms of 
interactivity because it allows for continual feedback cycles, as can be seen in 
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forms of open-source environments, like those of Wikipedia or software 
development.  
 
Kaitatzi-Whitlock further develops her typology through the use of 
oppositional couplets (p. 5) to demonstrate the ways in which the internet offers 
a deeper and richer form of interactivity than traditional media. The table 
below demonstrates these couplets: 
 
Table 2 
Kaitatzi-Whitlock’s oppositional couplets 
Traditional media Networked media 
Non-mediated Mediated 
Symbolic Practical 
Bi-directional Multi-directional 
Asymmetric Symmetric/partly symmetric 
Simple Complex [hybrid, fluidly dynamic] 
Intrinsic [to the medium] Extrinsic [adjunct to the medium] 
          
From this we can gather that interactivity online in a Web 2.0 environment is: 
always mediated by technology; practical, and material, “achiev[ing] concrete 
practical results: telework and material transactions, rather than, just exchange 
of immaterial symbolic contents” (p. 5) ; multi-directional, with possibilities for 
sharing and collaboration, rather than bi-directional; more symmetrical than in 
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traditional media, insofar as technical and socio-economic constraints will 
allow; complex in the way in which collaboration and sharing, or open 
feedback loops allow for hybrid and dynamic use and re-use of information; 
and extrinsic in that it occurs outside of the infrastructure of the communicative 
system itself, and is rather facilitated by external networks enabled by 
telecommunications and so on.  
 
 But Kaitatzi-Whitlock bases her typology of interactivity on a set of 
binary opposites, at odds with her earlier recognition of the varying levels of 
interaction that can be adopted in the current technological environment. Thus 
her couplets are better understood as existing on a continuum of interactive 
features that may or may not be adopted in practice. While digital media might 
offer more potential by way of its affordances for interactivity, this is no 
guarantee that it will necessarily offer an interactive experience. Interactivity 
certainly requires the dialogue between the audience and a computer program 
that Pavlik and McIntosh put forward, but in the intervening years has 
developed to also include the audience talking to the producer as well as the 
audience talking to the audience, and extending to encompass the audience 
becoming the producer through actual and open feedback loops. Interactivity 
includes the navigational, functional and adaptive characteristics Deuze 
outlines, and encompasses the hyperlinks, comment functions, forums, and 
polls that are outlined by Boczkowksi and Fortunati. But Kaitatzi-Whitlock’s 
oppositional couplets demonstrate the way in which interactivity in digital 
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networked media exists in relation to traditional media, and in this way it is best 
assessed as part of a historical spectrum rather than by set characteristics that 
may soon be superseded and reformulated as technology progresses. Because, 
despite exhibiting the affordances for many interactive tools, empirical research 
often finds these to be absent from actual examples of online news. Fortunati 
reminds us that the affordance for a particular feature does not automatically 
equate to its existence; in the following sections I consider what sorts of factors 
might operate as constraints on the adoption of interactive features at online 
news sites.  
 
Domingo (2008) argues that interactivity has always been “at the 
epicenter of online journalism myths” (p. 286). But why might news sites not 
always utilise the interactive affordances of the web environment? Newhagen 
and Rafaeli (1996) argue that the affordances of internet communication 
technologies are often hidden from the user, which can account for the 
tendency to “dump text into a computer network and call it an ‘electronic 
newspaper’”, obscuring the ways in which this content might be made more 
interactive, and presenting a site as ‘closed’ in its possibilities. Massey and Levy 
(1999) argue that online newspapers are only as interactive as the level of 
funding will allow, suggesting that some more fruitful indicators of interactive 
online journalism may be found in such cultural and political measures as 
freedom of the press, speech, or assembly, the size and technical skill of the 
newspaper’s staff, and the willingness of the owner to invest in interactive 
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features.  Similarly, Chung (2007) found that the lack of interactivity on 
mainstream news sites may be linked to the number of readers, and that at 
smaller independent sites, interactivity was more likely to be defined in terms of 
exchange with the audience – because the smaller number of users made such 
interactivity more manageable. Issues of funding, readership, resources and 
independence can all be brought to bear on the adoption of interactive features 
at online news sites, and these will be considered through the case studies 
below. However, they are not the only factors that come into play.  
 
Boczkowski (2004b) found that the ways in which interactive and 
multimedial options are adopted at online news sites were shaped by 
approaches to production within the newsroom, such as organisational 
structures, assumptions about the users, and work practices. So, for example, 
an online newsroom positioned closely alongside its print counterpart, 
perceived its users as possessing a limited level of technical skill. It thus 
maintained the gate-keeping role of traditional journalism as being central to 
the online news context by producing a site with low multimedia and low 
interactivity. On the other hand, a site with far less alignment with its print 
counterpart and a perception of its users as technologically savvy, produced a 
site with high levels of multimediality but low levels of interactivity because it 
was still attached to the gate-keeping role of journalism. While the newsroom 
that perceived of its users as possessing limited technological skills, but had very 
little attachment to its print counterpart, and was reconfiguring newsroom tasks 
 215 
around alternatives to gatekeeping, produced a site with low levels of 
multimedia and high levels of interactivity. Thus in considering The Age Online 
and Crikey, the way in which each site positions itself in relation to the 
institution of journalism may prove influential in shaping the approach to 
interactive options in each case.       
 
Sometimes the gap between perception and reality regarding the 
theoretical and practical adoption of interactivity can be found in the meaning 
attached to the terms used. Chung (2007) found that there is a tendency for 
journalists to conflate interactivity with the concepts of technological 
convergence or immediacy. In the words of the editor of OpinionJournal.com 
(in an interview with Chung): “The main thing about interactivity is immediacy 
… However, [interactivity] is not a word that I think of that much” (p. 51). The 
difference here is the way in which these two features work within existing 
professional practices in journalism. While immediacy (or the speed of news 
online) sits comfortably alongside pre-existing news values to do with timeliness, 
interactivity does not. Interactivity clashes with the norms and values of 
professional journalistic culture, and particularly, the traditional relationship 
between news producers and audiences. The adoption of interactivity would 
require for the journalist a “complete redefinition of working routines” 
(Domingo, 2008, p. 692). Despite this, the rhetoric of interactivity remains, 
which Domingo argues is a symptom of the high expectation of social change in 
the profession of journalism that came with the adoption of internet 
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technology. With the initial transition of news online, optimists envisaged the 
web as a space in which journalism could be realised anew without the 
problems that it was facing in its traditional forms. Positioned against the 
realities of a profession facing dwindling audiences, industrial pressures and 
renewed questions about its ethics, it was an appealing myth. But in practice, 
the facilitation of interactive features online is often seen as a distraction and 
hindrance to the actual practices of news making, and a “problem to be 
managed” (p. 698).   
 
MacGregor (2007) made a similar finding in his study on the use of 
tracking data in the newsroom. While journalists keenly follow the success of 
stories as well as related geographical data about readers, they are unlikely to 
use this data to make immediate changes to their published work. Echoing the 
findings of Domingo, MacGregor argues that a key reason for a resistance to 
such data, which provides the potential for deep interaction between the 
audience and the journalist, is the deeply entrenched professional practice of 
news values. Tracking statistics is seen as less trustworthy than the abstract 
‘feeling’ for news values that professional journalists earn and cultivate: 
 
... to be perfectly frank, if I just wanted to chase what people on the 
internet wanted to click on, I would do stories about soft porn and 
football and nothing else. We are a news site so we have to be treated as 
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news and we have to cover stories which do not always have mass appeal. 
(CNN journalist as cited in MacGregor, 2007, p. 291)  
 
The professional prominence of news values in shaping responses to interactive 
opportunities resonates with Boczkowski’s claim that it is the way that a 
newsroom positions itself in relation to journalism and its associated practices 
that holds more sway than the ‘newness’ of the technology involved. It also 
reminds us that the cultural shifts within journalism that occur alongside 
broader political changes do not always entail a comfortable transition. The 
journalist’s rejection of the marketing expertise through which it is now possible 
to know the audience in new ways also operates as a form of political resistance. 
In this case, it represents a resistance to a new form of professionalism, 
increasingly positioned in relation to financial objectives that do not sit 
comfortably with older professional practices and knowledges. My task now is 
to consider the actual adoption of interactivity at The Age Online and Crikey in 
order to outline the extent to which these sorts of factors are impacting on the 
level of interactivity offered in the local online news environment.  
 
Interactivity at The Age Online and Crikey 
Interactivity has always been central to Crikey’s operation. Established in 
2000 by ‘shareholder activist’ Stephen Mayne, the first weekly edition 
contained just six stories (Mayne, 2010). Since its establishment, Crikey, which 
now operates as both a substantial daily subscriber email and a website, has run 
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a combination of items by full-time staff, regular contributors, anonymous tip-
offs, and longer contributions from interested or qualified readers. Thus the 
publication has always thrived on a lively and active relationship with its 
audience, and has cultivated a readership that is keenly interested and able to 
comment as amateur experts – or, in fact, often as legitimate experts in their 
field. While its tenuous financial situation – whether from legal threats or the 
shaky dot com market at the time of its inception – placed its owners in 
financial jeopardy a number of times (Day, 2001, 2010), it also enabled the 
growth of a strong ‘insider’ culture among its readers, allowing it to occupy a 
critical position much like the ABC television program Media Watch, which 
critiques and analyses the Australian media from within, with Crikey readers 
contributing tip-offs and articles about issues from the media, finance, politics 
and the arts.  
 
With the sale of Crikey to Private Media Partners in 2005, which saw 
former Editor-in-Chief of The Sydney Morning Herald, Eric Beecher, take the helm 
as publisher, anonymous articles were no longer published, and Crikey began to 
build its status as a mainstream news source and align itself more clearly with 
traditional journalistic values (Hogan, 2005). Nonetheless, the strong 
relationship with the audience has remained. For example, a more classic 
letters section has remained throughout Crikey’s history – originally as a weekly 
section called ‘Yoursay’, now a daily section of the subscriber email known as 
‘Comments, corrections, clarifications and c*ckups’ (Josey, 2010). While today 
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Crikey employs far more full-time staff and paid contributors than ever before41, 
it still relies on its dynamic relationship with its readers to provide tip-offs and 
act as occasional contributors on expert or niche issues as they arise. It is this 
intimacy and responsiveness between readers and journalists as well as its 
ability to find contributors and sources among its readership outside of the 
domain of traditional journalism that has been part of Crikey’s success.  
 
Eleven years since its inception, Crikey is now interactive in different 
ways. Key members of the Crikey staff are notably active on microblogging 
service Twitter. The (ten, or so) Crikey-affiliated Twitter accounts (see Brown, 
2009 for a compilation of these) are used for a range of activities, from linking 
to daily stories, advertising competitions and exclusives, holding informal 
reader polls, drawing readers to the website, linking to interesting media 
content from outside sources, and largely, as a form of interaction with their 
readers and followers. Each story on the website is also accompanied by links to 
enable instant sharing through a range of Web 2.0 platforms, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Digg, del.icio.us, Reddit and StumbleUpon, encouraging reader 
interaction with content beyond the bounds of the immediate experience of 
consumption.  
 
                                                
41 Today, Crikey employs two full-time journalists, one Canberra correspondent, one investigative 
journalist, one cartoonist, two website journalists, one editor, one deputy editor, one production 
manager, one roving correspondent, one part-time sub-editor, one media writer, one TV writer, and 
about 30 semi-regular contributors, as well as fielding unsolicited material (S. Black, personal 
communication, 7 March 2011). 
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In May 2009, Crikey relaunched its website as a media portal, in addition 
to its usual function as an anchor for Crikey archives and point of entry for new 
subscribers. The newly configured website was described as “Crikey, but now 
with extra source”, positioning Crikey as more than a news producer, but also as 
“a point of view, a filter, a perspective, a way of seeing the world” ("The new 
Crikey," 2009). It also signalled a move away from Crikey as a solely text-based 
medium, introducing a new focus on video and podcasts. The relaunch was 
successful in attracting a new, younger audience, but not in bringing in more 
revenue – which it makes from a combination of paid subscriptions and 
advertising across the site and daily email – and so with a new editor, Sophie 
Black, appointed in late 2009, the focus has shifted again to further building 
links from the website to the email (Simons, 2009c), where interaction is more 
limited.   
 
The Age Online has a very different provenance to Crikey. While the latter 
is a web-only publication, The Age Online is the online version of print newspaper 
The Age, Melbourne’s only local broadsheet, traditionally positioned to the left 
of the Murdoch-owned Herald Sun tabloid. While The Age Online began with few 
more features than the ability to navigate via hyperlinks, it has recently 
relaunched its website with heightened interactive features. These include: 
greater prominence for comments on stories alongside encouragement to ‘join 
the conversation’, though not all stories are open for comment; a counter 
showing how many users are reading a particular story at a given time; links to 
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enable instant sharing on Twitter and Facebook; links to related coverage; the 
compilation of top stories within each news category; and a heightened video 
presence throughout the website. Online Editor-in-Chief Mike Van Niekerk 
wrote that the site had been reorganised to “give [readers] more choice and to 
present the big stories and features more quickly and effectively” (Van Niekerk, 
2010).   
 
However, beyond stories that are open to readers’ comments, 
interactivity is limited. Unlike Crikey, readers at The Age are not encouraged to 
become part of the news-making process if they have a tip-off or are interested 
in making a contribution in areas of their expertise. While Crikey fosters and 
thrives on such interaction, The Age Online only reaches out to readers in cases of 
dramatic breaking news, usually running readers’ photos as part of a 
compilation the next day (for an example, see "Heavy rain strikes Melbourne," 
2010). Readers wanting to send feedback to The Age Online must fill in an 
anonymous comment box and hope for a reply. On the other hand, The Age 
Online has made use of Twitter, with a number of ‘official’ accounts linking back 
to the website to top stories and breaking news. While the official Age account 
(http://twitter.com/TheAge) does not demonstrate interactivity per se, simply 
directing followers to stories in a one-way fashion, the accounts of some 
individual journalists demonstrate far more interaction with followers and 
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content online.42 But overall, The Age Online presents itself as a closed journalistic 
product, produced beyond the readers’ reach, with limited, internally 
controlled areas for audience interaction.  
 
The Age Online and Crikey embody different histories and positions in the 
Australian media landscape. Simons argues that Crikey is significant “not only 
because it is Australia’s first commercial internet-only journalism service”, but 
also because it demonstrates the successful mix of paid and free content that 
other online news sources are keen to replicate (Simons, 2009b).43 In 
comparison, The Age Online (in combination with its print counterpart), 
represents an important alternative to the conservative Murdoch-owned press, 
and particularly the News Limited-owned, daily national broadsheet The 
Australian, which in recent years has “consciously positioned itself as the site for 
thought leadership in conservative politics in Australia” (Flew, 2008, p. 9). 
However, in light of recent staff cuts and internal reshuffles at The Age Online’s 
parent company, Fairfax Media, Crikey has begun to position itself as the 
independent alternative to The Age Online – and mainstream news media more 
generally. In particular, Crikey publisher Eric Beecher argues that Fairfax is no 
longer interested in providing public-oriented journalism in Australia ("The axe 
                                                
42 See, for example, Jesse Hogan’s account (http://twitter.com/jesse_hogan), which he reports has 
been successful in facilitating exchanges with his audience (J. Hogan, personal communication, 10 
August 2009).    
43 While this comment is made by Simons in an article for Crikey itself, it is also underpinned by her 
standing as the convenor of journalism at Swinburne University of Technology and chair of the 
University’s Public Interest Journalism Foundation. These positions endow her with the credibility to 
comment on Crikey with neutrality, despite her ongoing connection with them (for example, her blog is 
housed on their site).  
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falls," 2008), the implication being that Crikey is interested, and offers a robust, 
independent and committed alternative.  
 
With the increasing role of the audience and the decreasing prominence 
of the journalist as the site of knowledge and expertise in advanced liberal 
incarnations of journalistic culture, ‘traditional’ (liberal) journalism is left in an 
uncomfortable position. While Crikey is open to audience participation and 
contribution in a range of ways, The Age Online sets out clearly defined spaces for 
interaction within an otherwise closed system. While The Age Online has 
embodied the struggles of a large media organisation responding to the 
challenges of a changing media and business landscape by consolidating its 
operations and cutting journalists’ jobs, Crikey has moved beyond early financial 
pressure to position itself as the independent champion for the cause of quality 
journalism in Australia. But despite their different positions in the local media 
landscape, and their different responses to interactivity, both publications only 
allow audience interaction within clearly demarcated boundaries. However, 
while this analysis demonstrates that Crikey currently possesses more avenues for 
reader-journalist interactivity, I suggest that this might not always be the case.  
 
Despite its unique characteristics, Crikey is more outwardly attached to 
liberal notions of journalism’s social role as its investment in current debates 
about the future of ‘public trust’ journalism in Australia demonstrates, and this 
investment could work to limit further development of interactivity. The Age 
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Online might not find itself so constrained, as evidenced by its recent heightened 
attendance to audience demands, as I outline in a latter section of this chapter 
through discussing the example of Catherine Deveny’s dismissal as an Age 
columnist in response to readers’ online comments. In instances such as this, 
interactivity is central to the contemporary development of online news because 
of its resonance with the economic politics of the times, and specifically, with 
forms of market populism that are taking on an increasingly widespread 
cultural significance. Is an attachment to journalism’s traditional liberal role 
more conceptually palatable if it means a rejection of market populism? 
Ensuring a future for some of journalism’s ‘traditional’ characteristics is not as 
simple as proposing a return to the past as I argue in the conclusion of this 
chapter. So Crikey might find itself embracing more interactive options in the 
future in order to form a compatibility with the dominant contemporary, 
market-oriented, political-economic logic. The ability to encompass interactive 
options within a liberal conception of journalism is further problematised by 
definitions of interactivity that represent it as a decisive break from the past. In 
the following section I explain why Lobato et al.’s (2010) positioning of ‘user-
generated content’ (UGC) as part of the informal economy provides a more 
constructive historical perspective for considering the changes occurring 
around interactive practices.        
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Interactive practices as part of the informal economy 
Lobato et al. (2010) argue that UGC, a term that encompasses the 
audience activities of interactivity, as well as the implications for producers, is 
best understood not as a challenge to traditional economic activity, but rather 
as part of the informal economy. They argue that informal economic activity – 
“that which escapes the regulatory gaze of the state, occurring outside 
conventional forms of measurement, governance, and taxation” (p. 3) – is a 
constituent part of all but particularly advanced liberal economies. Rather than 
positioning informal economic activity, such as amateur content production in 
opposition to the formal economy, the authors suggest that these activities 
occur on a spectrum that ranges from the formal to the informal: 
 
At one end of the spectrum are the consolidated and regulated media 
industries scrutinised in political-economic and media policy and 
analysis: entertainment conglomerates, satellite networks, publishing 
houses, public-service media, and so on. At the other end are 
innumerable small-scale, unmeasured and unevenly regulated media 
circuits which are barely captured in the statistics on industry output and 
trade and which rarely figure in media industry analysis. (pp. 3–4) 
 
UGC can then appear at different points on this spectrum at different times of 
its history. This approach problematises accounts that position UGC as 
‘disruptive’ to professional content production practices, but also allows for a 
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consideration of the relations between the formal and informal sectors of the 
economy.  
 
For instance, Lobato et al. provide the example of domestic 
photography that has occupied different points on the formality spectrum 
across its history. Around the time of its development, photography was an 
expensive and specialised media form, usually taking place in the studio and 
thus within the formal economy. But with the introduction of personal cameras, 
photography became increasingly personal and also less formal, and continues 
to move in this direction with the proliferation of affordable digital cameras and 
camera phones, as well as the ability to cheaply and easily share images on the 
internet. However, the intersection of photography and the internet has also 
sparked a movement back towards formality: “websites such as Flickr and 
Picasa are making a previously private form of expression rather more public, 
and entangling the informality of amateur digital photography with the 
formality of corporate media in hitherto unprecedented ways” (p. 8).  
 
Another example Lobato et al. provide, of a form of UGC that 
represents the interrelation of the formal and informal sectors of the economy, 
is the ‘letters to the editor’ section of the newspaper. They argue that despite 
their ‘amateur’ origins, letters to the editor must go through a formal, 
professional filter in order to be made ready for publication. The types of 
interactivity that have been discussed so far are in many cases extensions of this 
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sort of UGC. Interaction at The Age Online and at Crikey include letters to the 
editor, but also a more instant version in the form of readers’ comments, and at 
Crikey, readers’ incorporation into news production processes through the 
submission of occasional stories.  Rather than being read as a threat to the 
traditional practices of journalism, the informality model of UGC outlined by 
Lobato et al. allows us to consider these interactive features as: firstly, 
occupying an historically changing position on a spectrum between the formal 
and informal economies; and secondly, particularly in the contemporary 
political-economic landscape, as increasingly being coopted into the formal 
economy. In the section below, I outline the way in which a range of recent 
economic and social changes is making this cooption more prevalent. In my 
later discussion of the creative industries framework, I also outline the way in 
which these interactive options can be positioned as measures of value in social 
network markets.  
 
Interactivity and changing producer-consumer relations 
Thrift (2006) argues that an increasing prevalence of UGC, and 
particularly, greater interactivity between consumers and producers, is linked to 
a number of precise political-economic and social changes. He argues that 
consumers and producers are increasingly being brought together in new 
configurations of time and space within sped-up processes of innovation. Thrift 
links interactivity to broader changes occurring within the field of business, in 
which, given a recent crisis of profits in Western capitalism, there is a new 
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emphasis on innovation and invention  – and “this cultural model of economic 
change is, not surprisingly, based on the continuous interactivity of the media” 
(p. 282). It has also involved the “mobilization of the resource of forethought”, (p. 
282 – original emphasis) in which non-cognitive processes are encouraged, 
adopted and integrated into the processes of innovation and commodity 
development, in order to produce “a certain anticipatory readiness about the 
world” (p. 286).  
 
Thrift argues that central to these changed and intensified processes of 
capitalism is the reworking of production and consumption, “questioning both 
categories in the process, so leading to the perception of the commodity as 
consisting of an iterative process of experiment” (p. 288). In this reworking of 
innovation, the “locus of experimentation” is shifted onto the customers, so that 
their own capacity for innovation becomes integrated into the processes of 
design and creation (pp. 288–289). In order to maximise the opportunity for 
such exchanges, spaces are created to encourage the formation of user 
communities. While not all communities become innovators, Thrift argues that 
many become involved in ‘invention’ – in which the use of a product becomes 
“superseded by the pleasure of the activity itself” (p. 290), allowing consumers 
to become active in the process of creating value for the company: 
 
Consumers have become involved in the production of communities 
around particular commodities which themselves generate value, by 
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fostering allegiance, by offering instant feedback and by providing active 
interventions in the commodity itself. (p. 290) 
 
An example of one such community is the iPhone App Store, where a range of 
producers with only a “minimum of programming skills” is able to design 
applications for sale to a mass audience (Kortuem & Kawsar, 2010).44 The 
achievement of these sorts of communities of innovators is largely enabled by 
“large doses of information technology”, which, in combination bring about 
these sped-up processes of innovation and changing relationships between 
producer and consumer: first, an enormously increased amount of information 
available almost instantly to consumers; second, greater access to information 
by consumers about products, and by companies about products; third, 
“linkages and associations are automatically generated for the consumer” (p. 
291); fourth, there is increased transparency, allowing consumers to learn more 
about products; and finally, the “process of acquisition of information becomes, 
in principle at least, continuous” (p. 291). Thrift argues that, taken together, 
these features constitute a “spatial extension of intelligence” (p. 291).   
 
Examples of these changed processes of innovation occur across a range 
of industries. The App Store is one example, but another is open source 
                                                
44 The App Store is exemplary of Thrift’s notion of user innovation, not just because it provides a space 
for a productive community to form around product development, but also because Apple has 
demonstrated that it takes the feedback of its ‘users’ (in this case the third party developers of 
applications for sale on Apple devices through the iTunes stores) seriously, by integrating their advice to 
streamline and enhance innovation processes. In September 2010, Apple announced that it was 
opening up its App Store to third party development tools, and making its review guidelines and 
processes more transparent, in order to “help our developers create even more successful apps for the 
App Store” (Apple, 2010).  
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software; another, the use of advertising campaigns seeking audience 
involvement in product developments, usually attached to competitions (‘invent 
a new flavour to win!’). But communities of innovators are also forming around 
online news. Crikey provides an example through its integration of its audience-
as-experts in the production of everyday (but out of the ordinary) content. 
However, I want to suggest that the reconfiguring of producer-consumer 
relations that Thrift outlines is also occurring at The Age Online. Thrift provides a 
necessary corollary to the many accounts which focus on the technological and 
the democratic potential of ubiquitous computing and interactivity, while 
largely ignoring the pervasive business culture – perhaps only noting headline 
corporatisation events rather than the arguably more important minutiae. An 
example of the reach of this business culture into the practice of journalism is 
best illustrated at The Age Online through the example of Catherine Deveny’s 
dismissal. As I outline this event in the following section, I want to suggest that 
this is indicative of the way in which producers and consumers of news are 
brought into closer and faster relations within the business climate. In the 
subsequent section I will also outline the way in which this incident represents a 
triumph of market populism in the management and practice of journalism, 
before arguing that it is also representative of the social network markets that 
have become a key marker of the creative industries.   
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Catherine Deveny and The Age 
Catherine Deveny is a comedian and former columnist for The Age 
newspaper – as well as for its online version. Deveny, who began at the The Age 
writing a humorous column about parenthood in the 1990s, until May 2010 
published a weekly column that was often provocative and inflammatory 
around controversial social issues such as feminism, religion and class divides. 
Digital media scholar and regular commentator on Australian media debates, 
Jason Wilson (2009), argues that Deveny was not so much a classic columnist 
with the expertise and skill traditionally expected from such figures, but rather 
what he calls a ‘trollumnist’, named after ‘trolls’, the colloquial term for internet 
users who post deliberately inflammatory comments on internet forums, chat 
rooms and blogs in order to provoke anger, outrage and disruption with their 
incendiary comments. In the online news environment, Wilson argues that 
trollumnists are used to create cheap but valuable content by driving up hits 
with their deliberately provocative work:  
 
Whereas a true columnist might make controversial arguments or 
challenge common sense, trollumnists merely provoke outrage in order 
to sell papers, draw links and capture increasingly scarce reader 
attention. The beauty of it all is that it doesn’t take much training to do 
it, and as media content goes, it’s cheap as chips. Any fool can offend 
people given a reasonably prominent platform. 
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Wilson argues that there are a number of ‘trollumnists’ in the Australian media 
landscape, including Janet Albrechtson and David Burchell at The Australian, 
Miranda Devine at The Sydney Morning Herald, and Catherine Deveny:  
 
Deveny’s schtick is to leverage her own allegedly humble origins to put 
shit on “bogans” for the entertainment of The Age’s middle class audience 
… mocking the sensibilities of anyone with the bad sense to live beyond 
the extent of the tram lines. Last week she went to Chadstone [shopping 
centre] and poured scorn on suburban people, without basis except that 
their habits of leisure and consumption are distasteful to her. Her work is 
intellectually, morally and politically barren, but importantly, it gets a 
reaction, with social media and blogs pointing traffic in her direction 
with each lazy, offensive column she issues forth. 
But while Deveny’s columns served the purpose of garnering readers, links and 
comments, it was her comments beyond the reach of her column that resulted 
in her sacking from The Age. 
 
Officially, Deveny was sacked following a series of tweets – short posts of 
140 characters sent from micro-blogging platform Twitter to her followers – 
that were sent from the columnist and humourist’s personal account during the 
Australian television industry’s awards night, The Logies. Deveny was forced to 
defend her tweets after they sparked public outrage because of their 
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controversial nature. She tweeted about the sexualisation of Bindi Irwin – 
Australian icon Steve Irwin’s daughter, who is now the star of her own 
television show and enterprise – saying, “I do so hope Bindi Irwin gets laid”. 
She also tweeted about Australian television personality, Rove McManus, who 
had recently remarried actress Tasma Walton after the death of his first wife 
from breast cancer: “Rove and Tasma look so cute … hope she doesn’t die, 
too”. Deveny defended her tweets, saying they were the equivalent of “passing 
notes in class”, and had been taken out of context in their reporting in the 
wider media (Hunter, 2010).   
 
 However, the following day The Age announced that Deveny had been 
“dropped” as a columnist as a result of the tweets but, more significantly, the 
hundreds of readers’ comments that had been posted at The Age Online in 
response to the article about her defence. The Age cited the comments as a 
driving factor in their move to ‘drop’ Deveny: 
Her response did not sit well with readers – many of whom launched 
scathing attacks of their own on Twitter and in the online story’s 
comments section. More than 200 comments had been published by 
6.30 pm yesterday. (Sankey, 2010) 
They then cited some of the reader’s comments – for and against Deveny – as 
evidence of the need to act decisively. The Age’s Editor-in-Chief Paul Ramadge 
explained the sacking:  
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We are appreciative of the columns Catherine has written for The Age 
over several years but the views she has expressed recently on Twitter 
are not in keeping with the standards we set at The Age. (Sankey, 2010) 
A reader’s poll at the bottom of the article announcing her sacking asked, 
“Were Catherine Deveny’s Logies Tweets out of line?” – with 55 per cent of 
readers agreeing, “Yes, she picked on a little girl” and 45 per cent disagreeing – 
“No, that’s her style of humour”.  
 
But Jeremy Sear, in the Crikey-hosted blog, Pure Poison, argues that it was 
not Deveny’s original tweets, but the “storm of controversy” that erupted over 
them that prompted her sacking (Sear, 2010). He argues that The Age Online 
“milked” the controversy by posting the report of the incident as its top story 
for hours, and only made the move to sack the columnist after the glut of 
negative comments it received: 
Yes, The Age – supposedly a fearless member of the Fourth Estate, on 
whom we can rely to stand up to the powerful on our behalf – 
apparently got spooked by all the negative comments. ON AN ONLINE 
STORY! Negative comments! 
Thus Sear positions the move by The Age as contrary to their fourth estate role. 
The problem is one of professional values: “Never let it be said that Fairfax 
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can’t see which way the wind is blowing, and won’t lie down in whatever 
direction that is. Regardless of what that means to their own writers.” 
 
Media Watch host Jonathon Holmes, writing on the ABC’s online opinion 
site The Drum, argues that Deveny was being “disingenuous” in claiming that 
using Twitter is like passing notes in class when she has more than 4,000 
followers and her tweets were tagged, enabling them to be viewed in the public 
stream of Logies-related tweets (Holmes, 2010a). However, Deveny’s Twitter 
account was her own, and not affiliated with The Age – who, Holmes states, 
given Deveny’s status as a contributor is not her employer. Similarly, Margaret 
Simons, writing in Crikey, argues that “it is not immediately clear why The Age 
should regard itself as part of the relationship between Deveny and her Twitter 
followers” (Simons, 2010c). The problem is, according to Simons, that The Age 
has no social media policy for employees so it is hard to measure exactly where 
Deveny transgressed, particularly as she was hired “because she was edgy and 
offensive”. As Wilson suggests, Deveny was hired for her ability to provoke – 
and was fired for the very same reason.  
 
An interesting case of the protocols, practices and norms involved in 
governing “content makers”45 (Simons, 2007b) in itself, this event can also be 
                                                
45 While Deveny is a regular contributor to The Age, she identifies herself as a columnist and humorist – 
and not as a professional journalist. 
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read as indicative of some of the new relations entailed in online news. It 
signals, for instance, the way in which interactivity brings producers and 
consumers of content into closer relation, as suggested by Thrift. Here, the 
sped-up temporality he describes can be seen in the timeline of events: the 
entire event, from tweet to dismissal, took less than a week. But the event also 
illustrates the power of the market, the interactive audience poll running under 
the story of Deveny’s sacking indicative of the populism that informed the 
decision. While opinion polls are, themselves, populist tools,46 this incident 
speaks of a particular type of market populism that has infiltrated increasing 
areas of cultural life as the market logic of advanced liberalism takes greater 
hold across greater areas of life.  
Market populism and audience interactivity  
Thomas Frank (2001) outlines the way in which, in the US, a turn 
towards ‘public journalism’ represents the admission of market populism, 
increasingly prevalent in other areas of life, into the journalistic sphere. He 
argues that a crisis of American (political) culture,47 originating in the 1990s, 
was mistakenly identified as a crisis of journalism. Journalism, argued its 
detractors, was too adversarial, too cynical, and too critical. Journalism was 
                                                
46 As I outline in Chapter Two, populist rhetorics of ‘the public’ and the ‘voice of the people’ have for a 
long time infused the perception and practice of journalism. Opinion polls are one specific technique to 
constitute ‘popular’ or ‘public’ opinion. But Bourdieu (1979) argues that public opinion is constructed 
through the use of opinion polls on the basis of three (incorrect) assumptions: one, that everyone is 
capable of forming an opinion; two, that all opinions have the same value; and three, that there is 
consensus about the nature of the problem and questions being asked.  
47 Frank positions this cultural change as the result of the embrace of market forces, as I outline in the 
remainder of this section. But he also positions it alongside a growing suspicion of journalists and 
‘liberal elites’ in general, as well as the increasingly widespread conspiracy theories about the powers of 
the ‘New Class’ (“a mysterious fraternity whose aims and deeds were the subject of excited speculation 
in even the most respectable conservative journals”) (p. 309).  
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charged with leading a range of broader social changes and “the problem 
wasn’t the galloping influence of a newly unrestrained market; the problem was 
attitude. Newspapers didn’t need to somehow counterbalance or question 
market forces; they needed to stop criticizing” (p. 311 – original emphasis). The 
real cause, Frank argues, was an unmitigated embrace of the market that was in 
turn affecting the changes in journalism its detractors described:  
What actually underlay many of the big changes in American journalism 
– and hence precipitated much of the public anger – was the 
deterioration of the few checks that had once constrained the business 
aspect of the news media. The “New Class” didn’t transform most cities 
into one-newspaper towns; market forces did. TV news didn’t get 
dumber and dumber and dumber because liberals wanted it that way, 
but because advertisers did. (p. 309)  
But just as Frank identifies the rhetoric of the market at the root of these 
problems, so he finds it in the suggested solution – public journalism.  
This style of journalism, less concerned with the investigations and 
opinions of the ‘elite liberal media’ and more in touch with the concerns of ‘the 
people’ would, its proponents argued, smooth over the social differences 
created by adversarial journalism and make way for social harmony. If 
journalism was the problem – the source of social conflict, cynicism, and 
criticism – then it was also the source of the solution. Public journalism would 
remove the tendency for adversarialism in American life by listening to ‘people’ 
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and ‘communities’, and solving their problems. In the US, public journalism 
projects proliferated. Journalism scholar and blogger Jay Rosen was a key 
advocate; the Pew Foundation developed its Center for Civic Journalism. 
These projects were targeted at the figure of ‘the public’, but their government 
of this group was through market mechanisms:  
By putting its seal of approval on the trademark innovations of chain 
journalism – polls, demographic surveys, focus groups, “town meetings” 
– public journalism essentially embraced the market as an inherently 
democratic arrangement. The key to solving journalism’s problems, its 
leaders maintained, was to understand editing as a customer service. (Frank, 
2001, p. 318 – emphasis added) 
The populist appeal of public journalism intersected with the corporatisation of 
the news, and while both projects had quite different original aims, their paths 
were remarkably similar. The techniques of public journalism were integrated 
into an increasingly corporate media, allowing the meshing of populist 
sentiment and market logic:   
Newspapers would have to ‘listen’ more to their audiences, preferably 
through the standard marketing devices of polls and focus groups. 
Newspapers would have to redefine their coverage by demographic and 
excise the odd voices of those with funny (usually anticorporate) ideas 
they had come up with on their own. (p. 319) 
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The market logic that Frank describes is evidenced in the events that 
culminated in the dismissal of Catherine Deveny. The decision to terminate her 
involvement with The Age was taken not on moral grounds, nor as Simons 
points out because she was in contravention of any in-house social media 
policy, but as a result of ‘public’ outrage given voice through the provision of 
interactive options to The Age Online audience. Deveny typifies one of “the odd 
voices … with funny (usually anticorporate) ideas” that Frank suggests are 
increasingly being excised from newspapers in their attention to the demands of 
their demographic (p. 319). Deveny was swiftly removed by the power of 
market logic expressed by technologies for capturing popular sentiment, in this 
case, the audience comment box. Deveny’s removal is even more significant 
given her own self-conscious positioning somewhere between the ‘ordinary 
Australian’ and the ‘elites’. As Wilson (2009) notes, she traded on her position 
as an elite to gather material for her columns, openly critical of shopping 
centres and the suburbs – the heartland of the ‘ordinary Australian’ – while still 
trying to trade on her own status as a ‘bogan’. It is her complex and self-
conscious positioning as “willfully profane and unapologetically elite left, while 
remaining a vocally self-hating bogan” that undermined her wider popular 
appeal (Tijs, 2008).   
This incident demonstrates the way in which market populism has 
become a part of the management of news, journalists and other ‘content 
makers’ like Deveny. As Thrift suggests, interactivity has brought producers 
and consumers of news content into closer relations within intensified 
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conditions of capitalism. These capitalist conditions are routinely expressed 
through the populist logic of the market. The way in which these markets are 
organised though is changing. Increasingly, the creative industries – in which 
news industries are located – are organised around social networks where they 
gain their value, as well as their difference, from other industries. In the 
following section I take some time to map the terrain of the creative industries 
framework and surrounding arguments. I consider the way in which news and 
journalism are shaped by these rhetorics as well as what their existence means 
for the future development of journalism.  
The creative industries  
As journalists increasingly find themselves in changing relations with 
audiences and content, so their education and training has been adapted to 
these changed conditions. Deuze’s (2011) edited volume, Managing Media Work, 
which synthesises recent scholarship on media management, production and 
policy, is intended as a preparatory handbook for the skilled media worker. In 
her chapter on ‘Journalism in a Network’, Jane Singer provides advice for the 
trainee journalist. She argues that today’s journalist must be flexible, able to 
work across a range of media and roles, and adept at navigating constantly 
changing technologies and working conditions: “new storytelling platforms, 
new tools and formats, new collaborations, and new responsibilities for user 
contributions all come on top of the newswork expected of earlier generations 
of journalists” (p. 105). Singer’s journalist, attuned to conditions of constant 
change, instantiates Thrift’s (2005) notion of a new kind of ‘fast’ subjectivity, 
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governed by a range of new management practices (including the sped-up 
processes of innovation outlined earlier in this chapter), in which the possession 
of resources of knowledge and creativity becomes central. These ‘fast subjects’ 
must be “calculating subjects able to withstand the exigencies of faster and 
faster return. Yet, at precisely the same time, they must be subjects who can be 
creative” (p. 133).  
 
In this environment the cultivation of creativity becomes a central task of 
education not only for future knowledge workers, but for all citizens across all 
levels of their education. Education, policy and training is infused with the 
rhetoric of the creative industries, as Nick Stevenson (2010) notes in the British 
context:  
 
The modern knowledge economy requires the reproduction of workers 
who are flexible and mobile, but above all with good linguistic, affective 
and communication skills. It is in this context that we should view the 
rapid expansion of higher education, the extension of the school leaving 
age and the increasing involvement of business within education. (p. 
346)  
 
Because of its widespread diffusion across all levels of education, as well as its 
particular pertinence to the framing of the education, training and production 
of news content, it is necessary to delve into the field of the creative industries 
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framework. In this section I trace its development as a research and policy 
agenda, some of its major arguments, and its implications for the development 
of journalism.  
 
The concept of the creative industries is, at its most broad, about the 
linking of “culture and creativity with economy and industry” (Flew, 2003, p. 
89), and has had many definitional incarnations. The term first rose to 
prominence in the UK under the New Labour leadership of Tony Blair, with 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport developing a Creative Industries 
Taskforce and releasing a Creative Industries Mapping Document in 1998, in 
which the creative industries were defined as: “those industries which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for 
wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual 
property” (DCMS, 2001, p. 5). The Mapping Document itself became a 
successful export product, particularly in surrounding Europe, as well as Latin 
America and the Far East (O'Connor, 2007) and also marked the shift in 
nomenclature from cultural to creative industries – a concern I explore in more 
detail in the following section. However, it is its persistence as a theme for 
government and academic exploration that is of immediate relevance – for the 
rhetoric of the creative industries has become pervasive across a range of 
diverse and disparate fields (see Flew, 2003) throughout the 21st century to date.  
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A key voice in popularising the study of the creative industries (though 
he didn’t employ that term himself), was Richard Florida, whose book The Rise 
of the Creative Class (2004) is described by Flew (2003) as the “academic 
blockbuster of the new creativity movement” (p. 90). In it, Florida presents his 
vision of a creative class of “scientists, engineers, university professors, poets 
and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers and architects, as well as the 
thought leadership of modern society” (p. 69) living in urban creative enclaves 
and contributing to the growing creative economy. Within the academy, the 
creative industries have been most prominently and effectively deployed as 
both a research direction and policy alignment at Australia’s Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT), which replaced its Faculty of Arts with the 
Creative Industries Faculty in 2001, and in 2005 established its Australian 
Research Council Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation 
(CCI). Across the two institutional branches of QUT’s creative industries 
specialisation, Stuart Cunningham, John Hartley and Terry Flew, among 
others, are key voices in the development of scholarship in the field.  
 
In the introduction to his edited collection on the creative industries, 
John Hartley (2005) maps out the historical development of the concept from 
the creative arts of civic humanism, the emergence of the twin figures of the 
citizen and consumer, the concept of the culture industries, and finally, the 
emergence of the creative industries from the technological, economic and 
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policy landscape of the late 20th to early 21st century. Defining the concept, 
Hartley writes:  
 
The idea of the creative industries seeks to describe the conceptual and 
practical convergence of the creative arts (individual talent) with 
Cultural Industries (mass scale), in the context of new media 
technologies (ICTs) within a new knowledge economy, for the use of 
newly interactive citizen-consumers (p. 5).  
 
Conceptually, as Hartley’s definition demonstrates, the creative industries 
intersect with ideas, such as the ‘knowledge economy’ and Manuel Castell’s 
(2000) vision of the ‘network society’, but extends them to combine the social, 
cultural and economic domains. The creative industries make what was 
formerly ‘merely’ cultural, and largely government-funded, also count within 
the economic sphere while rejecting elitist conceptions of culture and 
broadening access to entrepreneurial activity (Hartley, 2005, p. 3). Creative 
industries typically involve micro-businesses and small and medium enterprises, 
but also encompass some of the world’s largest brands. They often take the 
form of public-private partnerships – places like Silicon Valley are sites where 
the economic and research concerns of government, academic and private 
enterprises converge to develop these hubs of creative economic activity, as is 
QUT’s Creative Industries Precinct. Hartley outlines that within the creative 
industries, creative workers increasingly work across roles and industry sectors 
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as part of their varied and flexible ‘portfolio career’, with learning increasingly 
becoming a “distributed system” extending beyond formal institutions and 
across many life stages, aiming to develop not specific skills but a range of 
capabilities that can be developed and applied across the various strands of the 
‘portfolio career’.   
 
 The CCI has further refined its definition of and approach to the 
creative industries in order to develop a more precise methodology known as 
the Creative Trident, so-named because of its three-pronged approach. The 
Creative Trident focuses more precisely the study of the creative industries on 
the following three groups of creative workers:    
 
‘Specialist’ artists, professionals or creative individuals working in 
creative industries; ‘support’ staff in those industries providing 
management, secretarial, administrative or accountancy back-up; and 
creative individuals ‘embedded’ in other industries not defined as 
‘creative’. Collectively, they are the ‘creative workforce’. (Higgs, 
Cunningham, & Bakhshi, 2008, p. 3) 
 
The authors argue that this approach is better for studying the creative 
industries, particularly for policy makers, because it focuses more closely on 
actual creative activities and allows for a more precise understanding of the 
economic value of creative activity through the use of accurate census data. 
 246 
However, Higgs et al. found in their UK study that “creative employment 
occurs disproportionately outside the creative industries themselves” – with 
some 35 per cent of the creative workforce employed in non-creative sectors (p. 
6). This form of ‘embedded’ creative labour is reconceptualised in the more 
recent consideration of the creative industries from Potts, Cunningham, 
Hartley and Ormerod (2008), who reconfigure their definition in relationship to 
social network markets.  
 
 Potts et al. question the traditional industrial definition of the creative 
industries, whereby they are defined and measured in the manner that most 
industries are – in terms of their material inputs and outputs – or in the case of 
the creative industries, by their creative inputs and intellectual property outputs 
(Potts, et al., 2008, p. 167). The authors argue instead for a market-oriented 
definition that recognises the centrality of social networks in the differentiation 
of the creative industries to other industrial sectors: 
 
The economics of the creative industries … is not the same as the 
economics of the agricultural or industrial economy, as is implicitly 
represented in neoclassical economics. The central economic concern, 
we argue, is not with the nature of inputs or outputs in production or 
consumption per se, or even with competitive structures, but with the 
nature of the markets that coordinate this industry. We think they are 
both complex and social, and that this offers a useful analytic foundation 
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as in creative industries markets complex social networks play at least as 
significant a coordination role as price signals (p. 169).  
 
Thus Potts et al. suggest that the creative industries are best understood as 
complex social network markets because of their distinctive reliance on “word 
of mouth, taste, cultures, and popularity, such that individual choices are 
dominated by information feedback over social networks rather than innate 
preferences and price signals” (pp. 169–170), such as in other industries. Their 
revised definition of the creative industries makes central the role of social 
networks in mediating market value:  
 
The creative industries are the set of economic activities that involve the 
creation and maintenance of social networks and the generation of value 
through production and consumption of network-valorized choices in 
these networks. (p. 174)  
 
In this reconception of the creative industries it is not the creative inputs or 
outputs that are central, but rather the social networks that organise the 
economic agent and their resulting enterprise in relation to the market. 
 
This allows Potts et al. to distinguish between a range of services that 
might involve various levels of creativity – some of which are more engaged in 
social networks than others. In defining the creative industries, then, social 
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networks rather than creativity become central (and what counts as a creative 
industry is thus constantly shifting in relation to the choices exercised within 
these social networks): 
 
All professional services involve specific skills and capabilities and thus 
creativity, but not all of these are creative in the social network sense. 
Neurosurgery, firefighting and nursing, for example, are all creative 
occupations, in that they involve critical decision making and adaptive 
response. However, they are not essentially defined by social networks, 
even though certain aspects of them will be … (Potts, et al., 2008, pp. 
173–174).   
 
Here we see that what Higgs et al. identified as ‘embedded’ creativity can be 
more clearly accounted for by the measure of social networks, rather than 
open-ended definitions of creativity that seemingly allow any enterprise to be 
categorised as creative. This centrality of social networks does not displace 
creativity entirely, but rather re-imagines it as a form of innovation, shaped by 
individual choice within complex social network markets.  
 
The social network market understanding of creative industries 
reinterprets them as part of “the innovation system of the economy rather than 
just another industrial sector” (Potts, et al., 2008, p. 174). The very innovation 
they are concerned with is industrial, but not in the way that the traditional 
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definition suggested – that is, as creativity within industries. Rather, as Potts et 
al. explain:  
 
The creative industries are, to coin a phrase, about the ‘creation of 
industries’ through social network market dynamics and institutional 
emergence rather than about creativity in industries, which may often be 
routine and functionally absorbed (p. 176).  
 
They argue that social network markets include the systems that build and 
maintain social networks, such as advertising, architecture and media, as well as the 
systems that create value on these social networks through content, such as film, 
TV, music, design, and so on.  
 
From this definition, media websites, and online news sites, in particular, 
can be seen as one of the systems for creating social networks. Journalism, as 
well as other types of content production, can be understood as one of the 
systems that add value to these networks. Online journalism, then, is situated 
within social network markets that mediate its value. The event that resulted in 
the dismissal of Catherine Deveny, I want to suggest, can be read as an 
expression of value within a social network market. The Age Online audience was 
acting as a social network, mediating the value of Catherine Deveny’s columns 
as a form of content. Through features that allow for a new prominence of 
audience expressions around market mechanisms, Catherine Deveny was 
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removed from The Age Online when it decided that she no longer brought value 
to the social network she was bound up in. This may appear mercenary and it 
is certainly at odds with the ‘fourth estate’ notion of the press, in which the 
journalist knew best what the audience wanted. But, as Potts et al. argue, there 
are political implications to this shift towards social network markets, as the 
“social welfare theoretic basis of the standard definition [of the creative 
industries] is replaced by an innovation system”, reoriented around the market, 
so that the “domain of policy is radically shifted from a top-down re-
compensatory model to a bottom-up model of experimental facilitation and 
innovation” (p. 180).  
 
Creative vs cultural industries  
It is the politics of the creative industries framework, and particularly the 
latter definitions framed around social network markets, that has provoked 
some scholars from the fields of communication, media and cultural studies to 
argue that the concept is inadequate for making sense of the intersection of 
what were once understood as purely cultural (and often government-funded) 
pursuits with the market. To demonstrate, consider this comment by Deuze 
(2007), who argues that the circumspect adoption of the creative industries 
framework can be useful for considering the way in which meaning is made 
and shared through and across producer and audience experiences, but in 
doing so, demonstrates a common slippage between the terms ‘creative’ and 
‘cultural’ in the discussion of media work:  
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The creative industries approach to sites of cultural production also 
focuses our attention on the seminal role (the management and 
organization of) that creativity plays in any consideration of media work” 
(p. 250 – original emphasis).   
 
Deuze mentions “cultural production”, but the QUT School is emphatic that 
the creative industries extend beyond what have traditionally been known as 
‘cultural’ pursuits and into fields that have not traditionally been considered 
creative at all. Cunningham (2002) critiques approaches that equate the 
creative industries solely with ‘the arts’. His approach, and that taken by fellow 
QUT researchers, encompasses the traditional ‘arts’ sectors, but stresses 
applications of creativity that lead to wealth creation:  
 
This approach places strategic but not exclusive stress on those 
applications of creativity which have a realistic enterprise growth 
potential, without confining that to digital content alone. Aboriginal arts 
and crafts, along with analogue fashion outputs (which, when I last 
looked, were what we used to call clothes) are proven wealth creators (p. 
56).   
 
Behind this changed conception of what were once known as the ‘cultural 
industries’ is a changed politics and corresponding changed ideas about the role 
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for the nation state in the realm of culture and enterprise. In the creative 
industries approach, the relationship between (mass) ‘culture’ and ‘government’ 
has been refigured as a relationship between (individual) ‘creativity’ and ‘the 
market’. This refigured relationship shifts the focus towards wealth creation 
(rather than public enrichment), encompasses (but is not limited to) the 
attributes of the ‘new economy’, is increasingly networked and less centralised, 
and less national and more global or regional (p. 59).  
 
Researchers informed by political economy or Marxist approaches to 
culture have been critical of the creative industries framework, arguing for a 
narrower definition of culture and a critical consideration of the effects of its 
coupling with Schumpetarian economics. For instance, David Hesmondhalgh 
(2007) maintains that the concept of the cultural industries is of more analytical 
utility than the creative industries. Hesmondhalgh’s cultural industries begin 
with a narrower conception of culture than the broader understanding of it as a 
“whole way of life” (see Williams, 1976). Rather, he focuses on the production 
of symbolic meaning within a culture, beginning with Williams’ definition of 
culture as “the signifying system through which necessarily (though among other 
means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and 
explored” (Williams as cited in Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 12 – original 
emphasis). Thus his definition of the cultural industries is: “Those institutions 
(mainly profit-making companies, but also state organisations and non-profit 
organisations) that are most directly involved in the production of social meaning” 
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(p. 12 ; original emphasis). Included in Hesmondhalgh’s list of core cultural 
industries are: broadcasting, film (in a range of formats), the content aspects of 
the internet industry (but not those aspects which fall under the computer or 
telecommunications industries), music (both recorded and live), and print and 
electronic publishing. This definition is far narrower than that of the creative 
industries, and extends to include state and non-profit organisations, at odds 
with the QUT definition that is based on wealth creation and market relations 
shaped by social networks. But Hesmondhalgh suggests that such definitions 
are too broad, encompassing industries that are not really creative, or that are 
not part of the ‘new economy’ they represent, allowing their users to claim a 
rhetorical victory without any real empirical evidence of a change.  
 
The very concept of the creative industries has been shaped by a 
neoliberal politics since its inception, and this political underpinning has been 
met with argument, resistance and even, at times, ridicule. In the UK, where 
cultural and then creative industries policies emerged from the 1980s onwards 
as part of the need to find new initiatives for local and regional development in 
light of the downturn of manufacturing, O’Connor – a former Professor of 
Cultural Industries at the University of Leeds, now Professor of the Creative 
Industries at the CCI48 – argues that it has been as much about the 
commercialisation of culture as it has the emergence of creativity into economic 
fields, as culture, “previously seen as a marginal and mainly decorative or 
                                                
48 As I outline in this section, O’Connor’s work is critical of the political-economic underpinning of the 
creative industries, but his move to the CCI suggests that he is now working within this framework.  
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prestige expenditure, began to move much closer to the centre of policy making 
as a potential economic development” (O'Connor, 2007, p. 26). Hesmondhalgh 
traces the development of the creative industries from the intersection of the 
ideas around the cultural industries with cultural policy. He locates the 
emergence of cultural policy from the left-wing Greater London Council’s 
(GLC) development of its own cultural policy from 1983. This was shaped by 
both a more democratic understanding of culture that encompassed not only 
the ‘high’ arts, but also commercial forms, with a funding emphasis not on the 
artists or creators, but on distribution and reaching audiences, and the 
recognition of the cultural industries as a valuable form of investment for the 
economic regeneration of urban centres. While the GLC was abolished in 1986 
by Margaret Thatcher’s British Conservative government, the ideas it 
generated about the value of the cultural industries as a means of regeneration 
and employment creation were re-imagined as a neoliberal project, the 
emphasis no longer on public investment but rather “an increasing emphasis on 
entrepreneurialism in the private and public sectors” (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 
140). The shift away from socially-oriented policy and towards individual 
responsibility that came with a neoliberal politics grew as the concept of the 
cultural industries evolved into the creative industries, while “the view that 
independent cultural production might be connected to wider movements for 
progressive social change, implicit in at least some of the GLC work, was by 
now being steadily erased” (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 140).  
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But Toby Miller (2009b) accurately locates an earlier point of 
conceptual emergence, arguing that neoliberalism’s genesis in the United States 
under Reaganism – where, interestingly, the creative industries have never had 
much purchase – provides the global political backdrop against which the 
creative industries were formed:  
 
What eventually became the creative industries as a discourse began in 
the 1960s with Ronald Reagan’s neo-liberal opposition to welfare and 
European attempts to create a new, practical humanities, in response to 
charges of irrelevancy, conservatism, and light-headedness. The West 
recognized 40 years ago that its economic future lay in post-industrial 
activities – not food or manufactures, but finance and ideology. (p. 93).  
 
Regardless of the exact point of genesis, this longer history provides the 
backdrop for a political shift away from ‘culture’ and towards the broader and 
more malleable concept of ‘creativity’. In the UK, the shift in policy direction 
from cultural to creative industries was signified by the release of the 1998 
Mapping Document – although it is worth noting that the concept’s earliest 
policy incarnation was in the form of the Australian Labor Party’s 1994 Creative 
Nation cultural policy document (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). The move from 
cultural to creative industries was explained as merely pragmatic by the 
responsible government minister, Chris Smith, and as a step away from ‘the 
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arts’ and their usual distance from all things economic. However, O’Connor 
(2007) argues that pragmatic or otherwise, the shift in name remains significant:  
 
Pragmatic or not, the change of terminology was not neutral; it served to 
uncouple the ‘creative industries’ from ‘arts and cultural’ policy, yet 
hoping at the same time to recoup (some of) the benefits for those very 
arts and cultural policy agencies. Crucial to this political trick was the 
identification of the creative industries with a ‘new economy’ driven by 
‘digital’ technologies and closely related to the ‘information’ or 
knowledge’ economy. (p. 42)   
 
This re-conceptualisation of cultural policy allowed governments and 
academics to take advantage of the rhetorical breadth and flexibility of 
concepts like creativity, technology and the new economy. However, as 
O’Connor notes, the move was not only rhetorical, but also shaped by the 
dispersion of neoliberal politics across increasing areas of social life.  
 
One of the greatest criticisms of the cultural industries framework 
levelled by the creative industries advocates is that it represents a top-down 
national project. But Hesmondhalgh counters this by first, citing the work of 
Garnham (2005) to argue that the sort of education that emerges from the 
creative industries discourse reflects, in its structure, the very “‘artist’-centred 
notion of subsidy” (p. 145) (or top-down funding) that it seeks to reject. Second, 
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he argues that Flew’s (2005b) suggestion that the creative industries act as an 
area of research and development (R&D) – whose value is mediated by the 
market, rather than the top-down funding of the arts – risks reinstating a 
different form of top-down control, this time in the form of the massive 
corporations that exercise similar dominance within the market, with its 
systematic “inequalities of access and outcome” (pp. 147–149). Similarly, Toby 
Miller (2008) argues that the creative industries approach fails to fully account 
for the types of work practices, relations and inequities that it advocates. He 
instead calls for what he labels ‘Media Studies 3.0’, in which texts and 
audiences remain central, but so does productive labour. Of central importance 
to Miller is the question of work practices and exploitation. He considers 
examples of the career patterns and work practices of members of the creative 
class and their alignment with self-governing practices, as such, as the 
development and maintenance of a ‘portfolio career’. One such example is his 
consideration of the highly fraught work practices forced upon video game 
creators at Los Angeles-based EA Games, where up to 91 hours of work per 
week for several weeks becomes the norm (pp. 224–225). 
 
But Miller (2009b) does not go as far as Daniel Mato (2009), to whom he 
responds in an issue of Cultural Studies, in which both authors address the 
concept of the cultural industries. Mato argues that “all industries and forms of 
consumption are cultural” (p. 72), but Miller suggests that this broad 
conceptualisation of culture “enters the troubling domain of the 
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decontextualised vocabulary where words mean everything and hence nothing” 
(p. 92). Nonetheless, he is openly critical of the creative industries agenda, and 
in particular, its politics, which he demonstrates in an attack on the concept 
and those who subscribe to it, in his Cultural Studies article. He begins by 
identifying the neoliberal origins of the creative industries, painting this as an 
abandonment of the values of socialism that once typified the humanities (p. 
94), before mocking creative industries disciples, including Richard Florida and 
his followers, the creative industries scholars at QUT, and “Brussels 
bureaucrats” for their slavish (and somewhat foolish) devotion to the concept:     
 
Consider (Richard) Floridians, riding around on their bicycles to spy on 
ballet-loving, gay-friendly, multicultural computer geeks who have 
moved to de-industrialized, freezing rust/rusting freeze belts; true-
believer creationists in Australia who find even cultural-policy studies 
too residually socialistic and textual for their taste; and endlessly 
sprouting Brussels bureaucrats offering blueprints to cities eager to be 
made over by culture and tolerance in search of affluence. They think 
many industries are cultural, and the way they mobilize that insight is 
through the neo-classical shibboleth of unlocking creativity through 
individual human capital. (p. 94)  
 
Miller even mentions the CCI, bitterly commenting that the Australian 
Research Council has funded the Centre, “run by a lapsed-poet and Girardian 
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(Stuart Cunningham) and a hitherto semiotic romantic (John Hartley)” (p. 94). 
The personal nature of the attack undermines Miller’s point, which is, it seems, 
that the creative industries are an untenable concept because they are not 
measured like other industries – something that the CCI has tackled in its 
formulation of its social network market approach.  
 
But Miller does not consider Potts et al.’s formulation of the creative 
industries as social network markets, or the specificities of measurements and 
methods outlined by Higgs et al. in making this critique. Rather, he takes issue 
with the fact that in the creative industries, “what is made in a sector of the 
economy does not characterize that sector, but rather, what goes into it” (p. 95) 
– that is, creativity is not an output but an input, in any manner of sectors. 
Miller argues that this “bizarre shift in adjectival meaning makes it possible for 
anything that makes money to be creative” (p. 95) – likening this reckoning to 
Mato’s belief that all industries are cultural. Miller suggests that the motivation 
for the development of the discipline is a desire for power and relevancy (by the 
“propagandists of the creative industries” (p. 95): “What such moves achieve at 
a tactical level, however, is a sleight of hand that places the humanities at the 
center of economic innovation by pretending that it encompasses information 
technology” (p. 95).  
 
His highly personal attacks aside, Miller’s alternative is not convincing. 
He recommends that researchers analyse the economic sectors encompassed by 
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the cultural and creative industries – and to recognise that all economic sectors 
have cultural elements while also maintaining the specificities of culture. While 
there are some merits to Miller’s critique, the creative industries scholars have 
worked assiduously to clearly demarcate their area of study and to develop a 
precise empirical methodology. They are not, as Miller claims, studying 
anything and everything under the tag of creativity – quite the opposite, 
particularly in their latest formulation of the creative industries as social 
network markets. However, Miller’s analysis is useful in identifying the 
neoliberal overlaps of the creative industries rhetoric – in both the government 
and academic contexts – and in highlighting the attendant issues to do with 
(global and regional) labour practices and relations.  
 
But it is also necessary to recognise that it is not possible to 
voluntaristically strip away this politics and simply replace it with any of its 
political precedents, nor is it a simple task to transform the governing relations 
of neoliberalism into a modern government of socialism, as I touch on in the 
next section. But just because this politics cannot be transcended or easily 
transformed does not mean that drawing attention to it is a futile task. Here, 
the critique of Hesmondhalgh and Miller is of most use – in drawing attention 
to the politics of what is rapidly becoming the status quo, and in giving detailed 
examples of the sorts of relations this entails. In this instance, it provides an 
analytical framework through which to observe the sort of politics that infuses 
the training, production and study of journalism and other associated ‘creative 
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industries’. The task then is not to wish for a return to a non-market-oriented 
system, but rather how to work within current political economic realities in 
order to maintain those things from the past that are worth saving. As I map 
out the relationship between the creative industries and neoliberalism in the 
following final section of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate the way in which it 
is possible to work from inside this politics to map a path forward for politics – 
and journalism – without appealing for a return to a former era.  
 
Creative industries and neoliberalism   
At the heart of Miller’s critique of the creative industries is what he sees 
as a political divide in which neoliberalism is the wedge between cultural 
studies and the creative industries:   
 
From this flows an entire host of methodologically critical matters in the 
growing distinction between cultural studies and creative industries: a 
focus on collective struggle over meaning versus the rush to the discourse 
of creativity and the subordination of politics; the refusal of 
neoliberalism versus its embrace; and the methods of political economy 
(study material conflicts) versus narcissography (watching TV or playing 
games with one’s children and friends). (Miller, 2009a, p. 271)  
 
Miller (2010) takes a dim view of neoliberalism, arguing that it was “one of the 
most successful attempts in world history to reshape individuals in human 
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history via government programs” (p. 56) – placing it in the ranks of 
Christianity, colonialism, Islam and Marxism. He argues that its mission was 
(he uses the past tense, arguing that recent economic events, namely the global 
financial crisis, has compromised its stranglehold on global political systems) to 
reshape populations according to market objectives, “invoking and training 
them as ratiocinative liberal actors waiting for their inner creativity to be 
unlocked” (p. 57). Miller positions the imperatives of the creative industries as a 
cynical attempt to impose market imperatives on unwitting individuals, and 
neoliberalism as a scheme by the powerful to brainwash populations with the 
language of the market.  
 
Indeed, Flew (2010) argues that Miller presents neoliberalism as the 
“deux ex machina lying behind the rise of the creative industries discourse” (p. 3). 
He suggests that approaches like Miller’s are symptomatic of a tendency to 
employ the term neoliberalism in a negative, normative way as well as reducing 
its conceptual complexities and multiplicities to “a kind of all or nothing 
phenomenon: you either have bad neo-liberalism or a largely undefined good 
society” (p. 4). The sort of critique of neoliberalism presented by Miller, and to 
a lesser extent, Hesmondhalgh, is informed by a Marxist understanding of 
culture and government – something Miller brings to his reading of Foucault’s 
collected lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics: lectures at the college de France 1978–1979, 
of which neoliberalism is a central theme. Miller (2009a) reads into these a 
Marxist critique of neoliberalism, arguing that Foucault saw in this politics a 
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“grand paradox” and positioning his take as highly critical (p. 270; see also 
Miller, 2010). But Flew argues that this approach to Foucault and neoliberalism 
is anachronistic, misrepresenting Foucault’s politics and relationship to 
Marxism. Rather, Foucault’s politics were far more ambiguous than Miller’s 
reading suggests:  
 
The account of liberalism and neo-liberalism in these lectures, I would 
argue, presents a critique of Marxism as much as it does of neo-
liberalism itself, positioning Foucault in a more ambiguous political 
space than this synthesis of his work into the canon of contemporary 
radical thought would suggest (Flew, 2010, p. 11).   
 
Indeed, this interpretation of neoliberalism does away with the sort of agency 
that Foucault describes as an essential part of the government of populations.  
 
 Rather, Foucault’s lectures, though highly critical in style also represent 
a rejection of the sort of critique that Miller makes of neoliberalism in 
presenting it as a dominant ideology foisted upon the unwitting masses:   
 
The lectures consistently reject the easy critique of neoliberalism 
as ideology, presenting it as neither ‘a convenient cover for an 
underlying reality of oppression and domination’ or as ‘pseudo-science, 
to be exposed and condemned as the servant of whatever power is in 
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place’ (Guala as cited in Flew, 2010, p. 31).   
 
Further, Foucault is adamant that the task of reviving the values of socialism in 
the era of liberal government is not as easy as a simple return to the past – 
which is what is suggested by Miller and again, to a lesser extent, by 
Hesmondhalgh. Rather, Foucault argues that a return to an earlier socialist art 
of liberal government is not feasible because it is yet to be invented. Foucault 
(2008) argues that socialism has put forward an historical and economic 
rationality, as well as rational techniques of administrative intervention – but 
no autonomous socialist governmentality (p. 92). Rather, he argues that 
socialism has been successful at connecting itself to diverse types of 
governmentality – including liberalism – in which case “socialism and its forms 
of rationality function as counterweights, as a corrective, and a palliative to 
internal dangers” (p. 92). But in his 1979 lecture Foucault (2008) remarked: “I 
do not think that there is an autonomous socialist governmentality,” (p. 92) – 
which only seems even more true in the 21st century.  
 
Instead, Foucault suggests that we should interrogate the notion of 
governmentality in order to ascertain how it might be used to meet socialist 
ends: 
 
What would be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? Is there a 
governmentality appropriate to socialism? What governmentality is 
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possible as a strictly, intrinsically and autonomously socialist 
governmentality? In any case, we know only that if there is a really 
socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its 
texts. It cannot be deducted from them. It must be invented. (p. 94)  
 
As Dean (2009) suggests, today, “Foucault would urge the left to invent its own 
art of government … and to do so, it would have inevitably to borrow, adapt 
and modify elements from the liberal traditions”. This is why accounts like 
those of Miller provide an interesting critical counterpoint – much like the way 
in which socialism has operated in relation to liberalism to date. But such 
critiques are necessarily limited. In order to understand the contours of 
neoliberalism as it intersects with journalism and agendas like the creative 
industries, it is necessary to see this sophisticated and contemporary form of 
government for what it is – a rationality of government – and not an oppressive 
ideology that can easily be shed or ‘seen through’. Critique without this 
recognition is ultimately unconstructive and all the more so if no alternative is 
offered. 
 
Just as appeals for a return to a foregone political age (and its 
concomitant policy and research agenda) are untenable, given the nature of 
contemporary liberal government, so too are hopes of a return to a past era of 
journalism. If a socialist liberal governmentality has yet to be invented then 
perhaps so too a democratically oriented journalism that can work within the 
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economic rationality of advanced liberalism. What this requires is rhetorically – 
and practically – removing the broader political potential of journalism from its 
‘fourth estate’ goals, something entailed in Keane’s (2009) vision of monitory 
democracy. But the separation of journalism from the persuasive rhetoric of its 
‘fourth estate’ role, while necessary, requires the uncomfortable recognition of 
change in debates in which key actors have much at stake.  
 
In the following chapter I outline the way in which discussions of online 
news revolve around the utility of its ‘business model’ – a rhetorical device 
employed both as a diagnostic tool as well as the hopeful source of journalism’s 
renewal. But as I demonstrate, a narrow understanding of the news ‘business 
model’ which seeks to separate the business of news from its social role fails to 
account for the demands of numerous stakeholders whose investment in news 
and journalism is not (solely, or even slightly) financial. On the other hand, this 
separation – of news from its traditional social role – may also be the necessary 
step required to ensure that journalism, and what it can enable more broadly in 
terms of politics, government and citizenship, can be reformulated and 
reconceptualised within the constraints and demands of advanced liberal 
conditions. That is, it may be the disavowal of journalism’s ‘fourth estate’ role 
that will allow for journalism’s adaptation, and the securing of what this term 
has come to represent – journalism’s broader social role.  
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Chapter Six:  
The Business of News 
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Introduction  
I begin this chapter by outlining a recent example in the development of 
online news, with both local and global implications: Rupert Murdoch’s 
announcement and implementation of paywalls across News Corporation news 
sites. After outlining the details of this example, I identify the way in which, in 
the surrounding media coverage, the business model is upheld as a singular 
concept, an explanatory frame and diagnostic tool. At the same time, the 
discussion of the business model involves discomfort, as it requires recognition 
of the fact that journalism is a business – as well as a social institution. Thus 
drawing particularly on the work of Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, 
Richard Phillips and Karel Williams (2006, 2009), as well as Grahame 
Thompson (1986), I use this example to demonstrate that the business model is 
an insufficient explanatory frame for understanding online news, its problems, 
prospects and future, because it seeks to isolate the business element of 
journalism’s operation from its other roles. I outline the way in which firms, 
and in particular, media firms in the business of news production, are not best 
understood as existing to fulfil a singular role (i.e. to ‘produce quality 
journalism’) but rather as sites of competing objectives – some of them 
economic, some of them social, some political, and so on.  
 
Nonetheless, it is also necessary to acknowledge that economic 
imperatives are increasingly central to the production of culture – and 
specifically, the development of online news – under conditions of advanced 
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liberalism. Thus these economic imperatives also increasingly shape the 
development and evolution of journalism’s other more traditionally social roles. 
Therefore, in the second part of the chapter I consider the extent to which an 
advanced liberal politics is shaping the economic development of online news 
around business objectives, and the way this is in tension with liberal 
journalistic traditions and objectives. Drawing this time on a local example, I 
outline the recent tumultuous history of Fairfax Media, focusing on the tension 
between its board of directors and the editorial arms of the company. I 
demonstrate the way in which, through the work of publisher Eric Beecher, 
Crikey has actively positioned itself in opposition to the Fairfax board and its 
economically driven decisions, whilst downplaying its own business model. 
While Beecher, and thus Crikey, would like to suggest that attention to business 
imperatives is at odds with securing the future of journalism online, I argue that 
Fairfax is demonstrating dexterity and flexibility around the political and 
economic evolution of contemporary journalism – albeit at the expense of 
liberal journalistic traditions and values, as well as the esteem of many of its 
media peers49. Crikey, on the other hand, while seeking to diminish the 
importance of its business model in order to assert its professional legitimacy 
and status within the mainstream media, embodies what Clay Shirky (2010) 
                                                
49 Indeed, it is important to emphasise here that the “dexterity and flexibility” noted in the Fairfax 
response to changing economic conditions by no means represents a better response to other news 
organisations, including Crikey. Rather, what I suggest is that Fairfax demonstrates a heightened 
attunement and attention to its financial imperatives. But this is certainly at the expense of an erosion of 
its previous commitment to its political and social imperatives. Thus while Fairfax represents a 
necessary and perhaps even sensible – given its business status – reaction to the current media 
environment, this does not remove the fact that something is lost when one of the imperatives of the 
news business is given higher precedence than the others. What exactly is lost is what is treasured at 
Crikey. How the two values can coexist represents the greatest challenge to journalism today, and will 
be the concern of the conclusion of this chapter.  
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identifies as a “transformed alternative” to the current dominant organisational 
form of journalism – rather than the ‘traditional’ liberal journalistic product it 
seeks to identify with.   
 
Murdoch and paywalls 
In May 2009, Rupert Murdoch held a conference call with journalists 
and economic analysts to discuss News Corporation’s most recent quarterly 
profits – down 47 per cent to $755 million (Clark, 2009a). In the discussion, he 
made a bold pronouncement about the company’s plans for its news businesses, 
outlining his plans to fix what he calls a “malfunctioning” business model. 
Murdoch said that all newspapers online were going through an “epochal 
debate over whether to charge” – and announced that News Corporation’s 
news websites would begin charging for content within a year. He used the 
success of The Wall Street Journal, which has long charged for content, as an 
example that it is possible to convince people to pay for content online. While 
he later extended the timeframe in which to undertake this operation, Murdoch 
did indeed begin erecting ‘paywalls’ around his content, beginning with The 
Times (of London) and its Sunday edition, The Sunday Times, in July 2010. Four 
months later, News International – the UK arm of News Corporation – 
announced that “the new digital products for The Times and The Sunday Times 
have achieved more than 105,000 paid-for customer sales to date” ("105,000 
Digital Sales," 2010). The response to this announcement was mixed, with 
some declaring the results abysmal, and others finding in them encouragement 
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for the future of online news. The BBC reported that this represented an 87 per 
cent drop in visits to the website – but that the company had expected to lose 
90 per cent of its readers, so this represents a good result ("Times and Sunday 
Times readership," 2011). On the other hand, The Guardian’s OrganGrinder blog 
reports that the gross yearly earnings represented by that number is only £5.5 
million, and “given that the advertising revenue lost could be in the £10m to 
£20m range, that suggests there is a long way to go” (Sabbagh, 2010). 
Regardless of its reception, Murdoch’s paywall experiment generated a great 
deal of debate about the future of news online, and positioned the business 
model as central to the success of news online.  
 
Responses to Murdoch’s paywall announcement generally fell into two 
camps: that this was a necessary move to ensure the preservation of journalism 
online, or that this was a ludicrous attempt to control an uncontrollable 
technology. In the latter camp, Guy Rundle (2009) writes that the 
announcement reflects Murdoch’s “arsed-up relationship to the internet”. 
Rundle’s technologically determinist argument is that Murdoch’s decision is 
evidence of his inability to understand the inherently free nature of the web, 
much like the inherent logic of technologies that came before it: 
 
Central to his idea that papers can suddenly claw back the material 
they’ve put out for free is the delusion that newspaper buying and 
reading is a static habit, unchanging beneath the flow of tech change. 
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It’s not – the net has changed our relationship to writing, news and 
information utterly, and to think otherwise is to believe that the middle 
ages could have uninvented block printing and gone back to the 
monasteries.   
 
Similarly, Michael Tomasky, in his blog at The Guardian’s website, suggests that 
Murdoch’s paywall plans indicate that the media mogul lacks an understanding 
of the nature of news online. He argues that The Wall Street Journal and the 
Financial Times work on a subscription system because “you can charge global 
financial elites to read a tailored product of financial news” (Tomasky, 2009). 
But there are a lot of things you can’t charge for, he argues – including gossip, 
sports, and the soft porn that populates some of the UK’s tabloids. Maybe, 
suggests Tomasky, Murdoch “knows something the rest of the world doesn’t. 
He often [does]. Or maybe he’s just losing his touch.”   
 
Arianna Huffington (2009), founder of online-only, US-based news 
aggregation and comment site, The Huffington Post, believes that thanks to the 
combination of “transformative technology, the advent of sites such as 
Craigslist, dramatic changes in consumer habits, and the dire impact the 
economic crisis has had on advertising” – the paywall is history. Subsequently, 
we are living through a “Golden Age” for news consumers, she argues, thanks 
to the geographical freedom and egalitarian nature of the web. The mistake is 
to believe that the future of journalism is dependent on newspapers; it’s not, 
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according to Huffington, and the best way to ensure its survival is to embrace a 
hybrid future, “where old media players embrace the ways of new media 
(including transparency, interactivity and immediacy) and new media 
companies adopt the best practices of old media (including fairness, accuracy 
and high-impact investigative journalism)”.   
 
New media researcher Clay Shirky (2010) argues that Murdoch’s 
paywall decision is significant because people are taking it as a serious move in 
the development of online news – in a way that they didn’t when The New York 
Times introduced TimesSelect50 in 2005. Shirky argues: “to the newspaper world, 
TimesSelect looked like an experiment. The Times and Sunday Times look like a 
referendum on the future”. But he argues that it is wrong to think of paywalls as 
something that will ‘save’ journalism, because as The Times experiment 
demonstrates, they don’t expand the revenue that is available from the existing 
audience – rather they “contract the audience to that subset willing to pay”. 
What paywalls do then, suggests Shirky, is change the nature of newspapers 
online. This is because the very nature of a newspaper is linked to its 
availability to the general public. When newspapers go online and protect their 
information behind a paywall, the proportion of the general public who can 
access that information contracts so dramatically that it changes the very nature 
of the newspaper:  
                                                
50 TimesSelect was The New York Times’ first experiment in paid content online, in which opinion pieces 
were only available to subscribers. However, many of the paid columns were made public by bloggers, 
and two years later the premium service was abolished on the basis that more money could be made 
from advertising fuelled by search engines and search engine optimisation (SEO) ("New York Times to 
close TimesSelect," 2007).  
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One way to think of this transition is that online, the Times has stopped 
being a newspaper, in the sense of a generally available and omnibus 
account of the news of the day, broadly read in the community. Instead, 
it is becoming a newsletter, an outlet supported by, and speaking to, a 
specific and relatively coherent and compact audience. (In this case, the 
Times is becoming the online newsletter of the Tories, the UK’s 
conservative political party, read much less widely than its paper 
counterpart). (Shirky, 2010)  
 
Following this argument to its conclusion, the implications of this sort of change 
are that, despite the success of paywalls, they are not a solution that can protect 
newspapers online because their existence changes the nature of the 
organisation they are trying to protect. Or as Shirky puts it: “This re-
engineering suggests that paywalls don’t and can’t rescue current 
organizational forms. They offer instead yet another transformed alternative to 
it”.  
 
However, Eric Beecher (2010d) argues that for Rupert Murdoch, the 
usual conundrum of finding an online news ‘business model’ does not exist 
because Murdoch’s news businesses operate on another form of currency. 
Beecher suggests that while most discussions of the business model for 
journalism assume that the end result is profit, Murdoch uses a different sort of 
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funding model that “while it appears to lose a lot of money, is highly profitable 
in a different currency – the currency of power and influence”. Beecher argues 
that Murdoch can afford to lose a lot of money on his flagship newspapers – 
such as The Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Post and The Australian – 
because they are worth the investment in power and influence with the 
governments who control his business environment: 
 
Without doubt, there is immense value for News Corp in owning 
strategically positioned newspapers to influence government policies – 
like media and broadcasting legislation, ownership limits, cross-media 
regulations, foreign ownership laws – which have a direct impact on the 
company’s profits.  
 
Further, Beecher argues that the decision to restrict online news content to paid 
subscribers, while presented by many as a gamble, is nothing of the sort. He 
argues instead that “publishers may be slow, but they aren’t stupid. They are 
hardly likely to create a situation that makes life even worse for newspapers 
than it is now” – leaving paywalls as an obvious and necessary solution. 
Beecher argues that it is possible for publishers to make the best of a bad 
situation by adopting three key strategies: publish enough free content – on 
current issues, breaking news, and gossip – to maintain the current audience 
and advertising; charge for ‘value added’ content such as investigative 
reporting, features, analysis and commentary (though Beecher states that “any 
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revenue gained here will be incremental”); and bundle online content with 
newspaper subscriptions as a way of protecting print newspaper circulations (in 
the short term). However, he maintains that these strategies only amount to a 
stop-gap solution, and that none will “solve the burning dilemma of how to 
fund highly-resourced quality journalism”.  
 
The business model as an explanatory frame  
 What will solve Beecher’s (2009e) “burning dilemma of how to fund 
highly-resourced quality journalism”, it is implied, is the right business model. 
But despite the current tendency to employ the term ‘business model’ to 
encapsulate both the malady and the remedy facing contemporary news 
businesses, Froud, Johal, Leaver, Phillips and Williams (2009) argue that business 
model is currently an “indistinct term”, used to mean a variety of different things 
(p. 254). In discussions around the development of online news, the business 
model is used as a rhetorical device to describe the revenue-raising activities of 
media companies, and is often divorced from the broader social context in 
which such businesses operate. Froud et al. argue that the business model is 
best understood as socially located, encompassing both the financial 
characteristics of the firm, but also the varied and socially-shaped demands of 
external stakeholders: 
 
All firms, whether public or private, are embedded within social 
networks of obligation where key stakeholders make influential 
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judgements about firm performance and those judgements then have 
important feedback repercussions on key variables such as share price in 
the private sector or the assessment of value for money in the public 
sector. (p. 255) 
 
That is, while businesses are required to produce revenues, this is just one of the 
measures of performance for just some of their stakeholders. Stakeholder 
demands can be varied and specific depending on the circumstances because 
the question of “how much profit or what kind of product or service is expected (as 
well as the variables used to judge firm performance) vary in different contexts, 
activities and patterns of ownership” (p. 255; original emphasis). In the case of 
journalism, revenue might be one measure of performance for shareholder-
stakeholders, but for other stakeholders, such as audiences and journalists, the 
provision of ‘quality journalism’ may be a more important measure of success.  
 
By adopting Froud et al.’s definition of business model, it can be 
employed as they recommend – “primarily as an analytical device that adds 
understanding, rather than explicitly a prescriptive strategic tool that offers 
managers solutions or templates …” (2006, p. 7).  It also draws attention to the 
way in which stakeholder demands are shaped by the political and economic 
context in which they emerge. For instance, Froud et al. contrast the 
expectations of stakeholders in the German market to the UK one. While the 
German stakeholders measure success in line with the expectations of a social 
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market, the UK experience is very different, and shaped by the particularities 
of its politics:  
 
 … the market-based system of the UK rests on neo-liberal precepts that 
assert the market primacy of shareholders as owners and the capital 
market as a disciplinary check on management slacking. The result is a 
governance system that aims to align management and shareholder 
interests around corporate strategies of increasing shareholder returns. 
(Froud et al., 2006, p. 8) 
 
Thus the expectations of stakeholders are shaped by the specific political and 
economic context in which the business operates. This demonstrates the value 
of attention to the advanced liberal conditions in which news businesses are 
being shaped, which reflects the sorts of conditions Froud et al. outline as 
shaping stakeholder demands in the UK context. 
 
It is also necessary to consider what other sorts of demands and 
measures might be made and used by stakeholders in the case of news 
businesses. Froud et al. (2006) argue that for private businesses, the aim is not 
only one of financial viability, but also credibility in the eyes of the stakeholders. 
The authors argue that this joining of viability and credibility is often achieved 
through the work of narrative, “including company narrative of purpose and 
achievement, industry narrative and grand narrative of economic 
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transformation” (p. 9). Arianna Huffington’s comment about the “Golden Age” 
of news, brought about by the combination of technology, innovation, changes 
in consumption and economic conditions is indicative of the sort of narratives 
that have emerged around the news industry as it adapts to a range of 
challenges, and this narrative itself is situated in relation to the larger ‘grand 
narrative’ of social and economic transformation wrought by the internet. This 
narrative tells us that news businesses need to find a new business model that 
will adapt to the irreversible path of technological evolution along which news 
finds itself intersected.  
 
But there is also a counter-narrative, as demonstrated by Beecher, that 
seeks to question the viability, and especially the credibility, that this narrative 
attempts to secure for online news. Beecher’s counter-narrative questions the 
journalistic credibility of the forms that news takes in this ‘evolution’ as well as 
the financial viability of traditional journalism within this evolved media 
landscape. This is demonstrated throughout his critique of Fairfax Media, and 
specifically, their constant attempts to appease their shareholder-stakeholders 
through the attainment of the best business model, as my later discussion of the 
negotiations over the Fairfax board will illuminate. Rather, the narrative 
espoused by Beecher in his critique of Fairfax challenges the demands of 
stakeholders in news businesses to question not only the financial viability of 
news, but also its journalistic credibility, and demonstrates the multiple levels 
on which a business model can operate.   
 280 
 
As this example indicates, satisfying the demands and measures of 
stakeholders can be further complicated when the business in question has not 
only financial but also social aims. This is so in the case study that Froud et al. 
explore: the BBC – the UK’s increasingly privatised public service broadcaster. 
But it is also true of privately owned or publicly listed news organisations whose 
social role requires vastly different demands and measures of success to its 
financial role. That is, the production of journalism, the very product that is 
being sold, can also be in conflict with the business imperatives of that 
company. In the example that I outline later in this chapter, Fairfax Media 
demonstrates the tensions between the social expectations of a news business 
whose journalism, in order to satisfy the demands of its traditional social role, 
requires levels of funding in conflict with the financial expectations of its 
shareholder-stakeholders.  Similarly, Froud et al. argue that the sorts of services 
offered by a public sector organisation, which in its social role can be taken as 
analogous to news organisations, cannot be “easily or wholly reduced to simple 
measures of efficiency or value for money” (2006, p. 11).  
 
This resonates with Thompson’s (1986) argument that a firm necessarily 
consists of disparate centres of action, and multiple and sometimes conflicting 
objectives – rather than the “organic unity” drawn together by management, as 
is often presented (p. 175). Thompson suggests that the firm is best understood 
as a “heterogeneous non-unitary, dispersed and fractured entity or social 
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agency” (p. 177; original emphasis). In this conception, the firm becomes the 
site of reconciliation of a range of objectives and expectations that are 
articulated, negotiated and juxtaposed – but not necessarily with a unified 
outcome. This conception of the firm is in direct opposition to the dominant 
understanding of the firm as a singular unitary identity. Thus it follows that 
there can be “no overarchingly unambiguous or fully coherent ‘meta-objective’ 
for the firm” but only a “shifting series of conflicting, contradictory and 
contingent partial ‘objectives’ organized with respect to particular knowledges 
and ‘interests’” (p. 178). Such contradictory objectives are clearly in play when 
journalism becomes compromised as media firms deal with current financial 
pressures. In a financialised environment, with a regime of shareholder value, 
the financial objectives of media firms are more pressing, and displace the 
broader social objectives of the firm. Further, there is no meta-objective that 
encompasses both the financial and social objectives of the news firm, thus the 
struggle to find a prescriptive business model to accommodate both. It is in its 
absence that the tension between the two arms of the business arises.  
 
The BBC example outlined by Froud et al. also demonstrates that the 
balance between financial viability and political credibility can often be 
maintained until there is a major shift or adjustment required of a business. In 
the case of the BBC, this came with the broadcaster’s expansion into digital 
services. It was an expansion that required many more hours of programming 
material that was achieved at first by the provision of cheaper programs and 
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more repeats. But while this provided financial viability, regulators in the form 
of the BBC’s Board of Governor’s held the broadcaster to account for lacking 
the prestige – or credibility – that their quality measures demanded. They 
insisted the BBC do better, and they did, committing to 7,000 hours more new 
and original programming a year. This placed pressure on the business model, 
which was further compounded by the situation of expensive compulsory 
outsourcing placed upon the BBC by a succession of government privatisation 
arrangements. Under these conditions, the BBC was forced to “adjust internal 
labour costs” – that is, make job cuts. But while they present this as the only 
alternative for the BBC in order to balance viability and credibility, Froud et al. 
do not present this as sustainable, particularly if workers take action against 
these moves. Rather, the authors argue that what this model suggests is the 
need for a new kind of regulation which is framed not by the “preoccupations 
with markets, consumer choice and corporate power” (2006, p. 24) of 
mainstream economic analyses, but rather in terms of the business model. Such 
an approach would be broader in its scope and socially grounded, able to 
account for “political credibility and the interaction between composition of 
costs and the politically sponsored expectations of key stakeholders at the 
business level” (p. 24). In terms of our study, it demonstrates the way in which 
what was once a sustainable business model can become stressed to the point 
that it becomes unsustainable when new challenges arise. Below, I outline the 
way in which Fairfax Media provides a similar example, and further, the way in 
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which the reaction of Crikey demonstrates the tensions that arise when one 
element of a business model – or one particular objective – dominates the rest.   
 
The Fairfax board  
In recent years, Fairfax Media has become perhaps the most troubled 
media company in Australia. I will demonstrate how many of the troubles the 
company has encountered have arisen from tensions between the management 
and editorial branches of the company, and particularly, the make-up and 
direction of the company’s board of directors. Among the board’s many critics, 
Eric Beecher and Crikey have been some of the most vocal, positioning 
themselves as ardent opponents of the board’s finance-based decision-making 
at the expense of editorial investment. Within the recent history considered by 
this research, Beecher’s criticism of the Fairfax board first arose when then 
CEO David Kirk announced plans to reduce the broadsheet newspapers’ (The 
Age and The SMH) size by around 14 per cent, to a “slightly narrower 
broadsheet” (but not tabloid) size – something that never eventuated (Kirk, 
2007; Ricketson & Williams, 2008). Kirk presented this as a move by the board 
to deliver what readers “keep telling us they want”. But Beecher argues that 
this announcement was used to hide the economic rationale and consequences 
behind it, including the 35 jobs and unspecified editorial space that would be 
lost due to the reduction in size. Beecher asks:  
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Why couldn’t they simply follow the Fairfax editorial mantra: tell the 
truth. That profits from Fairfax’s major newspapers are likely to decline 
substantially over coming years (like most major comparable newspapers 
throughout the world). That the reduction in page size is to save money 
… That in all probability there will be a net loss of editorial space when 
the page size is cut. (Beecher, 2007)  
 
By February of the next year the discontent at Fairfax centred on the then 
editor of The Age, Andrew Jaspan, who, editorial staff claimed, threatened their 
independence, and who was in turn in an increasingly compromised 
relationship with senior management (Simons, 2008a).   
 
In April of 2008, Margaret Simons reported on an ‘extraordinary 
meeting’ between The Age editor Andrew Jaspan and 235 editorial staff who 
voted that he was compromising their independence, particularly with 
reference to a number of sponsorships and partnerships made at a managerial 
or board level (Simons, 2008a). This came shortly after allegations by Crikey 
that the newspaper’s coverage of Earth Hour was compromised by their 
sponsorship of the event (Green, 2008b). Simons argues that the situation that 
emerged between Jaspan and the editorial staff essentially represented a motion 
of no confidence in the newspaper’s editor, but also provided evidence of 
deeper problems at the media company: 
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The fact that things were allowed to deteriorate to this stage is evidence 
of spectacularly poor management not only by Jaspan but by his 
superiors – Victorian Chief Executive Don Churchill, Fairfax CEO 
David Kirk and the Fairfax Board (Simons, 2008a).  
 
Similarly, Eric Beecher argues that the incident points to larger problems 
within Fairfax, which are chiefly found at the level of the board and 
management. Beecher (2008f) believes that the Fairfax board was ill equipped 
to face the range of problems facing newspaper journalism and the challenges 
that lay ahead as it continued to converge with the internet:  
 
Fairfax is in a bad way. It has no proprietor who understands media, its 
board works chiefly in the interests of its institutional investors, its share 
price is wallowing well below the levels of the sharemarket correction, its 
broadsheet business model has run out of growth and may be broken, its 
classified advertising base is eroding, it has been beaten by internet 
competitors in all key classified advertising categories, its editors have 
become marketeers, many of its journalists hold their owners and editors 
in contempt and its websites and in part its newspapers are being 
dumbed-down every day to reach a popular audience to replace a 
serious one. 
 
 286 
However, despite the public nature of the incident, and the vocal concern from 
Crikey, within Fairfax there was only denial and counter-strike, with CEO 
David Kirk hitting back at journalists who leaked audio of the meeting to Crikey, 
and arguing that “Fairfax Media has never been in better shape” ("Kirk: 
Fairfax Media," 2008). He continues: “I do not need any lessons in the issues 
surrounding ‘quality journalism’ from Eric Beecher. Crikey’s standards are 
hardly a credit to quality journalism”.  
 
But by August 2008 it was harder for Fairfax to hide their woes, with the 
media company announcing cuts of 550 staff across operations in Australia and 
New Zealand, including up to 55 (or 14 per cent of) editorial staff at The Age – 
despite the week earlier posting a net profit increase of 47 per cent for the year 
(Ricketson, 2008d). The cuts were presented as a necessary and ultimately 
positive step by Kirk, who argued that the 5 per cent staff cut – which was met 
with a commensurate 5 per cent rise in the company’s share price – was 
necessary for Fairfax if they were to “succeed in the modern media world” 
(Hogan & Ricketson, 2008). Included in the cull was beleaguered Age editor 
Andrew Jaspan, who stepped down on the day of the announcement – 27 
August 2008 (Green, 2008a). The following day, Beecher commented in Crikey 
on the lack of reflection on this latest incident, and those before it, from within 
Fairfax itself, arguing that there is “a distinct odour of internal censorship on 
this subject inside the Fairfax quality newspapers” (Beecher, 2008e). He argued 
that the silence from within Fairfax about its own demise suggests that the 
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newspapers and their journalism are not only financially compromised, but that 
the “pincer attack on fearless and independent journalism isn’t confined to 
sacking staff. It is editorial as well as commercial” – proving, he suggests, that 
editorial independence, as well as numbers, is under siege from management at 
Fairfax.   
 
Despite – or because of – Beecher’s claims, a week later The Age’s media 
and communications editor Matthew Ricketson addressed the cuts and their 
context in a longer piece of analysis (Ricketson, 2008g). He positions the rise of 
the internet as the root cause of the cuts, and Fairfax’s current financial 
challenges – but not only because of the commercial threat it poses. Ricketson 
also explores the way in which the rise of the internet as a journalistic tool has 
worked to undermine the traditional methods that fuelled the investigative ‘real 
world’ journalism for which Fairfax became famous. He does also consider the 
threat that the internet poses to the newspaper ‘business model’, and 
interestingly, apportions some of the blame to former Fairfax head Fred Hilmer 
for failing to transfer their classified monopoly from print to online. Perhaps 
most startling, the statistic that “in 2003 The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald 
accounted for about 75% of Fairfax revenue; today they make up about 25%” 
(Ricketson, 2008g). Despite reiterating Kirk’s claims that the staff cuts will not 
affect editorial priorities, Ricketson concludes by questioning how the 
newspaper’s tradition of journalism will stand up to this further most recent 
challenge.  
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In the aftermath of this series of incidents, former Age editor (from 1997–
2004) Michael Gawenda delivered the 2008 AN Smith Lecture in Journalism 
in his new role as the Director of the Centre for Advanced Journalism at the 
University of Melbourne. In the lecture he was highly critical of the recent 
direction of the Fairfax board in its management of its newspapers and 
approach to journalism. He argues that there is a “confusion and lack of 
confidence at Fairfax about newspapers” (Gawenda, 2008a, p. 7) that pervades 
the recent management of the organisation, and in particular, the recent staff 
cuts. This lack of confidence is best typified, he suggests, by the editorial 
approach to the 2007 federal election. Gawenda begins by describing the sort 
of confidence that surrounded journalistic culture during his years as a young 
journalist in the 1970s. In that era, editorial staff regarded their job with a 
certain weight, and editorials he argues, “were written with a tone of 
confidence, confidence that readers wanted and expected the paper to take 
positions on matters that mattered to them and their community” (p. 6). 
Gawenda contrasts this to the editorial that ran in The Age on the eve of the 
federal election, 2007, in which the paper stated that they would not make a 
judgement as to which party ought to form the next government, as it 
traditionally had, because “the paper did not believe its role was to tell readers 
how to vote” (p. 6). Gawenda argues that this statement represents a “sort of 
surrender”, revealing a “fundamental misunderstanding of the role of editorials 
and an even more fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between a 
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newspaper and its readers” (p. 6). This episode in The Age’s history, Gawenda 
suggests, encapsulates the fact that “newspapers are unsure of their role and 
deeply unsure of their future” (p. 6).   
 
Like Beecher, Gawenda’s criticism of Fairfax rests squarely on the 
shoulders of the board, which he argues has lost confidence in the company’s 
newspapers and can no longer see a future for them:  
 
At a time of transition and great challenges for the newspapers, Fairfax 
… was run by people who had no experience of the business, no 
knowledge of its history and role in the communities in which their 
newspapers operated and what’s more, no great love of them. 
(Gawenda, 2008a, p. 11) 
 
He attacks the board for its inadequate response to the loss of Fairfax’s 
classifieds monopoly, labelling its online classified sites (such as real estate 
website Domain, and cars website, Drive) “disappointing” (p. 11). Gawenda 
describes the process he saw unfold during his seven years as editor at The Age, 
wherein “journalism became content, reporters became content providers, the 
newspaper became a content platform” (p. 8). This change in nomenclature, 
Gawenda suggests, is symptomatic of an attitude that no longer values 
journalism in and of itself, but rather primarily as a business product. He 
suggests that the board, lacking in newspaper experience, was one of the first to 
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lead a newspaper company in Australia to reduce journalism to its business 
elements ..., and in doing so “junk[ed] the history and traditions of newspapers 
and journalism” at the company (p. 8). 
 
 The contents of Gawenda’s speech predictably caused a ripple in the 
local media. But confirming his earlier suggestion of internal censorship at the 
Fairfax papers around such matters, Beecher notes that the Fairfax coverage of 
Gawenda’s speech diverged from that of the Murdoch-owned papers on one 
important point (Beecher, 2008d). While The Age and The SMH boldly 
published Gawenda’s criticism, they omitted his pointed criticism of the Fairfax 
board, while The Australian did not (see Gawenda, 2008b, 2008c). Beecher 
suggests that Gawenda’s lecture made public what many media insiders have 
known for years – that “Australia’s premier newspaper publisher was (and 
largely still is) run by people with no experience of or love for newspapers” 
(Beecher, 2008d). Further, he agrees with Gawenda that there is a place, and a 
business model, for quality newspapers in the local media landscape: “It’s just 
that the people running Fairfax don’t even know how to start conceiving it”.   
 
 The defence from Fairfax came a week later in the form of CEO David 
Kirk’s (2008) address to the Sydney Institute. In the address, Kirk defends the 
recent moves by his company, arguing that they will not affect the quality 
journalism that distinguishes Fairfax’s publications. He positions himself as a 
supporter of the role of a free press in a democracy, and to that end is 
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committed to investigative journalism and the provision of insight and 
information for the benefit of civic society through the Fairfax press. Further, 
Kirk specifically addresses the criticism of Beecher and Gawenda:  
 
I must say it is galling to have to listen to the self-appointed experts 
prattle from the sidelines. Some people think we should give up the fight. 
Eric Beecher has been a poisonous critic of our company, for reasons 
best known to him … a self-proclaimed champion of the cause of quality 
journalism in Australia, and publisher of that quality online site, Crikey, 
telling us to roll over and die.51 (Kirk, 2008)  
 
But Kirk insists, “We won’t be throwing in the towel”. Similarly, he lashes out 
at Gawenda, criticising his “prescription” for a niche newspaper with a smaller 
circulation, premium cover price, and no lifestyle segments. Kirk notes 
Gawenda’s comment that such a publication would require a smaller staff than 
present – “I daresay, under Gawenda, there would be many more staff cuts at 
the Herald and The Age than we have contemplated”. But this defensive move by 
Kirk did not help much. By early December 2008 he was no longer Fairfax 
CEO, announcing his resignation following pressure from board members 
(Ricketson, 2008c).  
 
                                                
51 This is in response to Beecher’s comments on (ABC Television current affairs program) Lateline, when 
asked by journalist Virginia Trioli, “What would you do with Fairfax if you got your hands on it 
tomorrow? “ to which he responded, “Well, the first option would be to sell it or break it up and sell it. 
That’s what I would do … the problem is, if you owned 100 per cent of it and there wasn’t a share 
market to deal with, yeah, you could do lots of things with it … but whilst you’ve got a share register 
which is just open like theirs, no I don’t think there’s anything you can do (Trioli, 2008).  
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 But this only sparked a new controversy, this time surrounding Ron 
Walker, one, Fairfax chairman, and one of Kirk’s few supporters on the board. 
With Kirk gone, Walker’s chairmanship became the new issue of tension, 
symbolic of the problems facing the board and the company in general. 
Following Kirk’s departure, Beecher wrote of the deep problems facing the 
company:    
 
The problems at Fairfax will get worse, not better, unless and until 
someone sacks the company’s board of directors … Fairfax Media is 
suffering from an almost total absence of direction, strategy, 
comprehension of its problems or understanding of its business … The 
culpability for the smoking mess at Fairfax, and for the death-by-a-
thousand-cuts of Australia’s best journalism at The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The Age, lies entirely with the board. (Beecher, 2008c)  
 
He is particularly scathing towards Walker, who released an announcement of 
Kirk’s resignation, praising his work at the company. “These are the words of a 
chairman of a company that has been hijacked and destroyed by a board of 
directors whose epitaph will read: They murdered Australia’s best journalism 
and newspapers without knowing what they were doing” (Beecher, 2008c). 
Beecher had found a new target for his rage, and it was reignited when Walker 
became embroiled in a public feud with the Fairfax family over the direction of 
the board and company in 2009.   
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In September 2009, John B. Fairfax and his son Nicholas made public 
their dissatisfaction with Walker’s chairmanship when the latter announced his 
intention to delay his retirement from the position for another year. The 
Fairfax family, who owns 9.7 per cent of Fairfax Media through their private 
company Marinya Media, responded by announcing they could no longer 
support Walker’s stewardship of the company, and would vote to dump him at 
the upcoming October Annual General Meeting:  
 
Marinya, for one, cannot see how Mr Walker’s stated intention to delay 
his retirement assists the company or its shareholders. It unnecessarily 
defers the commencement of the much-needed process of board and 
leadership renewal and we consider it inappropriate that a departing 
chairman would be influential in the choice of new directors (Oakes & 
Huxley, 2009).   
 
While Walker had the support of most of the board, the Fairfax family carry a 
substantial degree of clout within the media itself, and the following day 
Beecher came out in support of the Fairfax family, and soundly against Walker. 
He argued that Walker had failed as chairman to address the company’s 
biggest challenge in recent history, and failed to provide a plan for the future 
(Beecher, 2009a). He claimed that Walker and the board had failed Fairfax and 
that for the sake of the company he needed to step down: 
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To have any chance of surviving the media industry maelstrom, Fairfax 
needs to be guided by people like the Fairfax family, who understand 
newspapers and journalism, and others like them … Ron Walker should 
think hard about legacy  —  his own and Fairfax’s. Then he should 
gracefully resign. (Beecher, 2009a)  
 
By the end of September, Walker was announcing his decision to step down – 
“in view of the unfortunate developments of the previous few weeks” (Zappone, 
2009) – indicating an apparent truce between himself and the Fairfax family, 
who had originally opposed the ascent of Walker’s deputy Roger Corbett into 
his position, but seemed to reach an agreement to that end. But despite 
Walker’s resignation, Beecher remained adamant that the Fairfax board was 
mismanaging what was once Australia’s premier journalism company. He 
argues that Roger Corbett, “former grocer” (as CEO of the Woolworths 
supermarket chain) was not fit to lead a troubled media company at such a 
difficult time, illustrating this with an anecdote about an earlier encounter with 
Corbett, some five years prior, when asked to present to the Fairfax board 
about its company’s future. Beecher describes how he presented a “Catastrophe 
Scenario” based on the loss of a large portion of the company’s classified 
advertising – a scenario that is startlingly realistic today. Beecher tells of 
Corbett’s disdain for him and the scenario he was presenting, and his inability 
to conceive of the likelihood of such a scenario: 
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Throughout most of the hour I talked, Roger Corbett prowled the back 
of the Fairfax boardroom like a caged tiger, his body language 
suggesting a disdain for me and for what I was saying. After I finished 
speaking, Corbett moved to the head of the board table. Picking up a 
copy of one of Fairfax’s hefty Saturday broadsheets from a nearby pile, 
he told his fellow directors that he didn’t want anyone coming into the 
Fairfax boardroom again suggesting that people will buy houses or cars 
or look for jobs without “this”, as he held up the newspaper bulging with 
classified ads. (Beecher, 2009d)   
 
Despite this attitude, Corbett was indeed elected to lead the company, being 
unanimously named the chairman of the board in mid-October 2009 ("Roger 
Corbett named Fairfax chairman," 2009). What followed was a period of 
relative calm for the company under Corbett’s leadership until the events of 
late 2010 saw more trouble in the media company.  
 
In November 2010, Fairfax CEO (since Kirk’s outing in 2008) Brian 
McCarthy presented his vision for the future of Fairfax with the release of his 
updated strategic plan for the company. The plan proposed an integrated 
Fairfax across print and online operations, something that many within and 
outside of the media company saw as essential to ensuring the success of both 
arms and better relations between staff. But aside from this structural proposal, 
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the strategy failed to address the problem of “how Fairfax plans to better 
monetise its digital presence” (Bartholomeusz, 2010b). Two weeks after the 
release of McCarthy’s strategy, he was gone too – he said it was because he 
could not commit to the position for the three to five years the board 
demanded of him, but others suggest it was because his strategy had been 
underwhelming and he had lost the confidence of the board (Chessell & Clegg, 
2010) or that a power struggle over the filling of management positions had 
emerged between him and Corbett (Day, 2010b). Just prior to McCarthy’s 
departure an anonymous group of “concerned citizens” – including several 
former Age executives – released a document, ‘The Age: a litany of decline’, 
damning the paper’s management, calling for urgent action to save the paper 
(Day, 2010c) and forming the basis of a campaign to demonstrate a public vote 
of no confidence in Fairfax management to take place in the coming year.   
 
Following McCarthy’s departure, Beecher again decried the failure of 
Fairfax to confront its problems, specifically locating the problem at the level of 
the business model, not at the level of commitment to quality journalism, as he 
has previously: 
 
The truth is that “quality journalism” (whatever that means) or the “very 
best” is not enough. The solutions to the future of newspapers such as 
the Herald and The Age lie in their business models, not just in their 
journalism … They need to be totally re-invented, editorially and 
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commercially, from top to toe … Otherwise they will take a large chunk 
of Australia’s most important institutional journalism down with them. 
(Beecher, 2010a) 
 
For Beecher, the champion of quality journalism, this is a remarkable shift of 
focus. It represents an admission that the pursuit of ‘quality journalism’ is no 
longer the sole determinant of the business success of journalism. However, it 
does not represent an abandonment – quality journalism still remains central to 
his vision of the future of journalism online.  
 
 Beecher’s direct acknowledgement of the necessity of finding a viable 
business model to underpin the quality journalism he seeks to secure is an 
important step in safeguarding his authority as an expert on the business of 
journalism. But it has little to do with Crikey, which already has a successful 
business model. This model involves a dual income stream with revenues raised 
from both advertising and subscriptions. Beecher admits that this model, while 
successful for Crikey, is unlikely to be adapted to other publications (E. Beecher, 
personal communication, 13 March 2009). Further, this model is also sustained 
by Crikey’s unique position in the media as an independent but reliable insider 
voice, and it is unclear whether the Australian media landscape could support 
another similar publication. What this reveals about Crikey and the discussion of 
the future news business model is twofold. First, Crikey, in its structure and 
business model, is more like what Shirky (2010) calls a “transformed 
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alternative” to the traditional newspaper model. Shirky argues that as news 
organisations erect paywalls around news content online, and their audiences 
contract, these sites become less like the newspapers they originated from, and 
more like online newsletters. Crikey already is an online newsletter, and in this 
it represents the sort of online alternative Shirky is describing. Secondly, 
Crikey’s successful business model, given its basis on such a different mode of 
news provision, cannot be offered as a widespread alternative in the search for 
a business model for quality newspaper journalism. It is these two facts in 
combination that, if acknowledged, could work to undermine Beecher’s, and 
Crikey’s, authority. But in downplaying these facts, and in working to maintain 
Crikey’s professional status in the mainstream media as outlined in Chapter 
Four, Beecher seeks to maintain a central position for himself and Crikey in 
negotiations about journalism’s future.  
 
Indeed, as Beecher’s at times highly emotive engagement suggests, the 
series of recent events encompassing the Fairfax board expose the highly 
political nature of the current state of news and journalism. And while 
financially driven decisions on the part of the Fairfax board demonstrate an 
uncomfortable awareness of the economic realities of the contemporary news 
industry – realities that even Beecher, for all his idealism, is able to 
acknowledge – this does not mean that such decisions will secure and sustain 
journalism’s future. Rather, the moves at Fairfax, while financially necessary at 
a business and shareholder level, continue to undercut the quality journalism 
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for which the company has become known. Indeed, while decisions to prioritise 
the financial stability of the company over its journalistic reputation have led to 
a tumultuous time for the media company, there is no saying that the decision 
to prioritise its journalism would not have been equally tumultuous. As this 
quandary suggests, the problem for news businesses and journalists alike arise 
because these two branches of news – the journalism and the business model – 
that were once comfortably and successfully paired under different political and 
economic conditions, have come adrift. The challenge now for news producers 
is to find a path that values both imperatives – the journalism, and the 
business52. However, it is not safe to assume that just because society has always 
had or ‘needed’ journalism, it will continue to survive. It is an unfortunate 
reality that current political economic conditions may mean that socially 
concerned journalism will always struggle – or that it will only survive where it 
can identify a niche business model, as Crikey did. The hope is that a model – or 
number of models – will be found that allow for the coexistence and balance 
between journalism’s social, political and economic imperatives. It is presently 
impossible to say what this or these model(s) might be, or whether they will 
indeed be ‘found’ and tested. But that is not to say that it is impossible. 
                                                
52 Indeed, while this will by no means involve a rejection of the necessity of a business model for 
journalism, it will require an acknowledgement of the sort of business model that is necessary to secure 
journalism’s future. That is, the sustainability of journalism (online and elsewhere) requires a business 
model that grasps and values a broad conception of the news business, rather than a model with a 
narrow, solely financial focus. While a business model that focuses on the ‘financials’ – perhaps of the 
sort found at Fairfax – may be successful in the short term, evidence suggests that it is incapable of 
sustaining journalism’s broader traditional social and political remit in the long term.     
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis ends with what must sound by now like a familiar tale. On 
the eve of submission, the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011) has 
released its latest annual report on the news industry in the US. Among its most 
striking findings is the revelation that, for the first time, more people reported 
getting their news from internet sources than newspapers. While television 
continues to be the leading source of news for Americans, the internet is closing 
the gap between first and second place. Significantly for those who say the 
struggle between print news and internet sources is not one of readership but of 
advertising, the report found that online advertising spending has surpassed 
print newspaper advertising for the first time. This thesis has argued that print 
journalism is being embraced by a broad crisis, and this latest empirical 
evidence adds to that which was offered in Chapter One to establish the nature 
of this crisis.  
 
While the symptoms of the crisis are expressed through advertising 
spending and readership figures, its source is less easily conveyed. A changing 
technological environment, generational differences, a declining trust in the 
authority of journalists, and a qualitative shift in the practices of journalism are 
all held up as possible causes of this crisis. These various accounts swirl around 
the production, consumption, discussion and deliberation of online news, 
rhetorics that tap into familiar narratives about journalism’s already-written 
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decline. In opposition to these are the counter arguments about journalism’s 
renewal online, with the availability of new technologies posited as opening the 
way for a new, closer relationship between audiences and journalists, the 
democratisation of news production so that ‘anyone can publish’, and an 
increased civic or public role for journalism.  
 
As I indicated in Chapter One, these competing rhetorics exist in 
opposition, suggesting either threat or opportunity in the advent of the internet 
and its intersection with the practices of journalism. But while this opposition 
makes for an interesting point of intervention into the arguments that surround 
the development of online news, they neither accurately describe the problems 
facing journalism, nor its possible solutions. As I outlined in Chapter Two, the 
genealogical approach allows for a more constructive take on the nature of this 
problem, through consideration of the way in which particular areas of social 
life are shaped into commonly held problems. By positioning journalism as a 
domain of action that has been shaped into a shared social problem, this thesis 
has been able to more precisely describe the historical nature of that problem.  
 
In Chapter Three I outlined the way in which ‘the problem of news’ is 
deeply political. While for working journalists and the businesses that employ 
them the crisis affecting journalism is about financial losses, these concerns are 
underpinned by a concern about journalism’s traditional political role. This 
traditional model positioned the press as a fourth estate and additional check to 
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government power. The fear is that with the decline in traditional journalism, 
democracy will be less robust, its citizens less engaged. However, by 
demonstrating that journalism has long existed in a problematic and changing 
relationship with politics, any presumptions that this relationship is natural or 
essential are left on shaky ground. Rather, by working to position journalism as 
a cultural technology within a broad, governmental approach to politics, it is 
possible to see that journalism’s relationship to politics is not fixed but shifts in 
relation to changing political rationalities. It is the relatively recent shift from 
more socially-oriented incarnations of liberal government to forms of advanced 
liberalism, and the associated changes to journalism, that are of most concern 
to those who decry the loss of journalism as a fourth estate. I have argued that 
by decoupling journalism from its fourth estate role, a more productive, precise 
and mobile concept of journalism as a cultural technology can be grasped and 
used in description and analysis.  
 
For instance, in Chapter Four I extended this approach to consider the 
way journalistic autonomy is used to shape journalism as a governmental 
technology in a range of political programs, but especially as part of the self-
government of its own professional status. Within the changing professional 
environment, rhetorics of professionalism proliferate in attempts to secure 
journalistic authority in the face of perceived threats, like the one to the 
traditional newspaper audience posed by shifting news consumption habits 
outlined above. But in this environment, independent online news sites like 
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Crikey find themselves compromised by their twin desires for professional status, 
as well as recognition of their authenticity as alternatives to the mainstream 
media. In comparison, The Age Online embodies a changed professionalism 
online, particularly in comparison to the print newspaper from which it is made 
both culturally and structurally separate.   
 
In Chapter Five I added to my political analysis by considering the way 
in which advanced liberal rationalities of government are reshaping the 
relations between audiences, news, and journalists. I describe how, in the 
conditions of advanced liberalism, audiences and journalists are increasingly 
brought into new, closer relations with one another. This refiguring of time and 
space between audiences and news producers has been popularly positioned as 
either a positive step towards the democratisation of news, or as a threat to the 
traditional journalistic news judgement that enshrines journalism’s fourth estate 
role. I map the way in which these changed relations are symptomatic of 
Thrift’s (2005, 2006) description of a broader refiguring of relations between 
producers and consumers in intensified and sped-up capitalist conditions. This 
refiguring can have swift disruptive impacts, as illustrated in the example of 
Catherine Deveny, an Age columnist who was sacked following a spate of 
negative readers’ comments in response to remarks made on her Twitter 
account.  
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This event is marked by the market populist logic that has come to 
infuse increasing areas of our social life. Deveny was sacked in response to the 
loud and clear voice of ‘the public’, exercising their voice as consumers. But I 
have suggested that another way to think of this event is as an expression of the 
operation of social network markets, the presence of which indicates the 
existence of creative industries as defined by Potts, et al. (2008). It was the 
negotiation of the value of Deveny’s contribution to The Age (Online) within the 
social network constituted by active consumer-commenters on that site that 
determined her value to that network and prompted her dismissal. The creative 
industries framework is instructive here because of the way it can be used to 
analyse the activities of social network markets. In my fifth chapter I have 
aimed to convey that this framework is of central importance to the 
development of online news, not only because of the way in which it is 
informing the framing, education, and training of professional journalism, but 
also because of the way that its politics brings journalism into being in quite 
specific ways. That is, the creative industries research and policy agenda 
positions news producers and consumers in a changed relationship, informed 
by a neoliberal focus on the market.   
 
In Chapter Six I isolated the financial element of online news, 
considering the way in which the business model is presented as central to its 
development. While the rhetoric of the business model permeates discussions of 
journalism’s future, as a concept it is of limited utility because of what it 
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conceals. That is, the rhetoric of the business model seeks to detach the 
financial element of journalism from its broader social, political and cultural 
roles and is thus unable to account for the influence they have on the success of 
journalism. It is only with a broader understanding of the range of social groups 
with some sort of stake in the production of news that any assessment can begin 
to be made about its ability to survive in the future. While this of course 
requires a financial viability, it also requires maintenance (even in a 
transformed manner) of some sort of broader social role for journalism, and I 
argue, a continued consideration of what journalism can do for politics.    
 
What then can be said about the future of news and journalism in light 
of this thesis’ investigation? While my aim throughout has been to suggest a 
constructive separation of journalism from its fourth estate role, I do not 
propose an apolitical journalism. Rather, I argue that journalism is deeply 
political given its status as a cultural technology, and thus always operating in 
relation to specific political rationalities and programs. However, I have also 
aimed to map the history of journalism’s fourth estate role and the way in 
which current historical conditions are dismantling this perceived traditional 
model. With this broader political and historical understanding, journalism’s 
relationship with politics remains, though it is re-imagined beyond the fourth 
estate. Further, the fourth estate is recognised as an untenable ideal, and it is 
the uncompromised commitment to it that brings discomfort to those railing 
against the current shifts occurring within journalism practices.  
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One remedy offered in the US is the public journalism movement, but 
this is underpinned by a populist logic that conceals the many social inequalities 
it seeks to address. Nonetheless, we can find promise in one of its central 
elements, perhaps not in the way its proponents imagine. Here I refer to the 
increased ‘interactivity’ or new closeness emerging between consumers and 
producers of content online. What Thrift has described as a reconfigured 
spatial and temporal relationship, bringing consumers into the processes of 
innovation, resonates with Keane’s (2009) description of monitory democracy 
in which “[q]uestions are raised about which SUVs are most likely to roll over, 
and which companies retail the worst fast food, and which are the biggest 
polluters” (p. 19). This new intersection between producers and consumers is 
suggestive of a way forward.  
 
Keane’s monitory democracy is a far more useful rendering of 
journalism’s political possibilities replete as it is with the acknowledgement that 
it does not present an idealistic or utopian view of future democracy. Monitory 
democracy is, of course, political – it is even democratic – but without being 
attached to the objectives of a fourth estate. It accounts for and indeed exploits 
the changing media environment in which journalism now operates and in 
which audiences as consumers have access to worlds of information that were 
once beyond their reach. Within this environment, too, consumers are more 
willing to use their time, knowledge and skills to produce content and wrangle 
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information for free. Wikipedia epitomises the ever more prominent practices 
of non-market innovation in which people take part for altruistic reasons: 
“people put information up on the web or contribute to Wikipedia, mostly 
anonymously, simply because they think it is a good thing to do” (Quiggin & 
Potts, 2008, p. 146). It is in this “gift exchange model”, alongside which 
Quiggin (in Quiggin & Potts, 2008) argues there is a growing importance of 
“collective innovation of individuals and households” (p. 147) that models of 
‘computational journalism’ explored by Daniel et al. (2010) can be said to 
operate. As outlined in Chapter One, these models of journalism provide a 
larger space for the routine innovation of individuals alongside the expertise 
and reach of journalists.  
 
These examples are suggestive of a vision of journalism’s future that can 
cut through the ‘threat or opportunity’ dichotomy, maintaining the political 
importance of journalism, but decoupling it from its fourth estate ideal. While 
acknowledging the way in which practices of journalism are being radically 
reshaped, these examples maintain a place for journalism without seeking a 
return to a former era. The tussles, struggles, disagreements, decisions and 
negotiations that fill the pages of this thesis suggest that the political, economic 
and cultural changes that are found within journalism come for some at a great 
cost. For those, like Eric Beecher, invested in maintaining journalism’s 
traditional political role, this might mean the re-imagining of the way in which 
his public trust model for journalism might be fulfilled. And while a return to 
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the journalistic models of social liberalism is not a battle likely to be won, 
advanced liberal politics has not rendered journalists completely redundant. 
Rather, there is a continuing need for the expertise of journalists, through the 
cultural technology of journalism, as part of the complex task of governing 
populations in an advanced liberal political rationality.    
 
I would like to conclude by pointing out a suggestive connection 
between the communicative abundance that Keane argues makes possible new 
forms of monitory democracy, and Schudson’s (2010) call for the continued 
need for journalists-as-experts. Schudson begins by outlining Walter 
Lippmann’s call in 1920 for the establishment of ‘political observatories’ to 
make sense of the growing complexity of modern life. In the contemporary 
political environment the sorts of observatories Lippmann imagined have 
flourished. They take the form of non-government organisations, research 
bodies, advocacy groups, and increasingly, government agencies that are 
themselves involved in the monitoring of government. In short, these 
observatories are involved in the multiple tasks and processes of Keane’s 
monitory democracy. This proliferation of expert bodies does not make the 
work of journalists obsolete. Rather, Schudson argues that the “matters of 
professional training, experience, and judgement are as or more important than 
ever” (p. 6). In Schudson’s vision of a possible future journalism, these monitory 
bodies work alongside (a changed) journalism:  
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The population of news organizations in 2012 or 2020 will likely have 
many newspapers, but smaller, leaner staffs than today. It will have 
many new, online-only organisations run by a handful or a couple dozen 
journalists, perhaps with a significantly larger set of loyal readers who 
also serve as scouts, correspondents, or citizen journalists. It may have 
enhanced reporting capacity in public radio or television. It will surely 
be assisted by the large number of political observatories that we can 
think of as institutions of adjunct journalism. (Schudson, 2010, p. 7) 
 
In Schudson’s projection, and Keane’s monitory democracy, it is possible to see 
a more carefully formed, precise, and qualified relationship between journalism 
and politics. But in spite of changing relationships between democratic 
mechanisms and journalistic practices, politics does not recede entirely. Indeed, 
as I have argued, the politics of journalism continues to be of utmost 
importance.  
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